

Racial and Ethnic Diversity: A Sociological
Introduction



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Chapter 1: Introducing Diversity

UNIT I: INTRODUCING DIVERSITY



The image above represents global **diversity**.^[1] Pictured are various world regions with varying cultures and languages. The map highlights relationships among societies, inviting comparison and contrast of different nations and peoples.

What is diversity and why is it worth studying? How is it possible to examine just one form of identity (like race), when in our experience we have many social identities? How can we challenge injustice against particular racial or ethnic groups, while also treating all people with respect? In studying diversity, what insights can we gain about ourselves and our communities? How can we develop diversity competence—knowledge and skills enabling people of different social identities to interact with each other in mutually beneficial ways?

Chapter 1 Learning Objectives

1.1 Why Study Diversity?

- Explain why it is worthwhile to study diversity
- Identify ways diversity learning is applied in the real world

1.2 Overview of Diversity Concepts

- Understand the definition of diversity as both a fact and a value
- Explain key concepts central to diversity learning

1.3 A Sociological Approach to Diversity

- Explain what sociological theories are, and how they are used
- Differentiate among four major sociological theories: conflict theory, structural functionalism, symbolic interactionism, and feminism

1.4 A Comparative Approach to Diversity

- Understand the importance of a comparative (international, global) perspective in diversity learning

Chapter 1 Key Terms (in order of appearance in chapter)

diversity: (1) as a fact: the observation that people and groups have varying characteristics; (2) as a value: respect for people who differ from oneself

multiculturalism: the fact (or value) that American democracy is (or should be) culturally pluralistic, rather than culturally homogeneous

diversity competence: knowledge and skills enabling people of different social identities to interact with each other in mutually beneficial ways

intersectionality: people of crosscutting social identities often experience the world in different ways

sociology: the social science that studies the organization of society's structures and processes

paradigm: a broad scientific worldview or perspective. For

example, symbolic interactionism is a sociological paradigm, generating many testable theories.

feminism: the view that traditional male control of women should change, giving women more power over their own lives

sexual orientation: the direction of sexual attraction: to opposite sex, to same sex, to all sexes, to no sexes

cisgender: your body parts are the same as your gender identity. (The Latin prefix “cis-” means “on this side.”)

transgender: your body parts differ from your gender identity. (The Latin prefix “trans-” means “across,” “on other side.”)

LGBTIQ: lesbian, gay, bisexual (sexual attraction to both females and males), transgender, intersex (having both female and male genitalia or sex organs), queer (an umbrella word for non-heterosexual, non-cisgender). It's not always easy to interpret one's sexuality or sexual experiences, and Q can also mean “questioning” (unsure of one's sexual or gender identity).

American globalism: Since 1945, the U.S. has been the predominant military, economic, cultural, and ideological power in the world, with global commitments, relationships, and interests

mestizo: combined non-European and European ancestry, especially in Latin America

indigenous: referring to non-European, American first nations (e.g., Native American or Indian nations such as Cherokee or Sioux)

1.1 Why Study Diversity?

*“America the beautiful,
Who are you beautiful for?”*

This poetry was written by an anonymous student in one of the racially segregated and impoverished American public high schools visited during 1988-1990 by writer Jonathan Kozol (1991:112).^[2] The student is asking the overall question this textbook seeks to address: What is the relationship between inequalities of social power and racial-ethnic diversity?

In the twenty-first century, America is a country of enormous social diversity (APAN:II:886). In addition to this sheer demographic fact (see Table 1.1 below), diversity is also a social value that more and more Americans say is important. Virtually all Americans say (on scientific surveys) that they believe in the importance of social values like democracy, efficiency, fairness, equality, and prosperity (Wright & Rogers 2011). In recent decades, an increasing number have included diversity in this list (Chun & Feagin 2020).

Diversity is an ordinary English word meaning variety or difference. It began to take on its current political meaning (respect for people different from oneself) during the 1970s. Social heterogeneity refers to all dimensions of social identity: race-ethnicity, gender and sexuality, socioeconomic class, ability, age, etc. The 1960s-70s were decades of international social movements advocating racial justice and marginalized identity empowerment. Also, in 1965 the U.S. Immigration Act—which ended racist national origins quotas restricting non-European immigration—began a new era of mass immigration, especially from Latin America and Asia, that continues today.

The roots of **multiculturalism**—viewing U.S. society as democratic but also culturally heterogeneous or plural—in turn, date to the 1920s (Klinkner & Smith 1999:121). In that intensely anti-immigration and white-supremacist era, public intellectuals and political activists W. E. B. Du Bois, Jane Addams, and John Dewey advocated anti-nativist and antiracist values of internationalism and cross-racial cooperation. According to Dewey, democracy—whether in the U.S. or abroad—should “develop the capacities of human individuals without respect to race, sex, class or economic status” (quoted in *ibid*:123). Advocates of multiculturalism in the 1920s and diversity in the 1970s faced massive political opposition and controversy. Intolerance of social difference has been a core feature of most human societies throughout history; American society has frequently displayed such intolerance in its colonial era and national era.[3]

Today, Americans continue to live in the post-1960s watershed

of social change. Multiculturalism and diversity have deeply challenged older social values regarding race, gender, sexuality, social class, ability, and more (Tracy 1994). The result has been dramatic changes in all areas of society: family, sexuality, work and economy, education, law and politics, religion and morality, healthcare, culture and media, military, etc. Although social change has been accompanied by significant continuities with pre-1960s society (see Chapter 11), it's undeniable that American society today is very different from one hundred years ago. To understand our world in the twenty-first century, we need to understand diversity.

Studying diversity is especially valuable if you live in a region where America's extraordinary degree of multiculturalism may not be immediately visible. For example, in central Ohio **many students live in rural areas and smaller towns whose racial composition, for decades, has greatly contrasted with the nation overall.** Examples are Marion and Morrow counties, with populations respectively 90% and 97.5% non-Hispanic white (Ohio Development Services Agency 2018a, 2018b). Although these numbers were comparable to the 1950 national figure of 88% non-Hispanic white, since the 1970s they have become increasingly unrepresentative of the nation. By 2010, about three-fifths (60%) of Americans were non-Hispanic white (APAN:II:763)—still by far the largest racial-ethnic group, but much less so than in 1950. And according to many demographic projections, Americans of solely European ancestry will dip below 50% in coming years, making the country “majority minority.”

Table 1.1. Year by group percentage of U.S. population

Year	Non-Hispanic white	Hispanic or Latina/o	African American	Asian and Pacific Islander	Two or more races	Arab American	American Indian
1950	88	2	10	< 1	N/A	N/A	< 1
2010	60.3	16.4	12.2	5.0	2.9	0.5	0.7
2060 projected	37	30.6	14.7	8.5	5.9	1.8	1.5

Sources: Adapted from APAN:II:887-88; Schaefer 2015:4

Other reasons why diversity may not be apparent to students include transportation. For instance, poorer rural Ohioans may have had little opportunity to travel to large cities such as their state capital, Columbus, a car trip of less than one to three hours. Moreover, there may be few Hispanic, black, or Asian students, staff, or faculty at their high schools or two-year colleges. These Ohio patterns are characteristic of the Midwest in general, as well as other U.S. regions. It follows that engagement with diversity is a critical need with high stakes for students, if they are to succeed in developing broad economic, political, and social connections with their home states, as well as accurate, factual understandings of contemporary U.S. society and its extensive links to the world. **Diversity competence** provides foundations for strengthening your critical awareness of America's changing racial-ethnic demographics, introducing you to America's variety of multicultural identities, and boosting your skills at social and political criticism of existing society.

This textbook introduces you to major topics in the study of diversity of race and ethnicity, one of the most important categories of group identity. Although the overall focus is the present-day United States, we'll take many sustained looks at history and international context. This is crucial because it is impossible to understand today's world without understanding the past, as well as other countries. As historian David Blight noted in 1990, modern controversies over multiculturalism and diversity have important historical roots (Blight 2002:224). In the late twentieth century, multiculturalism was new as a widely accepted value among Americans (APAN:II:851). However, **the descriptive fact of multiple American cultures is old** (Gómez 2018:1). Colonial and early national America comprised a variety of intersecting cultures (e.g., language, religion, race-ethnicity, immigrant status). Many of today's controversies and conflicts over diversity took their first forms during the colonial era. Accordingly, we will explore key and

consequential aspects of American history, to develop a clearer orientation for navigating the present.

1.2 Overview of Diversity Concepts

Below are five foundational concepts in the study of diversity. Later chapters will build on our initial understanding of (1) diversity as both a fact and a value, (2) human unity, (3) intersectionality, (4) freedom of speech, and (5) double standards.

(1) Diversity is both a fact and a value. **Diversity has two sides: descriptive and normative.** First, it is a factual description about heterogeneity or variation in social groups. For instance, it is a demographic fact about the U.S. that it is currently among the most multicultural of all nations. Diversity of many cultures is a factual observation about American social reality, based on social scientific data by social survey (e.g., U.S. Census). Although no scientific practice is entirely value-free, scholars and scientists have important means for controlling the bias of everyday social values. Historical and sociological description strive to be relatively objective by evaluating multiple viewpoints in a balanced, evidence-based, and critical way. Such evaluation is informed by considerable historical and sociological study and learning, which may contrast with students' assumptions or current level of knowledge.

Second, diversity is a value.^[4] As noted, on scientific surveys virtually all Americans say they believe in social and political values such as democracy, equality, fairness, prosperity, and efficiency. In recent decades, increasing numbers of Americans have also valued **diversity: unwavering respect for people of different characteristics.** Such characteristics include age, social class, color, culture, (dis)ability, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, immigration status, race, religion, and sexual orientation.^[5] Respect presupposes, at minimum, toleration of people different from oneself; such tolerance in the U.S. is supported by the federal Constitution (1787) and its separation of church and state. However, we've seen that diversity as a social value in itself is much more

recent, dating to the 1970s. Diversity education since then has developed **diversity competence: knowledge and skills enabling people of varying social identities to interact with each other in mutually beneficial ways**. Because the nation is so multicultural, such competence plays a key role in American citizenship today.

The dual nature of diversity as fact and value informs this entire textbook. On the one hand, you will learn many descriptive facts about varieties of racial-ethnic experience, both today and in the past. On the other hand, the textbook actively promotes the view that diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) are socially positive and valuable: that their acceptance and promotion contribute to other social, political, and economic goods such as democracy, equality, fairness, prosperity, and efficiency.

(2) Human unity. Race and ethnicity have no important biological foundation; there are no “sub-species” of the human species (*Homo sapiens*). Despite appearances of variety, humanity is biologically uniform. Natural and social scientists (e.g., biologists, anthropologists) established consensus on this issue in the decades following World War II. If any further evidence were needed, human genome sequencing since 2001 has shown that “race” has no significant basis in genetics, and from a biological standpoint is an illusion (Gómez & López 2013:x).

The story of human evolutionary origins is fascinating. Today’s scientific consensus is that many human-like (hominid) species evolved and went extinct, in non-linear ways, between some 3 million to 40,000 years ago. These species were, like us, members of the genus *Homo* (Latin for “man”); we are the only surviving example of this genus. Our species, modern humans (*Homo sapiens*), first appeared in East Africa about 250,000 years ago. There were several migrations out of Africa, and all non-Africans today are likely descended from a single migration group of perhaps 100 individuals leaving Africa about 80,000 years ago. The physical “racial” differences we see today (skin color, hair type and color, eyelid type, eye color, etc.) may have originated in different groups of

Homo sapiens living in greatly varying climates (e.g., amount of sun exposure) for tens of thousands of years. Beneath these surface contrasts, we are all biologically Africans (Gould 1996). Though biologically meaningless, the concept of “race” continues to be a significant marker of *social* identity, community, and inequality. Accordingly, this sociology textbook refers to “race” without scare quotes: **race has social meanings that remain real and consequential in the twenty-first century.**

(3) Intersectionality. We all have many social identities. For instance, some of us are male, white, heterosexual, married, middle-class, middle-aged, US citizen, native-English speaker, etc. Although we are also unique individuals, our social identities strongly shape our experience, thoughts, and actions. For example: although Tanya and Lisa are both female, working class, mothers, twenty-somethings, the fact that Tanya grew up black and Lisa grew up white is important. There are some things about Tanya’s life experience that Lisa has a hard time understanding because she grew up white, and vice versa.




Figure 1.1. A Venn diagram can help to visualize intersectionality.[\[6\]](#)

(4) Freedom of speech and “political correctness.” Many diversity students worry that they will encounter limits to their verbal expressions and opinions. I encourage you, both in class and the real world, to express yourself directly and authentically. Remember, however, that diversity is fundamentally about respect. For instance, there’s a difference between respectful group names and racial slurs with long histories of dehumanization, violence, and abuse. **Our actions (including talk) affect other people.** It’s a bad idea to yell “Fire!” in a crowded room when there’s no fire, because that action is likely to hurt people. Similarly, it’s a bad idea to use slurs.

An example of how words can promote social inclusion is changes to traditional sexist language. Speech is sexist when it assumes a male perspective and excludes women. Grammar is not rooted in

the nature of the world; society is capable of changing talk to pursue political goals such as inclusion of marginalized groups. Today we are used to sentences like “Each employee may bring their lunch”; or “Each employee may bring her lunch.” These grammatically correct sentences can refer to both women and men. They de-center the traditional assumed male perspective. However, in the 1980s (when I was in elementary school) teachers would only accept as correct “Each employee may bring his lunch.” Grammar has changed since the mid-twentieth century, reflecting the political impetus of feminism (see below).^[7] At the time, many people felt angry and confused by this “politically correct,” gender inclusive way of speaking. Today, we are used to it. Just because something is traditional or old, doesn’t make it right (fair, just).

(5) Double standards. A behavioral standard might apply uniformly to all, or selectively depending on one’s social category. If Mike and Linda are judged differently for similar behavior, and if the reason is that Mike is male and Linda is female, that’s a gender double standard. Double standards are forms of social inequality. Often, traditional double standards were (and are) sexual: boys and men were often not criticized or punished for pre- or non-marital sex (fornication, adultery), whereas girls and women were. In general, this was/is a double standard regarding morality: males could get away with breaking the rules for proper behavior, whereas females couldn’t. For instance, men could get drunk and rowdy, but women couldn’t. Or men could use swear (cuss) words, but women couldn’t. Gender double standards have long been a major part of patriarchal cultures around the world—for instance, in both North America and Latin America (Freedman 2007; for Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, see Lavrin 2005).



Figure 12. [8] Islam is the world's second largest religion. Its 1.8 billion members comprise 24.1% of the world's population. [9] In the 1800s-1900s, Catholic Americans were widely feared and perceived as "un-American." Today, this religious bias reappears against Muslim Americans (Klinkner & Smith 1999:306).

1.3 A Sociological Approach to Diversity

This textbook takes a *sociological* perspective on diversity. Sociology is one of the social and behavioral sciences, like economics, psychology, anthropology, political science, and linguistics. **Sociologists study the organization of social structures, processes, and relationships.** They study the social world, whereas natural scientists (e.g., chemistry, biology, physics, geology, botany) study the natural world.

Sociology is a powerful tool for understanding diversity, but it may also seem disorienting and disconcerting. Like all education, it may lead us to question aspects of the conventional wisdom around us (Mills 1959). Sociologists study many topics of great social importance; relevant to diversity, these include race and ethnicity, discrimination and racism, race relations, immigration, mass incarceration, politics, social power, etc. They're *social researchers*: they use scientific methods to produce quantitative or qualitative evidence supporting or failing to support theories about society (Patton 2002). Sociologists study topics from a particular scientific perspective on the social world. The four most important sociological theories, or perspectives, for understanding racial and ethnic diversity are discussed below: (1) conflict theory, (2) structural functionalism, (3) symbolic interactionism, and (4) feminism.

But first, just what is a sociological theory? We need to distinguish between “paradigms” (aka “grand theories”) and “testable theories” (aka “middle-range theories”). Conflict theory, functionalism, symbolic interactionism, and feminism are **paradigms: scientific worldviews or perspectives on the world** (Kuhn 1962). Although this concept has many shades of meaning, for our purposes paradigms are not themselves testable or falsifiable. Sociologists work within a particular paradigm. Viewing society with that lens has consequences: some aspects of society loom large in one paradigm, but their importance shrinks in another. Sociologists formulate testable theories based on a paradigm’s foundational observations. For example, feminism suggests that men dominate women. This

general proposition can lead us to more specific, and empirically testable, hypotheses: for instance, “women do more unpaid household labor than men”; or “women are paid less than men for the same amount of work”; or “as a female-dominated job type includes more men, pay and prestige will increase.” Sociologists then choose the best research method to gather evidence to test the hypothesis. Repeated testing will tend to support the hypothesis or fail to support it—leading to advances in knowledge about society.

(1) Conflict theory. The most influential sociologists taking this overall perspective were Karl Marx (1818-1883), Max Weber (1864-1920), W. E. B. Du Bois (1868-1963), and Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002). According to them, society is like a battlefield. Different social groups compete for power, resources, prestige, and control.




Figure 1.3. Marx, Weber, Du Bois, Bourdieu[10]

Often two particular groups are described as being in conflict with each other, with one exercising domination over the other (wealthy/poor; men/women; whites/people of color; etc.). Sociologists subscribing to this perspective usually start from Marx's insights about economy and society (Tucker 1978). Marx, the most influential nineteenth-century communist (aka scientific socialist) intellectual, saw society as a setting of socio-economic classes in conflict. For instance, some people in Marx's time owned significant property (like a textile mill), whereas others owned practically nothing except their sheer bodily capacity to work (aka labor power). Conflict theorists see the self-interest of each of these

two classes of people as opposed (zero sum)—what’s good for management is bad for labor, and vice versa.

Few people today think that Marx was entirely correct in his social theory. However, virtually all people who study society regard Marx as one of the most insightful and important nineteenth-century sociologists.^[11] He opened up new ways of understanding society that today’s social scientists and historians (of all political stripes) use all the time and take for granted. For example, how might the social group of males be analogous to wealthy people with many resources (capital)? How might the social group of females be like laborers with few resources? How are male and female adult identities outcomes of a long process of “production” starting in infancy?

(2) Structural functionalism. Three of the most influential structural functionalists were Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), Talcott Parsons (1902-1979), and Robert K. Merton (1910-2003).





Figure 1.4. Durkheim, Parsons, Merton^[12]

To functionalists, society is like the human body. Different social institutions or spheres (economy, law, politics, education, housing, medicine, etc.) each contributes to the well-being of society as a whole. The body's overall health and well-being is based on the harmonious collaboration of different systems (nervous system,

circulatory system, muscular system, etc.) and organs (heart, brain, stomach, etc.).

Durkheim was the single most influential functionalist sociologist. In his view, the different social institutions all work together for the well-being of society as a whole. What's good for one area (say, the economy) is good for the other areas (say, education). Likewise, different social groups share common interests. For instance, functionalists argue that public policy benefiting the middle class also benefits poor people, and vice versa. Policies that benefit white people also benefit black people. In this perspective, internal conflict is bad for the health of the human body, and likewise bad for social health. The 1960s saw many sociologists beginning to question the continuing usefulness of Durkheim's emphasis on social cohesion rather than conflict. However, more recent work has highlighted ways that Durkheim remains relevant or was misunderstood (Emirbayer 2003; Rawls 2005).

(3) Symbolic interactionism. Three thinkers who deeply influenced the symbolic interactionist (SI) tradition were George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), Harold Garfinkel (1917-2011), and Erving Goffman (1922-1982). These sociologists observe that society is based on many individuals interacting with each other (Mead 1934).






Figure 1.5. Mead, Garfinkel, Goffman^[13]

People are constantly talking with each other, acting in reference to other people. People use symbols such as language in their interactions, and thereby make the world seem familiar, recognizable, and ordinary. This theoretical perspective highlights the ordinary social interactions that we engage in every day: talking with your mom about how someone's joke at school made you feel, small talk about the weather with your co-worker at the grocery store, texting your best friend about a movie, etc. These interactions depend on symbols (especially spoken and written language, and gestures), and our ability to use symbols with ease, without even having to think about our ordinary ability to speak words or type

texts. Symbolic interactionists argue that it's essential to study ordinary social interactions, in order to explain how society works. For example, to better understand how society marginalizes transgender people, sociologists might interview transgender people and cisgender people, identifying shared and contrasting themes from their experiences and views about gender identity.

(4) Feminism. Three feminist thinkers who have strongly influenced sociology are Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986), Dorothy E. Smith (1926-), and Patricia Hill Collins (1948-).





Figure 1.6. De Beauvoir, Smith, Collins^[14]

The domination of men over women is a powerful historical force that continues today around the world (J. Collins 2003; Freedman 2007; Smith 1990). It's important to understand how masculine domination works, in order to reduce or eliminate it. Feminism is a global social movement, starting in the 1800s in Britain and the U.S., demanding changes to traditional social roles of women (Regazzoni 2012). Feminists don't agree on everything; there has been much controversy about what should change. Consequently, **there are many different varieties of feminism: some are “conservative”; others are “liberal.” But all agree that traditional male control of women should change, giving women more power over their own lives.** If you think that women should be able to vote and hold elected office, work for pay outside the home, or refuse sex on demand from their husbands—then you are a feminist of some type. Each of these items encountered massive resistance (especially

from men, but also from many women), requiring generations of intense political activism since the 1840s to achieve in the U.S.

Basically, feminism seeks to understand and overcome one of humanity's oldest ideas: that men and women have different essential natures, with male nature superior to female. According to Aristotle (384-322 BCE)[\[15\]](#) for instance, man's essence is active, commanding, brave, and intelligent, whereas woman's essence is passive, obeying, cowardly, and emotional. **For most of human history, to be fully human meant being male. By contrast, women had two options: saint or slut.** Pretty much the only culturally approved role for an adult woman was being a mother or nun ("saint"). If women didn't follow the rules, they were accused of immorality ("slut").

The history of feminism has featured three (or perhaps four) eras or "waves." (It's not yet clear if the "fourth wave" is different from the "third wave.") Notice that the gender revolution started only 200 years ago, with many changes happening since 1960. This is a blip in time compared to most of human history.

Table 1.2. History of feminism

<i>Name</i>	<i>Era</i>	<i>Description</i>
First-wave feminism	1800s-early 1900s	Concentrated on changes to law: property rights, voting rights, etc. A social movement that started in Britain and US, then spread globally.
Second-wave	1960s-1980s	Demanded greater equality with men in all areas of society (work, family, sexuality, education, etc.). Started in US, then spread globally.
Third-wave	1990s-2010s	Continuation of second-wave, but more emphasis on individualism and diversity. More recognition of intersection of gender with social class and race (see “Intersectionality” above).
Fourth-wave?	2010s-present	Renewed interest in feminism, recognizing that important past goals have not been met (female political representation, sexual harassment, violence against women). Social media is important resource and topic for fourth-wave feminists.

Source: Freedman 2007

Sexual Orientation; Non-Binary Gender Identities. An important area studied by feminist sociologists is sexuality. In turn, a major dimension of sexuality is **sexual orientation**. Although most people are heterosexual (sexual attraction to opposite sex), it’s clear that homosexuality (sexual attraction to same sex) is fairly common in most societies. It’s also clear that nature and nurture interact to produce our sexual orientation: we’re born straight or gay, but we interpret this sexual attraction in terms of what we experience growing up. Some of history’s greatest achievers were lesbian, gay, or bisexual: for example, Oscar Wilde (British playwright), Marcel Proust (French novelist), Alan Turing (British founder of computer science), Sally Ride (American astronaut).

Sociological gender is not simply binary (female or male). For

instance, most people with female sex organs experience themselves (identify) as “female” (**cisgender**). But in recent decades many people with non-binary gender identity have demanded freedom from abuse, shaming, and force-fitting into female/male categories. For instance, people with male sex organs who experience themselves as female are **transgender**. Sexual orientation and non-binary gender are important parts of the spectrum of human sexual identities. The formerly marginalized identities are summarized with the acronym **LGBTIQ** (aka LGBT+). The letters stand for lesbian, gay, bisexual (sexual attraction to both females and males), transgender, intersex (having both female and male genitalia or sex organs), queer (an umbrella word for non-heterosexual, non-cisgender). It’s not always easy to interpret one’s sexuality or sexual experiences, and Q can also mean “questioning” (unsure of one’s sexual or gender identity).

Like gender, neither is biological sex simply binary (female or male). Although most humans are chromosomally male (XY) or female (XX), some people are born with an “extra” X or Y chromosome (Klinefelter Syndrome, XYY Syndrome). This is a biological fact. Whether we interpret this fact negatively (as a “disease” or “syndrome”) or positively (as “diversity”) is a cultural choice.

1.4 A Comparative Approach to Diversity

Like the sociological approach, the *comparative* perspective—which contextualizes U.S. diversity processes and topics in international comparisons and contrasts (Fredrickson 1981:xiii)—is a core feature of this textbook. Since 1945, the U.S. has been the predominant military, economic, cultural, and ideological power in the world, with global commitments, relationships, and interests (see Chapter 13). **American globalism** has played a key role in post-WWII U.S. diversity processes like the black civil rights movement and immigration (APAN:II; Klinkner & Smith 1999). To adequately understand diversity—like many other dimensions of

American society during and after the Cold War—we need to see the international context (Cristancho et al. 2008).

In the twenty-first century, demographic changes since the 1970s have badly dated older discussions of racial-ethnic diversity, especially those focusing on “white-black” contrasts while ignoring other groups (Gómez 2018:157). As sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2018) observes, “the United States is slowly moving toward a triracial or ‘plural’ order similar to that found in many Latin American and Caribbean countries” (16). This plural order especially involves **mestizo** (mixed non-European and European ancestry) and **indigenous** (Native American)—as well as black and white—racial identities. Likewise, Asian-origin populations have grown since 1965. Diversity students need information on these international processes, given the ongoing demographic changes forming the future (mid-twenty-first century) America in which today’s high school and traditional college-aged students will live most of their lives.

In recent years, comparative perspectives have become even more necessary as many Americans have embraced a strident, aggressive U.S. nationalism and (white) Americanism, often based in ignorance both of nonwhite American cultures and other nations and cultures (Feagin 2020:272). Socially powerful groups usually have significant blind spots in relation to less powerful ones, and the relationship of the U.S. to Latin America is no exception (Delgado & Stefancic 1998; Feagin & Cobas 2014). Many North Americans have little awareness of this world region beyond stereotypes, even though it continues to powerfully impact our national experience and politics (Davis & Moore 2014; Hernández 2010). In particular, **Latin America has much to teach the U.S. about multiracial democracy** (cf. Feagin 2020:Ch.9; Telles 2004). By the early twenty-first century in many Latin American nations, African or Native American ancestry remained a social obstacle; many continuities with the explicitly racist past were evident (Chasteen 2001:314). However, although multiracial societies like Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Argentina, and Cuba have not transcended racism, their embrace of

indigenous American and African identities has often gone further than in the United States (ibid:217).

This textbook offers a wide vista of international facts and perspectives, helping you see beyond narrow categories of nation, race, language, citizenship status, and religion, toward broader understanding of human unity. Essentially, the book performs two, complementary tasks: (1) *teaching the U.S. context* (the contemporary relevance of diversity events and processes in U.S. history); and (2) *teaching the comparative perspective* (comparison and contrast of U.S. experience with other societies). It does so in one possible way, by highlighting North America's many historical, economic, political, and social relationships with Latin America and the Caribbean.

Ultimately, this book's goal is to empower you: to build your knowledge about today's America, to familiarize you with racial-ethnic difference, and to offer tools for engaging more effectively in community life and global society.

Chapter 1 Summary

Chapter 1 began Unit I (Introducing Diversity) with general discussion of racial and ethnic diversity. Section 1.1 explained why studying diversity is worthwhile, briefly discussing the history of this kind of education. This topic has benefits, in particular, for rural and smaller-town students in developing broader connections with their home regions and states. Table 1.1 (racial-ethnic group percentages of the U.S. population) helped to make this point.

Section 1.2 presented five concepts basic to diversity learning. Especially important here was the definition of diversity as both a fact and a value. Although the textbook's main focus is racial-ethnic diversity, gender and sexuality themes relevant to diversity were also introduced here.

Section 1.3 explained what a *sociological* approach to diversity learning means. Four major sociological theories are conflict theory,

structural functionalism, symbolic interactionism, and feminism. Table 1.2 introduced the four eras or waves of feminism's history.

Section 1.4 introduced the textbook's *comparative* approach to diversity. It explained the value of understanding U.S. diversity in international perspective, especially through comparisons and contrasts with Latin America.

[1] Image: Creative Commons license

[2] CREDIT LINE: Excerpt(s) from SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS by Jonathan Kozol, copyright © 1991 by Jonathan Kozol. Used by permission of Crown Books, an imprint of Random House, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

[3] "National era": post-1776, after the U.S. declared itself an independent nation.

[4] By "value," I mean treatment of some existing or possible practices, beliefs, or states of affairs as better or more desirable than others.

[5] Source: Marion Technical College Welcoming Committee Description, 6/23/16.

[6] Image: Creative Commons license

[7] Another example is the gender-neutral "mail carrier" replacing "mailman."

[8] Images: Creative Commons license

[9] Source: Wikipedia, "Islam." Accessed 2/5/21.

[10] Images: Public domain, Creative Commons license

[11] Though Marx described himself as a political economist rather than sociologist.

[12] Images: Public domain

[13] Images: Public domain

[14] Images: Public domain, Creative Commons license

[15] “BCE” (before the Common Era) means “BC” (before Christ). Likewise, “CE” (Common Era) means “AD” (anno Domini = in the year of the Lord).

Chapter 2: Social Criticism



Frederick Douglass (1818-1895), a powerful critic of American

slavery and white supremacy, was one of the greatest African American leaders of the nineteenth century.^[1] Born enslaved in Maryland, his mother was a black slave. His father, a white man, was probably her owner (Douglass 2017:2-3). After escaping to Massachusetts, the fugitive (whose freedom was later purchased by anti-slavery friends) soon became a famous abolitionist orator and author.

The image above illustrates American social criticism, motivated by the need to overcome complacency about significant contradictions or gaps between national ideals and realities. What is social criticism's important role in promoting democracy in open societies, as opposed to closed, authoritarian societies? Why does such criticism nevertheless often encounter strong opposition? How can empirical, social scientific research complement and support social criticism? What is the role of criticism in learning about racial and ethnic diversity?

Chapter 2 Learning Objectives

2.1 Reflexivity

- Define and describe reflexivity
- Explain the relationship between reflexivity and social criticism

2.2 Social Criticism in Open Societies

- Describe the role of social criticism in holding society accountable to its claimed values
- Explain how the U.S. currently falls short on international measures of democracy
- Define ideology

2.3 Repression and Social Criticism in Action

- Define McCarthyism

- Understand Frederick Douglass' use of social criticism in the service of democratic values

2.4 “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?”: Discussion of Douglass' Speech

- Demonstrate awareness of connections between Douglass' nineteenth-century abolitionist career and social criticism today

Chapter 2 Key Terms (in order of appearance in chapter)

Frederick Douglass: (1818-1895), abolitionist critic of American slavery and one of the greatest African American leaders of the nineteenth century. His 1852 abolitionist speech “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?” has great relevance to social criticism today.

reflexivity: self-awareness of how our social identities influence our everyday experiences

American Dream: an ideology stating that the U.S. offers economic, political, educational, and cultural opportunities accessible to most citizens and immigrants

full democracies: “nations where civil liberties and fundamental political freedoms are not only respected but also reinforced by a political culture conducive to the thriving of democratic principles”

flawed democracies: “nations where elections are fair and free and basic civil liberties are honored but may have issues (e.g., media freedom infringement and minor suppression of political opposition and critics)”

ideology: the political worldview of a social group—whether a nation, a social movement, a political party, a religion, or a socio-economic class

McCarthyism: extreme anticommunism in the early Cold War. Wisconsin senator Joseph McCarthy led highly publicized “witch

hunts” of alleged Communists in American government and industry.

2.1 Reflexivity

Our social identities matter for how we experience society and formulate (or don't) criticisms of it. For example, the fact that Frederick Douglass was born and grew up as an African American slave in 1820s-30s Maryland thoroughly shaped his views on controversial political topics of his day such as slavery and abolitionism. By contrast, his white owners were masters, not slaves: this fact of social identity likewise deeply shaped their political views.

Who we are influences what we experience (and don't experience). Accordingly, most sociologists argue that—rather than conceal these inevitable personal influences on their scientific observations—they should acknowledge them. Sociologists develop their reflexive self-awareness about how their personal experiences and views may influence or bias their observations of society. Also, it often makes sense for sociologists to communicate to their audiences something of this self-awareness. Scientists have sophisticated techniques for limiting sources of potential bias in data—and thus social scientific observations typically differ from commonsense observations. Nevertheless, it isn't possible for human beings, even scientists, to attain a purely objective “view from nowhere” (Rorty 1979).

For example, paleontologist and biologist Stephen Jay Gould (1996) noted that objectivity is best defined as fair, balanced treatment of evidence and data, rather than absence of preference. Scientists inevitably have preferences about various theories, and must understand such biases in order to treat evidence fairly (36). Indeed, despite their crucially important role in human knowledge, natural science and mathematics are grounded in social values. These include objectivity, intellectual/logical consistency, reason over appeal to authority, the search for truth as worthwhile, publicly

verifiable evidence over intuition, knowledge over contentment not to know, etc. Scientists' work practices show how much they care about these ideals, with good science approximating them more closely than bad science. Such values—not held by all social groups—help make science what it is as a distinctive social activity.

Beyond this overall agreement about reflexivity, however, sociologists have many different ideas about the social background of science. Reflexivity is a complicated subject, with many implications and facets. Pierre Bourdieu, one of the most important conflict-theory sociologists of the past fifty years (see Chapter 1), offered an influential definition of reflexivity as the inclusion of a theory of intellectual practice within sociological theory (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:36). That is, theories of society must include self-awareness of how they are created, applied, and tested.

Similarly, for our purposes we can define **reflexivity as: self-awareness of how our social identities influence how we experience everyday life**. It is consciousness of the relationship between one's social identities and one's perceptions and actions. Reflexivity is an especially important habit for students and teachers of diversity. Indeed, a major goal of this textbook is to develop your awareness of how your social identities—your gender and sexuality, socioeconomic class, race and ethnicity, nationality, citizenship status, age, religion, etc.—influence your ideas and feelings about diversity. Sociology offers many insights into the relationship between one's personal experiences or troubles, on the one hand, and public issues, on the other (Mills 1959).

For these reasons, as the textbook's author, I want to share with you a bit about myself, to offer further insight into why I think diversity education is important and how my life circumstances have shaped this view. My name is Matt Hollander. I'm a middle-aged, non-Hispanic white man from the Midwest. I've taught many diversity and sociology courses at Marion Technical College in Ohio (as full-time faculty) and at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (as a graduate student). I moved to Ohio with my wife from Wisconsin in 2019 to start teaching sociology at MTC. Before that, I finished

my Ph.D. in sociology in 2017 at UW, and then worked as a post-doctoral researcher in the UW Department of Emergency Medicine, where I contributed to several research projects on community paramedicine and dementia caregiving.

At UW, I taught many undergraduate sociology classes, including sociological theory, statistics, criminology, and introduction to sociology. I also got married in 2017. (I guess that was a big year for me!) My wife—who has two master’s degrees (Spanish and Portuguese; Latin American and Caribbean Studies)—hails from Sonora, the Mexican state just south of Arizona. I have a strong interest in Mexican history and culture, working hard in recent years on my Spanish. I also enjoy playing jazz guitar (big fan of jazz), an art form rooted in African American culture.

As you can imagine, key features of my social identity (e.g., being male, cisgender, non-Hispanic white, Midwestern, middle class, heterosexual, married to a Mexican immigrant) have shaped in many ways my life experience, and what I’ve *not* experienced. My multifaceted identity has colored my outlook on the world, and certainly on racial-ethnic diversity. What role has your own identity played in your life, and how you think and feel about diversity and other political issues?

2.2 Social Criticism in Open Societies

There are many admirable features of the United States and its republican, democratic, open social institutions: work and economy, politics and governance, education, culture, civil and criminal law, etc. Why else would immigrants today continue, as in the past, to be willing to endure sacrifices (sometimes even risking their lives) to come here? The U.S. features economic, political, educational, and cultural opportunities that amount to an **American Dream** that many people in many countries wish for.

However, American society has embodied this ideal to different degrees at various points in its history. Democracy has been stronger or weaker in different eras of U.S. history. One example is

Reconstruction (1865-1877) and the Gilded Age (1877-1900). Though eras of mass immigration, they also featured rampant corruption in politics and business, which often included members of Congress and at times reached into the White House. Democratic ideals were often hard to find in the U.S. of the late 1800s, and something similar could be said about the nation in the early 2000s.

Today, the search for democratic opportunities might more accurately be termed the “Norwegian Dream” or the “Canadian Dream” than the “American Dream.” Currently, the most respected **non-partisan measures of democracy rank the U.S. as #25 in the world** (see below). Among the overall categories (“full democracy,” “flawed democracy,” “hybrid regime,” and “authoritarian government”), **the U.S. is currently a “flawed democracy.”** By contrast, comparable developed countries like Canada (#5), Australia (#9), and the United Kingdom (#16), are all “full democracies”:

“**Full democracies [like Canada #5]** are nations where civil liberties and fundamental political freedoms are not only respected but also reinforced by a political culture conducive to the thriving of democratic principles. These nations have a valid system of governmental checks and balances, an independent judiciary whose decisions are enforced, governments that function adequately, and diverse and independent media. These nations have only limited problems in democratic functioning...

“By contrast, **flawed democracies [like the U.S. #25]** are nations where elections are fair and free and basic civil liberties are honoured but may have issues (e.g. media freedom infringement and minor suppression of political opposition and critics). These nations have significant faults in other democratic aspects, including underdeveloped political culture, low levels of participation in politics, and issues in the functioning of governance.”[\[2\]](#)

It would seem that Americans today have much to learn about democratic and republican governance, especially from the highest-ranking countries like Norway (#1) and New Zealand (#4), but also from Latin American countries like Uruguay (#15), Chile (#17), and Costa Rica (#18).

The mixture of truth and myth in the American Dream is an example of **ideology**. This term refers to the political worldview of a social group—whether a nation, social movement, political party, religion, or socio-economic class. Historian Thomas Holt (1992) defines ideology as “a particular systematic conjuncture of ideas, assumptions, and sentiments...” (25). Ideologies are abstract and often inspiring worldviews, reflective of individuals’ material self-interest as well as non-material ideals and values (Whimster 2007). Like any other political community (polity), the U.S. has always promoted certain ideologies about itself, and favored or opposed those of other polities relevant to itself. It is a basic historical and sociological observation that all nations (e.g., China, the United States, Norway) and all political parties (e.g., Republicans, Democrats, Greens) have ideologies. However, for members of those nations or parties, it may be difficult to understand how “their” worldview could be anything but the Truth, especially when contact with other perspectives is limited.

In addition to the American Dream, characteristic of U.S. domestic policy, a longstanding ideology of U.S. foreign policy asserts that the nation has usually been a force for good in the world, a “beacon of freedom.” This worldview, with roots in the colonial period, is called **American Exceptionalism** (Madsen 1998). A comparative, international perspective would observe that—although American power and example have often supported liberty abroad—it is also true that America has frequently sought to repress freedom in other nations. Supporting this point is the long history of U.S. interventionism in sovereign Latin American nations (see Chapter 12).

Political (dis)satisfaction is one factor social scientists use to measure a nation’s strength of democracy. Growing political

frustration is characteristic of weakening democracy. According to many scientific surveys, Americans have become increasingly dissatisfied with various aspects of government, a trend starting in the later 1960s in the context of the black-led Civil Rights movement and the Vietnam War. Following the 1960s-1970s, the U.S. political center began shifting to the right during the Reagan-Bush administrations (1980-1992), with Democratic presidents Clinton and Obama staking out centrist rather than traditionally leftist economic and social positions (APAN:II:Ch.29; Carter 1995; Klinkner & Smith 1999:Ch.9). Intense popular dissatisfaction with political process and performance has accompanied the political polarization between the new right and new left. Such dissatisfaction exemplifies important social criticisms voiced across the political spectrum. Today, Americans of all political stripes offer criticisms of how values and ideals are (or are not) reflected in society and government—especially at the federal level (executive, legislative, and judicial branches) but also at state and local levels.

Likewise, in this textbook you will encounter evidence-based criticism of the United States, as we discuss diversity. **Criticism of particular policies and views is distinct from underlying commitment to the nation.** The most useful criticism not only identifies social problems and injustices, but also proposes detailed actions for fixing or reforming them. There are important reasons for this kind of national self-reflection; perhaps the biggest is the urgent need to strengthen American democracy. Regarding diversity, there are many ways the nation today fails to live up to its values of equality and fairness.

History shows many eras of reform of American institutions. For instance, slavery was a popular, venerated, and widely defended American institution. It took a small group of patriotic citizens (abolitionists like Douglass) to condemn it as violating national and human values. Likewise, the Progressive Era (1900-1920) featured much social criticism in the name of justice and progress. We can all agree that some positions taken by public officials representing the American people were wrong in the historical past. Likewise,

today the U.S. may in some aspects of its domestic and foreign policies be in the wrong. Today, there is much need for reform, with many Americans strongly dissatisfied with politics and governance, criminal justice and policing, environmental inaction, educational mediocrity, etc. We must squarely admit to our social problems if we are to improve our nation's ability to solve them. This is the time-honored and democratic role of social criticism in our republic.

In sum, social criticism plays a role of overriding importance in open societies. Democracy requires citizens' ability to take a critical view of the gap between values (ideals) and social reality, the difference between words and actions. If we believe in such values, it is not somehow "unpatriotic" to criticize America for failing to live up to them.



Figure 2.1.^[3] *Dissent and controversy are essential features of open societies with modern forms of government. Like many countries today (such as Bangladesh in the photo), the U.S. is officially a republic*

(sovereignty inheres in the people). This is identical to saying the U.S. is a democracy (the people rule).

2.3 Repression and Social Criticism in Action

Despite the importance of dissent, all democracies have experienced repression and conformity. A major example of twentieth-century repression (**McCarthyism**) appears below. Then we discuss an example of nineteenth-century dissent—Douglass' attack on slavery.

The first example is extreme anticommunism during the 1950s. Fears during the early Cold War (1945-1991) led to political conformity and repression of dissent. Important civil liberties were stifled in the supposed interest of national security (APAN:II:753, 772). Extreme anticommunism in the early Cold War (aka McCarthyism) found champions in Wisconsin senator Joseph McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) (ibid:755). In hindsight, many Americans and foreign observers have seen McCarthyism as harmful to basic values of open, democratic societies.

The second example—here of social criticism and dissent—is Frederick Douglass' 1852 speech “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?” The context of Douglass' early career (1840s-50s) was strict intolerance in the South of abolitionist or any other criticism of slavery. This trend of increasing southern hostility to public debate and restriction of abolitionist views in print dated to the aftermath of the 1820 Missouri Compromise and the 1822 Denmark Vesey conspiracy in Charleston, South Carolina (Levine 2005:166). Likewise, the North experienced a good deal of suppression of slavery criticism (ibid:167-68; Klinkner & Smith 1999:39-40).

Douglass delivered “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?” to a white, abolitionist audience in Rochester, New York on Independence Day, 1852. It has been described as among the greatest works of American literature on the meaning of freedom in a republic (Douglass 2017:174). Many readers have concluded it

was indeed vital for Douglass' searing accusation of America to be heard, and that attempts to suppress it in the name of patriotism or economic interest were wrong.

“What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?”^[4]

“This...is the 4th of July. It is the birthday of **your** National Independence, and of **your** political freedom...**Fellow-citizens, I** shall not presume to dwell at length on the associations that cluster about this day. The simple story of it is that, 76 years ago [1776], the people of this country were British subjects. The style and title of your ‘sovereign people’ (in which you now glory) was not then born. You were under the British Crown...

“But, your fathers, who had not adopted the fashionable idea of this day, of the infallibility of government, and the absolute character of its acts, presumed to differ from the home government in respect to the wisdom and the justice of some of those burdens and restraints. They went so far in their excitement as to pronounce the measures of government unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive, and altogether such as ought not to be quietly submitted to...To say now that America was right, and England wrong, is exceedingly easy...It is fashionable to do so; but there was a time when to pronounce against England, and in favor of the cause of the colonies, tried men’s souls. They who did so were accounted in their day, plotters of mischief, agitators and rebels, dangerous men. To side with the right, against the wrong, with the weak against the strong, and with the oppressed against the oppressor! here lies the merit, and the one which, of all others, seems unfashionable in our day. The cause of liberty may be stabbed by the men who glory in the deeds of your fathers...

“Fellow-citizens, pardon me, allow me to ask, why am I called upon to speak here to-day? What have I, or those I represent [African Americans, enslaved or free], to do with your national independence? Are the great principles of political freedom and of natural justice, embodied in that Declaration of Independence, extended to us? and am I, therefore, called upon to bring our humble offering to the national altar, and to confess the benefits and express devout

gratitude for the blessings resulting from your independence to us? Would to God, both for your sakes and ours, that an affirmative answer could be truthfully returned to these questions!...I say it with a sad sense of the **disparity** between us. **I am not included** within the pale [bounds, fence] of this glorious anniversary! Your high independence only reveals the immeasurable distance between us. The blessings in which you, this day, rejoice, are not enjoyed in common. The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and independence, bequeathed by your fathers, is shared by you, not by me. The sunlight that brought life and healing to you, has brought stripes [whippings, lashes] and death to me. This Fourth [of] July is yours, not mine...

“...My subject, then fellow-citizens, is AMERICAN SLAVERY. I shall see, this day [July 4th], and its popular characteristics, **from the slave’s point of view**. Standing, there, identified with the American bondman [slave], making his wrongs mine, I do not hesitate to declare, with all my soul, that the character and conduct of this nation never looked blacker [more evil] to me than on this 4th of July! Whether we turn to the declarations of the past, or to the professions of the present, the conduct of the nation seems equally hideous and revolting. America is false to the past, false to the present, and solemnly binds herself to be false to the future. Standing with God and the crushed and bleeding slave on this occasion, I will, in the name of humanity which is outraged, in the name of liberty which is fettered, in the name of the constitution and the Bible, which are disregarded and trampled upon, dare to call in question and to denounce, with all the emphasis I can command, everything that serves to perpetuate slavery—the great sin and shame of America!...

“Allow me to say, in conclusion, notwithstanding the dark picture I have this day presented of the state of the nation, I do not despair of this country. There are forces in operation, which must inevitably work the downfall of slavery...I, therefore, leave off where I began, with **hope...**”

2.4 “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?”: Discussion of Douglass’ Speech

Douglass’ nineteenth-century polemic against racialized slavery dealt with an institution that no longer exists in America. Yet it’s important to understand crucial connections between his attack and social criticism today. Although U.S. chattel slavery is a thing of the past, racial injustice—albeit in less extreme forms—is not. Notice four features of Douglass’ speech:

(1) Douglass uses pronouns in important ways: for example, “you” (white, free) versus “me” (black, unfree). How does this pronoun usage relate to the speech’s title?

(2) Notice Douglass’ observations about exclusion and racial “disparity.” He, like other African Americans—enslaved or nominally free—is “not included” in the freedom celebrated by his white audience on Independence Day. Northern and Southern free blacks faced severe legal and extralegal limitations of their civil and political rights. How did antebellum U.S. society include some kinds of people (e.g., white men) and exclude other types (e.g., white women, people of color) from political and civil society?

(3) Douglass insists on discussing America “from the slave’s point of view.” How is this empathy and compassion analogous to seeing America in more recent times from the point of view of vulnerable and powerless people, members of marginalized social groups? How does this view from below—the perspective(s) of the conquered (León-Portilla 1972)—contribute to our understanding of American diversity? (Refer back to the Chapter 1 opening poem: “*America the beautiful, / Who are you beautiful for?*”)

(4) Finally, notice that Douglass, after attacking America in 1852, ends by affirming “hope”: that the situation, no matter how unjust, can yet be remedied and justice triumph. This feature, rooted in Douglass’ Christian faith, also characterized Martin Luther King Jr.’s 1950s-60s speeches (Morris 1986). What can we learn today from this affirmation of hope, about criticism proposing social change? How does Douglass illustrate the earlier points about social criticism in the service of national, and human, values?

Chapter 2 Summary

Chapter 2 introduced social criticism and its relationship to diversity learning. Section 2.1 discussed reflexivity, a concept referring to how our social identities influence our experiences. Our social criticism (or lack of it) will reflect our positions and identities in society.

Section 2.2 described the role of social criticism in holding society accountable to its claimed values. Social criticism refers to critical reflection on the gaps between a community's values and ideals, and its actual practices. It explained how the U.S. currently falls short in international, social scientific measures of democracy. Ideology was defined as the political worldview of a particular community, party, or nation. All communities and nations promote certain ideologies about themselves, including the U.S.

Section 2.3 presented two examples relevant to repression of dissent and social criticism. First, early 1950s McCarthyism exemplifies how extreme anticommunism threatened American democracy. Second, Frederick Douglass' 1800s abolitionism illustrates how social criticism can serve democracy and other political values such as fairness and equality.

Section 2.4 discusses Douglass' 1852 speech—"What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?"—suggesting its great relevance to social criticism today.

[1] Image: Public domain

[2] Source: Wikipedia, "Democracy index." 2020 rankings. Accessed 6/13/21.

[3] Image credit: Creative Commons license ("[Bangladeshi Spectrum workers protest deaths](#)") by [dblackadder](#) is licensed under [CC BY-SA 2.0](#))

[4] Source: https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/coretexts/_files/resources/texts/c/1852%20Douglass%20July%204.pdf

See also Douglass 2017:148-68.

Chapter 3: Why Talk About Race?



The image above illustrates the importance of discussing race.^[1] This includes talking about whiteness and about the experience of being white. For white people, it's easy to forget that “non-Hispanic white” is a racial category—in fact, the largest and most powerful American racial group of all.

As noted in Chapter 1, intersectionality means we all experience ourselves in terms of multiple social identities. Why is talking about contrasting lived experiences based on a particular type of identity—such as race—important? Why should we learn about the overlapping yet differing experiences of various American groups? Why are many white people reluctant, hesitant, and even fearful to talk about race or whiteness? What do such feelings reveal about the ongoing significance of race in American society?

Chapter 3 Learning Objectives

3.1 Race and Ethnicity

- Differentiate between race and ethnicity
- Understand how racial classification can differ between the U.S. and Latin America

3.2 The Sociology of Race

- Differentiate between individuals and groups
- Explain why natural and social scientists distinguish between individuals and groups
- Explain key concepts central to the sociology of race

3.3 The Politics of Hyphenated Identity

- Define identity politics

3.4 Self-Care: Studying Injustice

- Describe strong emotions experienced in studying diversity and learning about injustice
- Describe self-care strategies
- Define antisemitism

Chapter 3 Key Terms (in order of appearance in chapter)

race: human categorization by shared physical traits like skin color

ethnicity: human categorization by shared language, culture, and history

racial classification: a commonsense system for racializing individuals as members of various racial groups. Racial commonsense is formalized in official bureaucratic and demographic categories (e.g., U.S. Census). Racial commonsense works differently in the U.S. than in Latin American nations such as Brazil.

stereotype: a harmful generalization about individuals based on claimed group characteristics

republican: pertaining to a republic, a political community in which the people is sovereign

democratic: pertaining to a democracy, a political community in which the people is sovereign

identity politics: political conflict over public policy relevant to social identity (e.g., race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, citizenship, religion, age, etc.)

genocide: the attempted killing of an entire people (e.g., the Holocaust)

antisemitism: prejudice and violence against Jews

the African Diaspora: European dispersal to New World slavery of millions of Africans

the Destruction of the Indies: the catastrophic depopulation of the Americas' native peoples through conquest and disease, one of largest demographic declines in world history

self-care strategies: practical ways of managing strong emotions through self-awareness

3.1 Race and Ethnicity

We've seen that although race has no important biological meaning, its social meaning is both real and consequential (Telles 2004:21). Even though there are no biologically distinct "races," American society continues to treat race as an important marker of identity, community, and inequality. This importance (meaning, significance) is a purely social convention, not grounded in natural group differences. "Race" categorizes people by one set of physical features (skin color, hair type, eyelid shape) rather than another possible set (height, weight, head shape, eye color, ear size). As a phenomenon of the social world, not the natural world, **race is a social construction reflecting differences of power among social groups**. Racial categories and hierarchies are results (and causes) of political, legal, and other social processes. As politics and laws

change, such racial phenomena themselves can change (Gómez 2018:xiii). Chapter 7 explains social constructionism in more detail.

“Race” is an old word in English (and Spanish: “la raza”) that meant “type,” “breed,” or “family group.” The scientific consensus of biologists and anthropologists since the mid-twentieth century is that so-called “racial” groups display more *intra-group* genetic variation than *inter-group* variation (Graves 2013:40; see also Gould 1996; Kevles 1995). Biological science doesn’t support commonsensical notions of “race,” a fact that often confuses students of biology and medicine. For instance, many biomedical students assume that sickle cell anemia is a “black” (rather than “white” or “Asian”) disease. But the sickle cell anemia allele is not caused by race, but rather shows high frequency in malarial zones because it offers resistance to malaria. Populations in coastal Kenya, a place where malarial mosquitoes live, show higher frequency of the sickle cell allele than populations in high-altitude Kenya, where the mosquitoes are absent. Kenyans’ black “race” is the same in both regions (Graves 2013:43).

For centuries, white supremacists argued that some races (whites) are better than others in terms of criteria of human excellence: intelligence, morality, leadership, health, caring/empathy, courage, perseverance, strength/athleticism, creativity, etc. By contrast, by the mid-1900s evolutionary biologists were agreeing with anti-racists that **there is no biological foundation of “racial” differences in excellence within the human species.** The “black” and “white” groups vary more *within* themselves (for example, on intelligence) than they vary *between* each other. Likewise, the “Native American” (or “Asian” or “Hispanic”) group varies more *within* itself than it does with any of the other groups. Racial group differences—in wealth, education, crime, achievement—are outcomes of social and historical processes, not natural and biological ones.

Sociologists distinguish between “race” and “ethnicity.” **Race means sorting humans into categories based on physical traits**—whereas **ethnicity refers to differences of language,**

culture, and history.^[2] For instance, black Americans comprise a racial group—and this group, in turn, includes various ethnic groups such as African Americans, Afro-Caribbeans, immigrants from African countries, and Afro-Latinos (Gómez 2018:2). Likewise, white Americans are a racial group composed of various ethnic groups, including European Americans (non-Jewish Poles, Czechs, Italians, Germans, English, etc.), Jewish Americans, and Hispanic whites.

Racial classification in the U.S. and Latin America. **Racial classification** is a commonsense system of racialization that people use to categorize each other as members of various racial groups. Such classification often works differently in North America versus Latin America, a fact illustrating the social construction of race. Consider the following two examples: “Black” race and “Hispanic” ethnicity.

(1) Blackness. Racial classification as black can differ across world regions (as can white). For instance, blackness is understood differently in the U.S. than in Brazil. Someone seen as black in the U.S. may not be considered black in Brazil (Telles 2004:79). Racial mixing (interracial sex, mestizaje, **miscegenation**) **in Brazil has historically been perceived as “whitening” the nation, whereas in the U.S. it has been described as “blackening” or “browning” the nation.** Brazilians who understand themselves as white may have nonwhite ancestors. This can be difficult to understand for North Americans, who tend to assume that whiteness requires having virtually no nonwhite ancestry (ibid:91; cf. APAN:II:887).



Figure 3.1.^[3] *Can adding milk to coffee make it white? In Brazilian racial commonsense, adding more and more white ancestry over the generations to a black or brown family can make it white. In U.S. racial commonsense, a black or brown family can never become white, no matter how much white ancestry is added.*

(2) Hispanic. Another way racial classification differs between North America and Latin America is the U.S. “Hispanic” ethnic category. This term was introduced by Congress in 1976, forming a single demographic category for a population with many differences of nationality, social class, race, legal status, and generation in the U.S. (Gómez & López 2013:xi). Although arguably useful and important for U.S. demographic, bureaucratic, and political purposes, the term is not used in Latin America and has little meaning outside of the U.S.

“Hispanic” is usually thought of as an ethnic rather than racial category, since it primarily refers to shared culture and language rather than to physical traits. However, although the distinction between race and ethnicity is important, it can also be conceptually murky and politically contested. For example, legal historian Laura Gómez argues that Mexican Americans should be seen as a distinct

race of long standing in American society, rather than a newly arrived ethnicity (Gómez 2018:17; cf. Telles & Ortiz 2008:12).

In these ways, the U.S. categories “Hispanic” and “Asian” resemble each other. Both comprise many nationalities and ethnicities, speaking many languages (Loveman 2014). In Latin America, these languages include Spanish, Portuguese, and Caribbean Creoles (Chamoiseau 1999). Moreover, millions of Latin Americans speak only or mainly indigenous languages (Warman 2003). Similarly, Asian Americans often have family backgrounds from East Asia: China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Laos, etc. However, Asia is the world’s largest continent. Which census box would you tick if your family came from India (South Asia), a country culturally and demographically very different from East Asia? How about Iraq or Israel, both located in southwest Asia?

Further insight into the Hispanic ethnic category can come from learning about Latin American societies. For example, Mexico’s population is mostly comprised of the following “racial” groups:

- (1) mestizo (mixed indigenous and European ancestry, sometimes including African or Asian ancestry);
- (2) white (European ancestry);
- (3) indigenous (Native American ancestry);
- (4) Asian (especially Chinese ancestry).

Since the 1920s, Mexican politics has voiced the self-understandings and political ideologies of mestizos in particular, by far the largest Mexican racial group (Guzmán 1928; Preston & Dillon 2004; Vasconcelos 1925). Nevertheless, whites (*blancos*) and lighter-skinned mestizos have continued to hold social, political, and economic power greatly disproportionate to their population numbers (Velázquez 2010).

3.2 The Sociology of Race

Below, we first look at the relationship between individuals and groups. Second, we explore major concepts in the sociology of race.

Scientists basically study either nature or society. Natural scientists—chemists, geologists, botanists, physicists, biologists—study processes and phenomena in the natural (material) world. Social scientists—sociologists, economists, political scientists, anthropologists, linguists—study processes and phenomena in the social world.

(1) Natural science. The ocean is real. You can touch the ocean with your finger, and you can measure its salinity with a chemical instrument. Likewise, the Earth's electromagnetic field is real. We can't see it, but physicists measure its properties with the right kind of instrument.

(2) Social science. Greetings (people saying hi) are real. You can hear people greeting you. Conversation analysts study their properties by making video-recordings of people talking. Likewise, democracy in Ohio is real. We can't see it. It's a social institution embodied in what Ohioans do and believe. Political scientists measure its strength with instruments such as voting surveys.

Statistics is an important language of science. In both natural and social science, mathematical statistics and probability allow us to draw conclusions about the world, findings that support or fail to support aspects of scientific theories. Unlike mathematics theorems, scientific theories are never "proved" once and for all (Hacking 1983). What's important is that scientific consensus is reached about the theory that best explains relevant facts, evidence, and observations—not that every last shred of doubt is eliminated about the theory. Extremely robust evidence exists for theories such as the Earth revolving around the Sun, biological evolution from simpler life forms, and the expanding universe: hence, scientific consensus. Consensus means that everyday scientific research and theorizing builds on the relevant claim (e.g., "the universe is expanding"), not that every single scientist agrees (there are always skeptics).

Accordingly, **science distinguishes between groups and individuals**. There are always outliers (like scientists who deny climate change); we need to focus on the overall pattern. For example, poverty is a crucial social problem, and there are more white Americans who are poor than poor African Americans, in absolute numbers. However, the big picture is that the proportion of poor whites to whites overall is much smaller than poor blacks to blacks overall. In recent decades, African Americans have been much more likely to be poor than have European Americans. By the early 1990s, nearly 50% of black children were living in poverty (APAN:II:852). According to the 2010 U.S. Census, 25.7% of African Americans and 25.4% of Hispanic Americans lived below the federal poverty line, in contrast to under 10% of European (white) Americans.^[4] That is, one of every four blacks was poor, as compared to one in ten whites. These statistics all indicate that, overall, the white group is far wealthier than the black group. A social media post that simply contrasts an individual poor white family with an individual middle-class black family is misleading: it conceals the overall racialized pattern of poverty.

What's true of groups is not necessarily true of the member individuals (Pettigrew 1980). Facts about rural, white Ohio women's average number of years (or level) of formal education may or may not be true of any particular woman in this group. That number (one person's education) may be an outlier from the distribution of group educations. The number may be much lower or higher than the group mean (average). We can't draw inferences (logical conclusions) about the group, if all we know is information about that individual. In science, that sort of reasoning would be fallacious (logically invalid); in everyday life, it would be a **stereotype** (a pernicious simplification of group characteristics).

All of us are unique individuals. **Diversity learning involves keeping a dual focus: both on individual uniqueness and on facts about the social groups of which we are members**. Despite the fact that many white *individuals* are disprivileged by socio-economic class, gender, and/or education, it's also a fact that whites as a

racial *group* have always been advantaged as compared to other racial groups. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 1, people belong to many social categories (e.g., race, class, gender); the same person may be advantaged with respect to members of some groups and disadvantaged in comparison to people in other groups (Wingfield 2013:21). Such advantage or privilege tends to increase with higher class position, meaning that middle- to upper-class whites tend to continue to occupy the most advantageous social positions in U.S. society (Klinkner & Smith 1999:8).

The sociology of race. Having seen the importance of the individual-group distinction, we turn to major concepts in the sociology of race. The scientific study of race is based on the following four conclusions, derived from many empirical observations. Later chapters, by adding historical and present-day detail, will build our understanding of (1) race as biological illusion and sociological reality, (2) racial privilege, (3) varying racial-ethnic terminology, and (4) universality of culture.

(1) Race is a biological illusion, yet socially real. As noted earlier, the bodily “racial” differences we see around us are illusions from a biological standpoint. However, sociologically speaking, race is quite real and important. This is because race, like gender and social class, continues in the twenty-first century to be one of the major ways in which social power is distributed. It’s impossible to understand American society (or any other society) without grasping this fundamental point: power is distributed unequally in society. The unequal access to power is social inequality (Wright & Rogers 2011).

The social reality of race is the *relationship among more versus less powerful racialized groups* (Garcia 2013:79). The very meaning of race words—like “black,” “brown,” or “white”—depends on their relationship to other race words. “White” means not black or brown (Desmond & Emirbayer 2010). In this sense, there would be no white people if there were no black or brown people (and vice versa).

(2) Racial privilege. Given the history of European global colonization (see Chapter 4), the type of racial advantage that

sociologists continue to observe in many world regions is **white privilege** (see Chapter 7). This is generally the case, for example, in both North America and Latin America. As we've seen, "**privilege**" means **structural advantage of one social group over others** (Bonilla-Silva 1997, 2018). White privilege involves the internalization by whites during primary socialization (childhood) of racial identity schemas: cognitive frameworks for interpreting race (Helms & Mereish 2013:157). Whereas whiteness is often invisible to white people themselves, it tends to be obvious to nonwhites, having important consequences for nonwhites in many social situations in everyday life (see Chapter 10).

(3) Variation in racial and ethnic terminology. We saw earlier that racial and ethnic categories vary across time and place (Telles 2004:21-23). Terms that make sense in the U.S. don't necessarily make sense elsewhere. Likewise, offensive terms in the U.S. aren't necessarily offensive elsewhere. This textbook tends to use current U.S. census categories such as Non-Hispanic White, Hispanic or Latina/o, African American or Black, Asian American, Native American, Pacific Islander, etc.

(4) Universality of culture. Though varying greatly in time and place, **all human groups have culture** (are enculturated). Although culture can be defined in many ways, perhaps the broadest definition is a group's way of doing things. Such "things" range from ordinary activities such as eating (e.g., using chopsticks or a fork) and talking (e.g., speaking Hindi or English), to special activities such as religious ceremonies (e.g., praying to Allah or to God) and national celebrations (e.g., celebrating the Fourth of July—U.S. Independence Day—or the Sixteenth of September—Mexico Independence Day).

However, racial-ethnic culture may be difficult for group members to see and recognize, due to unfamiliarity with other ways of doing things. This is characteristic of some socially powerful groups such as American non-Hispanic whites, who often describe themselves as lacking a culture. Part of being powerful is the luxury of seeing everything around you as "normal." **Like fish unaware of the water in which they swim, whites are often unaware of white**

culture and how it may differ from nonwhite ways of doing things (Brown et al. 2003). Studying diversity can help you (no matter what your race-ethnicity) develop reflexive self-awareness, enabling you to appreciate how culture shapes your identity, actions, and relationships.

3.3 The Politics of Hyphenated Identity

Diversity has much to do with politics and history. Today, we are familiar with America's current two-party system of Democrats and Republicans. We know that modern parties organize partisan sentiment against a background of commitment to the nation. Americans with relatively "conservative" ideas and sympathies tend to support the Republican Party; those with relatively "liberal" views tend to support the Democratic Party. Despite such differences, partisans on either side tend to see their primary allegiance or sympathy to the nation, as coming before party loyalty.

To understand later chapters' historical discussion, it's important to know that political parties had different names and stood for different issues in the past. In the first generation after American Independence (1783), there was widespread suspicion about political parties ("factions") as being harmful to national unity. President Washington did not belong to or campaign for any political party. However, factionalism developed early, first around Congressional debates over the Constitution (1787-89) between Federalists and Antifederalists (APAN:I:184-85). Second, intense disagreements among President Washington's advisors led to political groupings calling themselves Federalists (led by Hamilton) versus Republicans (led by Jefferson and Madison). This was the first U.S. party system (ibid:191). Starting with Jefferson's presidency (1800-1808), the Republicans (aka Democratic-Republicans) long dominated U.S. politics.

By the 1830s-40s and starting with Jackson's presidency (1830-38), a second party system had emerged: Democrats (e.g., Jackson) versus Whigs (e.g., Harrison). The later 1840s and 1850s featured the increasing inability of Democrats and Whigs to compromise, and

the increasing geographic sectionalism of politics (North, South, West). Absent compromise, the era saw the emergence of third parties like the Free-Soil Party (1848). Likewise, the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854) was the catalyst for the rapid rise of the Republican Party, which featured a coalition of former Whigs, Free-Soilers, as well as the nativist Know Nothing Party (see Chapter 6). Ever since the Civil War (1861-65), a number of third parties have come and gone but the two-party system of “Republicans” and “Democrats” has endured. The names have stayed the same, but the issues and principles these parties have stood for have changed greatly with the changing times. Important eras of change in the two parties’ ideologies and political coalitions were post-Reconstruction (post-1877), the New Deal (1932-1941), and the Civil Rights era (1954-1968).

The word “**republican**” literally refers to features of a republic (literally “res publica”: “the people’s thing”), a political community in which the people is sovereign. The word “**democratic**” refers to democracy (literally “rule by the people”), a form of government in which, again, the people is sovereign. Although there are some historical differences,^[5] in U.S. history these words are synonyms. Because of the strong political overtones of these words today, the textbook alternates between describing the U.S. system of government as “democratic” or “republican.” It’s important to remember that, despite intense partisanship today, most Americans, whether Republican or Democrat, describe themselves as fundamentally committed to basic American values and principles: the rule of law, democracy, equality, fairness, prosperity, and efficiency (Wright & Rogers 2011; see Chapter 1). Likewise, many other countries are democratic republics and claim the same values.

Identity politics. In recent decades, controversy over multiculturalism and diversity has often taken the form of **identity politics**. This term means struggle for control over public policy relevant to personal identity (race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, citizenship, religion, age, etc.). Today we are familiar with

hyphenated self-descriptions such as Chinese American or Nigerian American. (Contemporary practice often omits the hyphen formerly used in such compound identities: e.g., “Chinese-American”).

American identity politics is not new but rather originated in colonial times. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an era of mass immigration from southern and eastern Europe, the use of hyphens—“Irish-American,” “Polish-American,” “Negro-American”—in racial-ethnic identity words became especially prominent and politicized (Du Bois 1903; Riis 1890). The political implications of hyphenated identity challenged the “melting pot” metaphor prominent at the time, which stressed immigrant European and Native American absorption into a homogeneous “American-ness.” The melting-pot emphasized undifferentiated unity, conceiving diversity as necessarily politically divisive. By contrast, hyphenation insisted on American identity in terms of a “mosaic” metaphor, in which national identity consists of complementary, distinctive, and irreducible racial-ethnic identities. Since the 1960s-70s, hyphenated identity based on mosaic (or salad bowl) metaphors has increasingly become the way Americans understand national identity (Gates & McKay 1997). In recent decades, even whites are increasingly likely to describe their identity in hyphenated terms, as European American (Gest 2016).

Oponents of hyphenated identity, past and present, have promoted undifferentiated Americanization. They’ve tended to oppose diversity as a social value, as defended in this textbook (see Chapter 1). For instance, during a 1919 speaking tour Democratic president Woodrow Wilson (1912-20) reacted to heckling by Irish Americans and German Americans in the audience: “Any man who carries a hyphen about him carries a dagger which he is ready to plunge into the vitals of the Republic” (quoted in APAN:II:613). Lashing out in anticommunist Red Scare terms, Wilson was attacking hyphenated identity as a feature of mass European immigration between 1880 and 1920. Immigrants often desired both to retain aspects of their “old country” culture, and to become genuine Americans, which resulted in hyphenated identities such

as German-American, Italian-American, or Hungarian-American (ibid:504). By contrast, Wilson insinuated that hyphenated identity was, by its very nature, subversive: treasonous and marked by dual loyalties.

Today, these old fears of Catholic, Slavic, or Jewish immigrant identity seem quaint. Yet the same type of fear and suspicion of “dual loyalties” remains, today attached to newer immigrant groups from the Islamic world and Latin America. Accordingly, it’s crucial to understand historical connections between newer immigrant identities—e.g., Muslim American—and older ones—e.g., Catholic American. There is nothing inherently “un-American” about being Catholic; and the same goes for being Muslim (see Figure 1.1). All too often, such fears are based in circumscribed experience—socially dominant group members lacking familiarity with a targeted group.

3.4 Self-Care: Studying Injustice

Many people prefer to avoid talking about past and present injustice. Wouldn’t things be better if we simply “let bygones be bygones” and forgot such history? Past or present, why talk about race?

There is a key saying about the Holocaust (aka the Shoah), in which Germany between 1933-1945 systematically murdered 6 million Jews across eastern, central, and western Europe: *Never forget*. Each new generation faces its own challenges and concerns. Yet it’s essential the world never cease to remember German **genocide** (attempted killing of an entire people) and the **antisemitism** (prejudice and violence against Jews) that caused it. A prominent theme of European Jewish history is centuries of Christian cruelty and exclusion, expressed in residential segregation (e.g., the Venetian Ghetto), mass deportations and expulsions (e.g., 1492 from Spain: Downey 2014), and recurrent massacres (pogroms) throughout the medieval and modern periods (Bauman 1989). This history culminated in the Holocaust: the industrial-style mass deportation, concentration, and murder of millions of European

Jews (Browning 1998; Crowe 2004; Snyder 2011; Wiesel 2006). Additional targeted groups were the Romani people, the mentally and physically disabled, political dissidents such as Communists, and others.

For my sociology Ph.D. dissertation, I read a lot about the Holocaust. In addition to being at times emotionally draining, a danger of this kind of study is that it can normalize injustice—making extreme antisemitism seem familiar, ordinary, and unremarkable—and even provoke sympathy for Nazi perpetrators (Hoess 1996). Holocaust scholars are always on guard against this tendency (Cesarani 2004). We can make a similar point about two older historical processes forming the background of U.S. diversity topics: (1) the **African Diaspora** (European dispersal to New World slavery of millions of Africans: Davis 2006) and (2) the **Destruction of the Indies**. This was the catastrophic depopulation of the Americas' native peoples through conquest and disease, one of largest demographic declines in world history, especially in the sixteenth century (Fuentes 1992:158–68; Las Casas 2005; Stannard 1992; Todorov 2009).

Like historians, diversity students and teachers need to be on guard against similar tendencies toward normalization. Regarding the African diaspora, there is nothing normal, routine, or unremarkable about the enslavement and dehumanization of 12.5 million women, men, and children trafficked to the New World during centuries of trans-Atlantic slave trading, the largest forced migration in world history (APAN:I:94). Simply by growing up in the U.S., a former slave society, we all—no matter what our racial-ethnic identity—absorb an antiblack “common sense” about race derived from white supremacy. This common sense is what race sociologist Joe Feagin (2020) terms the “white racial frame.” Although true for everyone, it is especially so for members of powerful social groups such as (1) non-Hispanic white, (2) heterosexual (3) men. (That's three groups.)



Figure 3.2.[6] *European antisemitism caused the Holocaust (1933-1945).*

In studying diversity, you may experience strong feelings. Some may be positive: inspiration, human connection (solidarity), self-understanding, commitment. Others may be negative: guilt, depression, fear, frustration, outrage. This subject makes demands on your sense of what ordinary life is like, what America is like, and what we are like as human beings. This may be so especially if you are white and have not previously thought much about race (DiAngelo 2018). Diversity learning involves sustained exposure to some of the most notorious cruelties and injustices of history and today's world, as well as some of their most noble and altruistic quests for justice.

Self-care strategies are practical ways of managing strong emotions through self-awareness. When feeling strongly, try taking a step back to observe the feeling. Ask yourself, "Why do I

feel this way? Is there anything to learn from this feeling? How can I relax, take a break, and return to this later?" Be kind to yourself. Talk to a family member or friend. Take a walk or do exercise. Do something you enjoy. It is totally normal to feel strongly about diversity, and there's nothing wrong with strong feelings. It's just that, when feelings start to overwhelm us, we need strategies for taking care of ourselves.

Colonization, slavery, indigenous depopulation, Holocaust—all this happened a long time ago. None of us were alive then. For some Americans today, our ancestors were dehumanized and brutalized by generations of enslavement. For other Americans, our ancestors directly organized, benefited from, or collaborated with slavery—as slave ship merchants or sailors, slave-pen guards or auctioneers, plantation owners or overseers or lawyers. For still other Americans, none of our ancestors were directly involved. In Germany today, what attitude should teens and younger adults take towards the Holocaust? Just as racial injustice lives on in America, so it does in Germany today, hitting old targets such as Jews and newer ones like Turkish immigrants.

How might we choose to take responsibility for how history impacts the future, by acting in the present (Harvey 2007:171; Klinkner & Smith 1999:9; Sartre 2001)? We weren't there in the past; but centuries of slavery left a legacy we've already inherited in our own minds and bodies, simply by growing up in a former slave society. We'd like to "end" or "solve" or "fix" this legacy once and for all; Europe would like to do the same for centuries of antisemitism. But, despite much important progress, these histories will never simply be resolved. They happened, and now form an ineradicable part of the human story. The tragic part of our story must never be forgotten. Each new generation, no matter of what racial identity, can take responsibility for learning from tragedy to address injustices today (Kozol 1991:179-180).

We can't change the past, but action in the present impacts the future. A first step towards action is educating yourself, which is what you're doing now.

Chapter 3 and Unit I Summary

Chapter 3 introduced the importance of discussing race. Section 3.1 defined race and ethnicity, distinguishing between these concepts. Racial classification can significantly differ across world regions such as North America and Latin America.

Section 3.2 discussed the sociology of race, an important area of sociological research. Like all scientists, race sociologists distinguish between individuals and groups. The section explained why both natural and social scientists make this distinction. It also explained key concepts in the sociology of race.

Section 3.3 introduced identity politics: struggles for control over public policy relevant to personal identity. The section also explained why, in U.S. history, “democracy” and “republic” are synonymous.

Section 3.4 presented self-care as self-awareness of one’s experience of strong emotions in studying diversity. Antisemitism and the Holocaust were used as examples of how studying injustice can arouse strong feelings, both positive and negative. Through concrete strategies, we can constructively channel our energies and keep from being overwhelmed.

Overall, Unit 1 introduced racial-ethnic diversity as a key topic of sociological research and discussion. Social criticism features importantly in such discussion, which requires talking about race and social injustice.

[1] Image credit: Creative Commons license ([“Let’s Talk About Race”](#) by [gdsteam](#) is licensed under [CC BY 2.0](#))

[2] Source: Wikipedia: “race,” “ethnicity.” Accessed 10/2/19. See also Garcia 2013:77-78.

[3] Image credit: Creative Commons license ([“Cafe au Lait”](#) by [insidious_plots](#) is licensed under [CC BY 2.0](#))

[4] Source: Equal Justice Initiative 2019 Calendar: “A History of Racial Injustice.” <https://eji.org/>

[5] E.g., ancient Athenian democracy was similar to, but also contrasted with, ancient Roman republicanism.

[6] Image credit: Creative Commons license (“[Holocaust Memorial Dedication](#)” by [CAHairyBear](#) is licensed under [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#))

Chapter 4: European Global Colonization, 1492-1945

UNIT II: WHITENESS AND POWER



This racial segregation sign from twentieth-century South Africa illustrates European world **hegemony** through **colonialism**.^[1] In English and Afrikaans, the smaller text reads: “THESE PUBLIC PREMISES AND THE AMENITIES THEREOF HAVE BEEN RESERVED FOR THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF WHITE PERSONS. By Order [of the] Provincial Secretary.” The sign illustrates how, for over 450 years,

western Eurasia dominated the globe, creating enduring legacies that continue to shape our societies, our mentalities, and our bodies today.

One such legacy was racial segregation, known in twentieth-century South Africa as **apartheid** (literally, “apartness” or “separation”). Racially separating people of mainly white European from mainly black African descent had roots in the colonial and slavery periods. However, strict enforcement of segregation became a large-scale social institution only after slavery’s **abolition**, which occurred in South Africa in 1838 (as Britain’s Cape Colony) and in America in 1863 (see Chapter 8). The U.S.—which originated as British colonies, whereas the Cape Colony was Dutch—ended legal apartheid gradually, between 1954 and 1968, especially under President Johnson. South Africa began a similar process under President de Klerk in 1990 (APAN:II:838), leading to the election of President Mandela in 1994, an anti-apartheid black revolutionary who famously described his nation’s transformation as “a small miracle” (ibid:858). Although post-emancipation official racism (of various forms) lasted longer in South Africa (152 years from 1838 to 1990) than in America (105 years from 1863 to 1968), both periods were excruciatingly long and damaging. The respective histories of the two systems are distinctive and complex (Fredrickson 1981; Marx 1997).

Post-apartheid America and South Africa have yet to fully overcome the profound consequences of centuries of colonialism, slavery, and legalized racial segregation (see Chapters 9–11). Following generations of enslavement, racism—enforced by custom, law, state violence, and extralegal white terrorism—victimized new generations of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Americans and South Africans. How did fifteenth-century European relations with Africans first create modern slavery? What explains Europe’s domination of so much of the world for so long? Why did European power diminish by 1945, leading to a wave of “Third World” decolonization: from the Caribbean, to Africa, the Middle East,

South and Southeast Asia, and the Pacific? What are the legacies of colonialism today?

Chapter 4 Learning Objectives

4.1 The Rise of the West

- Understand the rise of the West
- Describe the colonial binary system

4.2 Stages of European Colonization

- Describe four stages of European global colonization

4.3 Comparative Colonialism

- Explain the relationship between Eurocentrism and civilization
- Define mestizaje
- Name the basic feature of colonial education

4.4 Decolonization and the Third World

- Understand the time frame of decolonization in Africa and the Caribbean
- Name the principal European ex-colonial powers

Chapter 4 Key Terms (in order of appearance in chapter)

hegemony: political domination, mastery, leadership

colonialism: a nation's geographical expansion by planting colonies: settlements of the home country's people, achieved by conquering the people already there

apartheid: (literally, "apartness"). Racially segregating (especially in 1900s South Africa) people of white European from black African descent. By extension, any system of racial segregation.

abolition: emancipation: legally ending slavery and freeing slaves
creole: someone (usually white) born in the colony rather than in Europe, often treated as inferior by the European-born. George Washington was a Virginia creole.

ethnocentrism: treating one human group as the standard by which all other groups are measured

mestizaje: race mixture by interracial sex (“miscegenation”) between groups of mainly European versus mainly non-European ancestry

metropole: a European center of empire (literally, “mother city/country”). Britain was the metropole of colonial Massachusetts.

colonial education: teaching colonial children of color to see the metropole as their source of identity. Such education replaced native languages, religions, and values with those of the colonizers, claiming to offer children full membership in colonial society.

Indian boarding schools: North American colonial education. Reservation children were forcibly removed from their families’ indigenous values and cultures, to be indoctrinated in white language, religion, values, customs, manners, and dress.

polity: a political community (e.g., a national state like France, the U.S., or Mexico)

4.1 The Rise of the West

The historical backdrop of this entire textbook is 450 years of European global domination through colonies. Colonialism started in the 1400s and largely ended by the late 1900s, with many exceptions. For instance, whereas Martinique and French Guiana are today overseas departments of France, and Hawai’i and Alaska are U.S. states, Puerto Rico and American Samoa remain unincorporated U.S. territories (see Chapter 12). There are many legacies of European colonization: some are relatively good and others bad. Rather than thinking of this history as either all good or all bad, we should see it as a complex mixture of both. This period’s time frame and geographical scope are so huge that generalizations

are difficult. What's undeniable, however, is that for centuries Europeans colonized the world, reshaping it along the way in their own image.

Between 1492 (Columbus' first voyage) to 1945 (end of World War II), Europe came to dominate nearly every region of the non-European world. Some peoples were directly colonized through enslavement or white partnership with existing native elites; others were dominated less directly. Sociologists call this hegemony "**the rise of the West**" (Weber 1978; Whimster 2007). Today, we see vestiges of Western colonialism all around the world: Protestant Christianity in Nigeria, Catholic Christianity in Bolivia, capitalism in Japan, Arabic numerals (1, 2, 3, ...) in Australia, geography named for European royalty (Philippines) in the Pacific, French architecture in Vietnam, Old World animals (horses, sheep, goats) in the Western Hemisphere, trains in India, and much more.

Today we often refer to an entity called "the West." We use phrases such as "the Western world," "Western culture," "Western civilization," and "Western history." The title of a classic musicology textbook is "A History of Western Music" (Grout & Palisca 1996). But just what is the West? For thousands of years, distinctions between a Western and Eastern world have been made in terms of geography, culture, religion, and ethnicity (Moore 1989; Said 1979). Examples include Greece versus Persia; the Western versus Eastern Roman Empire; Christian Western Europe versus Islamic Ottoman Empire and North Africa; and capitalist, Christian United States and Western Europe versus communist, atheist Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China. Notions of West and East have changed meaning in many ways across time and place. The early modern (fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) West was a self-understanding deriving from both (1) Christian Europe's *local* struggles against Islamic Spain and Ottoman Turks; and (2) its *non-local* discovery (encounter) expeditions in Africa, Asia, the Americas, and the Pacific.

Given that the United States has traditionally imagined itself as a Western nation (Anderson 1983), **the notion of the West is crucial for understanding American racial and ethnic diversity.** Western

identity extends far beyond mere geographical regions (e.g., Western Europe, or the ancient Western Roman Empire, or Western Mediterranean) to include essential facets of group identity such as culture, politics, and religion. Accordingly, we can understand why some nations geographically distant from Europe—such as Canada, the U.S., or Australia—have long described themselves as “Western.” For example, Australia was colonized by Western Europeans (Britons), following Cook’s “discovery” (encounter) voyage of 1770. British race (white Anglo-Saxon), religion (Protestant Christianity), economy (mercantilist capitalism, then industrial capitalism), and politics (world empire) all strongly contrasted with Australian, Pacific, and Southeast Asian indigenous peoples. Thus, the notion of the West had as much to do with social institutions (especially race and religion) as with geography. Europeans saw basic values—goodness (virtue), beauty, truth—as inhering in themselves and being carried to distant peoples (Cabeza de Vaca 2007; Pané 2004; Todorov 1982).

Table 4.1. The colonial binary system

<i>Social institution</i>	<i>Imposed European institution</i>	<i>Subordinated non-European institution</i>
Politics	loyalty to a particular European empire	any other political loyalty
Religion	Christianity (Catholic or Protestant)	any non-Christian religion
Economy	mercantilist capitalism, then industrial capitalism	any alternative economic system
Race	white and whiteness	any nonwhite color
Language	Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, English, French, German, Italian	any non-European language

The modern West—founded in older West-East oppositions (e.g., Greece vs. Persia, Rome vs. Greece, Rome vs. Constantinople)—was a binary concept, at first (1400s) mainly opposing Islam. As Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Britain, and France encountered more and more of the world, an overall “civilized-barbarian” distinction crystalized, contrasting Europeans with everyone else. Non-Western peoples appeared as a world subject to colonization. By imposing European value systems, early colonization created or intensified fundamental binary oppositions between Europeans and the non-European world, privileging the former and devaluing the latter. **The “West” is a relational concept: defining the West simultaneously defined, by opposition and negation, the non-West.**

Today, despite many important breaks with the colonial past, this privileging of European-ness continues, albeit much less starkly.

For example, both scholarly and vernacular racial categories today contrast “whites” (people of mainly European descent) with “people of color” and “nonwhites” (everyone else). Such binary distinctions today remain deeply rooted in old colonial binary systems: white-nonwhite, English-non-English (language), Christian-non-Christian (Protestant-non-Protestant), capitalism-non-capitalism. Understanding such connections with the past offers many insights into contemporary American racial-ethnic diversity.

4.2 Stages of European Colonization

Prior to its rise in the fifteenth century, Western Europe for centuries was an economic and cultural backwater, as compared to the Islamic world and China. What explains the West’s ascent to global preeminence in the subsequent five centuries? Not the natural or inherent superiority of this part of humanity (Weber 1978)—although innate “white” supremacy is how Europeans long explained their dominance (Gould 1996). Rather, following conflict sociologist Max Weber (1905), sociologists have long argued that it was a complex array of interconnected historical developments: especially economic and religious factors, but also technological, military, political, and cultural ones. Table 4.2 shows four stages of European world colonization:

Table 4.2. Four stages of European colonization

Stage	Period	Description
1	1400s-1500s	Creation of overseas empires
2	1600s-1700s	Development of empires
3	1770s-1820s	Loss of empires, national independences
4	1800s-1990s	Second wave of empire-building, loss of em

(1) Creation of overseas empires. 1400s-1500s. Global expansion

via “discovery” expeditions: e.g., Vasco da Gama, Columbus (Colón 2000), Magellan, Cortés. Colonization of Latin America, Caribbean, Pacific. Colonization precedents within Europe included sugar plantations in the Mediterranean, Spanish conquest of the Canary Islands (Dunn 2000), and English warfare in Ireland (Ignatiev 2009). Portuguese and Spanish Catholic missions in overseas colonies created newly Catholic populations. Development of European enslavement of Africans and Native Americans in Caribbean and Latin America. Most new empires were European Christian, but exceptions included Ottoman Empire in Turkey, and Mughal Empire in India.

(2) Development of empires. 1600s-1700s. Wars among European powers continued, with some colonies changing hands (e.g., Canada from France to England). Further growth of Western Hemisphere slavery. New expeditions (Hudson, Cook, Bering) led to new colonies in Pacific (Australia, Indonesia) and Asia (India by Britain; Siberia and Alaska by Russia).

(3) Loss of empires, national independences. 1770s-1820s. The Atlantic revolutions created independent nations in which white **creoles** (in Spanish, “criollos”) ruled. A creole was a person (especially a white) born in the colony rather than in Europe, treated as inferior by the European-born. Prominent examples are George Washington (U.S.), Simón Bolívar (Gran Colombia in South America), Agustín Iturbide (México). Most such Creole patriots were white supremacists, both in Latin America and North America, seeing whites as the “natural” leaders of the newly independent nations (Chasteen 2001:105). Geographical expansion of new countries continued the white (European descendants), slave-based, empire-building pattern (Brazil, U.S., Mexico, etc.).

(4) Second wave of empire-building, loss of empires, national independences. 1800s-1990s. Many European colonies remained dependent colonies in the 1800s. Also, Europeans expanded their existing empires in a “scramble” to acquire new colonies: virtually all of Africa (e.g., French Algeria, 1850s), Southeast Asia (French Indochina), the Middle East (French Lebanon, Syria; British Egypt,

Trans-Jordan, Iraq). Japan, seeking to modernize by imitating Europe, likewise conquered colonies in Korea, China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific (Moore 1989). The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were decades of ascendant, not declining, racism (Ferrer 1999; Holt 1992). By the 1990s, most European colonies had achieved independence. But the previous centuries of European domination had transformed the world in fundamental and exceedingly complex ways.

4.3 Comparative Colonialism

Five overall themes of European global colonization are (1) Eurocentrism, (2) civilization, (3) settlement, (4) mestizaje, and (5) colonial education. Together, these concepts offer a comparative understanding across a variety of modern European empires, as well as similarities with U.S. practices.

(1) Eurocentrism. Five centuries of Western rule created Eurocentrism: a powerful and enduring form of **ethnocentrism** (seeing a particular human group as the standard by which all other groups are measured). For centuries, Europeans justified their power by claiming their own inherent superiority. They defined their own physical characteristics as the standard of human beauty (white skin and hair), their religion as the best (Christianity), their economic system as the best (mercantilist capitalism based on agricultural slavery, then industrial capitalism based on free labor). Anything not European was inferior: bad, ugly, and false. European values were the “norm” by which the world was measured and found wanting (Fanon 1952).

Eurocentric proto-capitalist agriculture created a binary relationship and opposition between a center or core—the European colonizer—and a periphery—the colony (Wallerstein 1974). Modern colonialism derived from ancient and medieval European history. Ancient Greek city-state metropoli (metropoles; “mother cities”) planted colonies on the shores of the Black, Aegean, and Mediterranean Seas (Moore 1989). The metropole was the

conceptual and often geographical center of the world, as the bellybutton (navel, ombligo) is the center of the body. In the Roman Empire, a “colonus” was a peasant (a “pagan”). Such peasants were natives of Roman provinces connected by extensive road networks, where “all roads led to Rome.” Colonialism in world history was not limited to Europe: for example, as in Greek and Roman societies, the Aztec (Velázquez 2010) and Incan (La Vega 2006) empires displayed distinctive versions of colonialism or hegemony in which they dominated neighboring groups.

(2) Civilization. A key concept for understanding Eurocentrism is civilization (“civilización” in Spanish). Derived from the Latin *civitas*, meaning political community (city-state, nation), it means advanced culture, refinement, or sophistication. In many ways, modern European empires measured themselves against the ancient Roman Empire, and, in turn, measured colonized peoples against themselves. Just as the Romans had conquered distant peoples with “strange” customs (such as the Celtic tribes of Britain, France, or Spain), so the Europeans conquered distant and strange peoples. The Romans saw themselves as the center of the world, the ideal of “civilization,” and claimed superiority over conquered “savages” and “barbarians” at the fringes of their world (Gibbon 1909). So too Europeans saw themselves as bearers of civilization with a need to impose it on the non-European, “uncivilized” world (Glissant 1990:13).

Using the modern notion of race, Europeans (1400s-1500s) equated civilization with whiteness, and savagery with non-whiteness. For instance, Afro-Barbadian novelist George Lamming (1953) has a school administrator describe the ideology of the British Empire’s “civilizing mission” (xviii) in the context of 1940s Barbados: “The British Empire...has always worked for the peace of the world. This was the job assigned it by God...” (38). The U.S., like many other former European colonies dominated by whites, inherited and developed this linkage between civilization and race: **to be civilized was to be white** (Ferrer 1999:190).

Moreover, “civilization” was a standard means of legitimating (rationalizing, justifying) imperial conquest in the conqueror’s self-interest. In addition to European empires, the expanding U.S. empire of the late nineteenth century furnishes examples (see Chapter 12). Consider Ohio-born President McKinley’s rationale for denying self-government to the newly won (in 1898) Spanish colony of the Philippines. He described American rule as “uplift[ing] and civiliz[ing]” Filipinos (APAN:II:579). Following a brutal war (1899-1902) in which the Americans defeated Philippine nationalists led by Emilio Aguinaldo, the U.S. ruled there until 1946. McKinley’s rhetoric—based on white supremacy—is the same as the U.S. had previously used for generations to legitimate conquest of Native Americans, and derives from European colonialism.

(3) Settlement. A central concept in the relationship between Europeans and the indigenous peoples they colonized worldwide is “**settlement**” (Sakai 2014). In the Americas, the image of European “pioneers” performing “settlement” has traditionally been the white commonsensical understanding of European activities starting with Columbus (Feagin 2020:39-40). Just as the English began settlement of Virginia at Roanoke and Jamestown, so Spain began settlement of New Spain (Mexico) at Veracruz, Mexico City (Tenochtitlan), and Puebla de Los Angeles (Rubial 2010; Velázquez 2010).

But what exactly is “settlement”? As with “civilization,” modern Europeans often saw themselves as the inheritors of the ancient Romans, expanding and conquering “uncivilized” peoples and “settling” their lands. Settlement, then, like civilizing, presumes the illegitimacy, in multiple senses, of aboriginal peoples. From archaeological and other research of recent decades, we now know important facts about non-literate, Iron Age, Celtic civilizations of Western Europe (in modern-day Spain, France, Britain) predating Roman conquest (c. 200 BCE-0 CE). First, they were largely settled (sedentary) farmers rather than nomads: agriculturists making extensive use of farmed fields and domesticated livestock, with towns as centers of political domination and trade. Second, they

themselves had a long history of immigration and conquest, processes dating back thousands of years and involving the carrying of agricultural (farming) techniques and technologies from the Near East and Anatolia to Europe, processes that involved large-scale clearing of forest and incorporation, displacement, or replacement of previous nomadic inhabitants (hunter-gatherers). **Seemingly neutral descriptions, then, of Roman conquerors “settling” and “civilizing” other societies (e.g., Celtic) is one way in which we today reproduce the original Roman political propaganda and ideology** of their superiority over these other societies.

As with the Western European Celts and Romans, indigenous Americans have a similar relationship with modern (1500s-1600s) European powers such as Spain, Portugal, France, England, and the Netherlands. The Americas in 1492 featured an enormous variety of societies, ranging from sedentary agricultural civilizations centered in cities, to semi-sedentary agricultural societies, to nomadic hunter-gatherer societies. Cities such as Tenochtitlan (the Aztec, or Mexica, Empire) and Cuzco (the Incan Empire) were world cities in 1492 in terms of population, social organization, division of labor, architecture, and engineering. Cities in the Western Hemisphere were not recent developments, but rather followed earlier urban sites in Central Mexico (e.g., Teotihuacan), Central America (e.g., Maya civilization's Tikal and Copan), and South America (e.g., Peruvian coastal cities). North America also contained urban sites. **As with the Romans, when we describe modern Europeans as “settling” and “civilizing” Native Americans, we uncritically reproduce the conqueror's own political ideology and propaganda** (Trouillot 1995).

There are two sides (at least) to every story. Given the longstanding privileging of European versions of events, it's necessary to highlight indigenous perspectives. Only then can we hope to attain less one-sided understandings of the origins of modern colonialism and slavery in the Western Hemisphere (La Vega 2006; León-Portilla 1972).

(4) Mestizaje. This Spanish word (“mess-tee-ZAH-hay”) means race mixture by interracial sex (aka miscegenation) between groups of mainly European versus mainly non-European descent (Telles 2004:4). Centuries of European colonialism created new “races” in many world regions. In Latin America, this racial group is called **mestizo** (“mixed”)—children or descendants of European fathers, and indigenous American or African mothers. Many of these sexual unions were what we’d understand today as sexual violence and rape: unwanted sex in which one partner is more powerful (Feinstein 2018; Telles 2004:25). Across Latin America and the Caribbean, mestizos often form the majority of national populations. Indeed, Mexican mestizos have long celebrated themselves as “la raza” (the Mexican people: see Vasconcelos 1966)—the largest Mexican racial-ethnic group as compared to indigenous peoples, whites, Asians, and blacks.

But in some regions, **mestizaje**, though prevalent, was demographically and politically minimized. Argentina and the U.S. are similar in this respect. As with the U.S. “Indian Wars” (1600s-1890), Argentina built its national sense of racial identity and geography through military expeditions that succeeded in controlling and often exterminating indigenous peoples in frontier areas. Thus, Argentine national identity was largely white, rather than mestizo, even before mass European immigration from 1870 to 1930 (Chasteen 2001:207-08; Lavrin 2005). Likewise, by 1900 relatively few non-Hispanic white Americans had significant indigenous native ancestry. **To be “white” in the U.S. has always meant to have almost no non-European ancestry.** As in Argentina, white Americans are not mestizos. Thus, a core part of (white) American and (white) Argentine national identity has been racial. As in many other countries, race and nation are linked in imagining who “we” are (Anderson 1983; Loveman 2014; Mallon 1995).



Figure 4.1.[2]
The Caribbean.

In the 1700s, Jamaica and Barbados were Britain's most valuable sugar islands, far more valuable than its North American colonies such as Virginia or Massachusetts (Dunn 2000). North American revolutionary Alexander Hamilton was Caribbean-born: on Nevis in 1755 (or 1757). Generations of enslaved Africans, Afro-Jamaicans, and Afro-Barbadians produced sugar for consumption across the global British Empire (Mintz 1986). Britain abolished slavery throughout its colonies (except India)

in 1834,
replacing it
with new
forms of
control over
“free”
colonial
subjects of
color (Holt
1992).
Jamaica
achieved
independenc
e in 1962,
Barbados in
1966.

(5) Colonial education. Given the identification of whiteness and civilization, a modern form of education was born: colonial education. This new form of schooling had long continuities, for example, with the European Middle Ages and Antiquity (e.g., sending royal barbarian sons to Rome for socialization, then back to the province to rule in Rome’s name: Gibbon 1909). **The basic feature of colonial education was teaching colonial children of color to see the metropole (European mother country) as their source of identity: their cultural home, origin, and**

center. Such education replaced native languages, religions, and values with those of the colonizers, and claimed to offer children full membership in colonial society. Yet when such people migrated from the colony to the metropole (e.g., for work or education), they realized that the metropole Europeans had deeply conflicting views of them, often rejecting them as not full members of society or “second-class” citizens (e.g., Afro-Barbadians as not “real” Britons: Lamming 1991:xxxviii). Widespread anti-immigrant rejection of people of color led to the pro-immigrant slogan, “*We’re here because you were there.*” That is, “we nonwhite immigrants are here today in the metropole (London) because you British came to us yesterday, enslaving or colonizing us in your empire.”

Modern colonial education for relatively privileged nonwhites involved attending private boarding schools in the colonial metropole, then returning to the colony for relatively prestigious careers as civil servants with internalized European values, tastes, and language (for British Barbados, see Lamming 1991; for French Martinique, see Chamoiseau’s [1999] character Pilon). By contrast, many less privileged nonwhites attended nineteenth- and early twentieth-century **Indian boarding schools** in North America, where reservation children were forcibly removed from their families’ indigenous values and cultures, to be indoctrinated

(brainwashed) with white language, religion, values, customs, manners, and dress (APAN:II:455, 457; Dunbar-Ortiz 2014).

Similarly, Australia ran indigenous schools performing colonial education (APAN:II:459). (Nineteenth-century Australia comprised several British colonies.) Such schools, whether in Canada, the U.S., or Australia, exemplified white colonial education: re-socializing children of color to assimilate them into the colonizer's ideology.

4.4 Decolonization and the Third World

The First World War (1914-1918) had global impacts, with one consequence being widespread questioning of European colonialism. In stark contrast with confident, pre-war claims of European moral and civilizational superiority, the Great War featured European empires using modern technology to kill, in horrific and amoral ways, unimaginably large numbers of each other's soldiers. Although U.S. President Wilson's Fourteen Points proposed the League of Nations, the end of imperialism, and self-determination of colonized peoples, these goals were largely deferred until after the Second World War (1939-1945) (APAN:II:611).

However, nationalist leaders coming of age during WWI—e.g., Ho Chi Minh (Indochina, Vietnam), Mohandas K. Gandhi (India)—took self-determination and independence seriously (APAN:II:615; Chasteen 2001:260). The years between the world wars were ones in which Europe, America, and Japan maintained or expanded their overseas empires. Following WWII, the United States' global power and interest in shoring up the stability of the status quo supported only gradual decolonization—or at times continued imperialism, as in the case of France's weakening grip on Vietnam. Gradualism led to independence only coming, for many colonized peoples, years or even decades after 1945. This “Third World” during the Cold War navigated between the “First World” powers of the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan, and the “Second World” powers of the USSR, Eastern Europe, and China.

African decolonization was gradual indeed, taking place across the entire second half of the century:

Table 4.3. African decolonization, 1951-1990

<i>Nation (mainland Africa)</i>	<i>Prior colonial name (if changed)</i>
Libya	—
Tunisia	—
Morocco	—
Sudan	—
Ghana	Gold Coast
Guinea	French Guinea
Benin	Dahomey
Burkina-Faso	Upper Volta
Cameroon	Kamerun
Central African Republic	Ubangi Shari
Chad	—
Congo	Middle Congo
Côte d'Ivoire	—
Gabon	—
Mali	French Sudan
Mauritania	—
Niger	—
Nigeria	—
Senegal	—
Somalia	Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland
Togo	Togoland

Zaire	Belgian Congo
Sierra Leone	–
South Africa ^[3]	Union of South Africa
Tanzania	German East Africa
Algeria	–
Burundi	Urundi
Rwanda	Ruanda
Uganda	–
Kenya	East Africa
Malawi	Nyasaland
Zambia	Northern Rhodesia
Gambia	–
Botswana	Bechuanaland
Lesotho	Basutoland
Equatorial Guinea	Spanish Guinea
Swaziland	–
Guinea-Bissau	Portuguese Guinea
Angola	–
Mozambique	–
Djibouti	–
Zimbabwe	Southern Rhodesia
Namibia	Southwest Africa

Sources: Adapted from APAN:II:735; Moore 1989:139

Table 4.3 shows that, since the mid- to late-nineteenth century second wave of European colonialization (Stage 4), almost the entire continent of Africa had been ruled for decades by a handful of European nations, principally Britain, France, and Germany. Africa became independent in the postwar decades, mostly the 1950s-1970s. Third World nations achieved decolonization in varied ways, some peaceably and others through revolution. For some African nations, independence came mostly in peaceful diplomatic terms; for others, only after long and bloody wars of independence from their European colonizers (e.g., Algeria from France).

Likewise, Caribbean decolonization, principally from Britain, did not occur until the second half of the century, long after 1945:

Table 4.4. Caribbean decolonization, 1962-1983

Nation	Prior colonial name (if changed)
Jamaica	—
Trinidad and Tobago	—
Barbados	—
Guyana	British Guiana
Bahamas	—
Grenada	—
Suriname	Dutch Suriname
Dominica	—
St. Lucia	—
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	—
Antigua and Barbuda	—
Belize	British Honduras
St. Kitts and Nevis	—

Source: Adapted from APAN:II:848

Some Caribbean **polities** in 1945 were already formally independent (e.g., Haiti, Dominican Republic, Cuba). Others remain today territories or overseas departments of the old colonizers: e.g., Puerto Rico (U.S.), Martinique (France).

In conclusion, the impacts of two world wars weakened the ability of the European imperial powers to resist the push of many colonies for freedom. Japan's East Asian empire likewise changed following WWII with Japan's subjugation to the American victors, with independence for Vietnam (1945) and Korea (1948). Likewise, the Philippines achieved independence from the U.S. (1946; see Chapter

12). The “Third World” nations newly independent of Europe, Japan, or the U.S. were located worldwide, and geographically concentrated in the regions of densest former colonial control: Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, Oceania (the Pacific Ocean islands), and the Caribbean.

Chapter 4 Summary

Chapter 4 introduced Unit II (Whiteness and Power) by reviewing the history of European global colonization. Section 4.1 explained the rise of the West, the fact of Europe’s world domination between 1492 and 1945. The table presented the colonial binary system, a set of contrasts between European and non-European institutions.

Section 4.2 presented the history of European colonization in four stages. The stages provide international context for understanding specifically American colonial and national history, as discussed in later chapters.

Section 4.3 introduced several themes from global colonial history. It explained the relationship between Eurocentrism and civilization, and discussed settlement, mestizaje, and colonial education.

Section 4.4 discussed decolonization and the emergence of the Third World. The tables offered a time frame for understanding decolonization, specifically in Africa and the Caribbean. The principal European ex-colonial powers also appear listed in the tables.

[1] Image: Public domain

[2] Image credit: Creative Commons license ([Kmusser](#) – Own work, all data from [Vector Map](#))

[3] South African independence was anomalous, being driven by Dutch Afrikaner white nationalism and severe repression of blacks (Marx 1997:107).

Chapter 5: White Slaveholding, 1441-1888



The image above illustrates European and European American enslavement of Africans and African Americans during the colonial

era and national era.^[1] It portrays a mid-1800s, middle-aged New Orleans woman with her enslaved girl servant.^[2] Child enslavement—by birth, commercial sale, or loan—was a pervasive form of North American child abuse (however inadequate that term to describe slavery). As Frederick Douglass reflected, in addition to American slavery’s violence and deprivation, its very worst feature was life enslavement itself (APAN:I:265; Douglass 2017).

What distinguished European slavery from other forms of enslavement in world history? From where in Africa did slaves come? What role did slavery play in American Founders’ constitutional debates and in their private lives? What obstacles to social, economic, and political freedom did African Americans face in the early United States?

Chapter 5 Learning Objectives

5.1 Racialized Slavery

- Describe the origins of the modern concept of race
- Define Middle Passage

5.2 African Ethnicities

- Define the African Diaspora
- Name the main New World destinations of slaves

5.3 Slavery and the Founders

- Define the one-drop rule
- Define the Constitution’s Three-Fifths Clause
- Explain the Constitution’s distinction between “persons” and “citizens”

5.4 Blacks in the Antebellum United States

- Describe slaveholding by U.S. presidents
- Explain northern restrictions on black civil and political rights

- Describe sexual violence of white men against black women

Chapter 5 Key Terms (in order of appearance in chapter)

Middle Passage: the Atlantic voyage of slave ships from Africa to the New World

one-drop rule: the major North American racial ideology: one “drop” of nonwhite “blood” (ancestry) is theoretically sufficient to make you nonwhite

Three-Fifths Clause: the section of the Constitution (1787) stating that three-fifths of each state’s enslaved population would be included in that state’s population count

Monticello: Thomas Jefferson’s slave plantation in Charlottesville, Virginia

white nationalism: the 1800s claim that America was a country for white people alone

First Emancipation: the gradual abolition of slavery in the northern states

free labor ideology: a northern version of 1800s white nationalism, seeking to prevent economic competition with enslaved southern blacks (e.g., in agriculture) or free northern blacks (e.g., jobs). For example: “Keep Ohio white.”

Black Laws: northern state laws denying that the Bill of Rights applied to African Americans. A version of 1800s white nationalism. Ohio passed its first Black Laws in 1804.

5.1 Racialized Slavery

Slavery is an ancient and widespread human institution, continuing to endure in several forms in the world today (Davis 2006; Patterson 2018). The form discussed here, modern racialized enslavement by Europeans of Africans, existed for about 447 years—from 1441 (first African slave market in Portugal) to 1888 (abolition in Brazil). White slaveholding is one of world history’s

greatest tragedies, a significant part of the human story demanding renewed attention in each new generation.

In some ways, modern slavery resembled other slave systems. Christian slaveholding shared origins with Muslim slaveholding in the Middle Ages (APAN:I:74). Modern European slavery began with Portugal's expeditions along the West African coast in the 1430s and 1440s (ibid). Portugal combined the European medieval practice of enslaving non-Christians with the modern practice of maritime voyaging to participate directly in distant markets: here, the existing slave trade in Islamic and sub-Saharan African societies. Like medieval slaves in Europe, Africans were not Christians. But unlike earlier slaves, Africans' dark skin color and hair type dramatically differed from European skin and hair. **Like modern slavery, the modern concept of race sprang from these first sustained trading encounters of Portugal with West Africa.**

By 1492, European, North African, Middle Eastern, and sub-Saharan African societies were all practicing African enslavement. But the ensuing rise of the West—European global colonization (see Chapter 4)—meant that only the European form would be transplanted into the New World, ballooning there to gargantuan proportions. In contrast to small-scale Islamic and African slaveholding, large-scale European plantation agriculture in the Americas would drag 12.5 million Africans across the Atlantic by the latter 1800s. This hellish transport inside suffocating, stinking slave ships became known as the **Middle Passage**.

Table 5.1. European Slaving, 1501-1875: Years by Nation

	Portugal / Brazil	Great Britain	France	Spain / Uruguay	Netherlands	U.S.A.	Denmark / Baltic
1501-1525	7,000	0	0	6,363	0	0	0
1526-1550	25,387	0	0	25,375	0	0	0
1551-1575	31,089	1,685	66	28,167	0	0	0
1576-1600	90,715	237	0	60,056	1,365	0	0
1601-1625	267,519	0	0	83,496	1,829	0	0
1626-1650	201,609	33,695	1,827	44,313	31,729	824	1,053
1651-1675	244,793	122,367	7,125	12,601	100,526	0	653
1676-1700	297,272	272,200	29,484	5,860	85,847	3,327	25,685
1701-1725	474,447	410,597	120,939	0	73,816	3,277	5,833
1726-1750	536,696	554,042	259,095	0	83,095	34,004	4,793
1751-1775	528,693	832,047	325,918	4,239	132,330	84,580	17,508
1776-1800	673,167	748,612	433,061	6,415	40,773	67,443	39,199
1801-1825	1,160,601	283,959	135,815	168,087	2,669	109,545	16,316
1826-1850	1,299,969	0	68,074	400,728	357	1,850	0
1851-1875	9,309	0	0	215,824	0	476	0
Total Slaves	5,848,266	3,259,441	1,381,404	1,061,524	554,336	305,326	111,040

Source: <https://www.slavevoyages.org/assessment/estimates>.
Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. Accessed 2/7/21.

Although European chattel slavery resembled other slavery systems, in many ways it was even worse. (“Chattel” means moveable property or assets: e.g., an ox, not a house.) The rising West was fueled by the emergence of a new economic system,

modern agricultural capitalism (aka mercantilism). Slavery played a central role in this system, which depended on large-scale, disciplined labor forces to cultivate cash crops (Levine 2005:18). During the 1600s, sugar became the primary Caribbean plantation crop, resulting in massive slave importation (Dunn 2000; Mintz 1986; Ortiz 1973). Additional New World crops included tobacco, coffee, cotton, indigo, and rice. Between the 1400s and 1700s, the vast majority of people—about 86%—arriving in the Americas were enslaved Africans (Levine 2005:19). Sugar in particular required large-scale, controlled, and dangerous labor. Life for slaves in the Caribbean sugar colonies was often extreme. In some colonies, European planters calculated that, by literally working their current slaves to death and purchasing new ones, they would receive more profit than by improving slaves' labor conditions (APAN:I:265). Slaves were living, breathing tools: investments of human capital joined to non-human capital (e.g., sugar mills, pounds sterling) to generate profit for Europeans.

Accordingly, New World slaves suffered the worst features of both slavery and capitalism: (1) no hope of liberation (womb to tomb, slave status of children); (2) racism (ideology of African natural inferiority); (3) enslaved capitalist workforce (absolute distinction between planter and slave classes); (4) massive scale (12.5 million imports: largest forced migration in history); (5) sheer cruelty (widespread rape, torture, and other extreme physical and psychological abuse). Together, such factors strongly suggest that **white slaveholding was the worst example of slavery in world history.**

By comparison, medieval and modern African and Islamic slavery, like ancient Mediterranean slavery—though all deeply damaging—inflicted less harm. In African societies, slavery was omnipresent and fundamental to economic activity. However, eventual freedom was often possible for such captives, with their children often being born free rather than enslaved, and their descendants enjoying full social inclusion (Chasteen 2001:44). Similarly, in Greek and Roman antiquity slaves typically had some

legal rights, with their legal status as slave being temporary and not inherited by their children (Levine 2005:19). **The fundamental difference was that European slavery was racialized:** based on the emerging modern (1500s-1800s) notion of race. Rather than on tribal or ethnic degradation or religious difference, European slavery increasingly relied on racial claims of absolute and innate inferiority of a sizable portion of the world's non-European peoples (Allen 1994).

5.2 African Ethnicities

Africans taken to the Americas and Europe collectively formed the **African Diaspora** (“die-AS-por-uh”: dispersal of seeds). They represented many ethnic groups with different languages and cultures. In this, they resembled their diverse European captors, who were primarily Portuguese, Spanish, English, French, and Dutch.

Africans came from three overall regions: West Central, West, and East Africa (Chasteen 2001:47-48). **Four New World destinations awaited them: the Caribbean, Brazil, the Spanish mainland, and North America.** 40% came from West Central Africa (today's Congo and Angola), 20% from West Africa's Bight^[3] of Benin (Togo, Benin, southwest Nigeria), 13% from West Africa's Bight of Biafra (Cameroon, Gabon, southeast Nigeria), and 9% from West Africa's Gold Coast (Ghana). Others originated in other West African regions (Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone) and East Africa (Mozambique, Madagascar) (APAN:I:94).

Slave merchants and buyers paid little attention to ethnic distinctions like Akan or Fula, Igbo or Kongo, Yoruba or Hausa, focusing more on individual slaves' age, health, strength, willingness to obey, childbearing abilities, etc. The result—complex ethnic mixing—hindered enslaved Africans' ability to understand each other. Nevertheless, concentrations of certain ethnicities did exist in many places, promoting New World survival of aspects of African languages and religions, handed down and transformed across

generations (Price 2001). Colonial North American planters created slave labor hierarchies using African ethnic distinctions (APAN:I:266-67). Over time, enslaved populations created new languages—Creoles—merging and transforming existing African and European languages (e.g., Dutch Creole: Price 2001; English Creole: Kincaid 1997, Lovelace 1998; French Creole: Chamoiseau 1999, Condé 1992).

Table 5.2. Enslaved Africans’ Destinations and Origins

<i>Destination</i>	<i>Total imported</i>	<i>Origins (general)</i>	<i>Origins (detailed)</i>
Caribbean	4,143,600	West, West Central	Slave Coast, Gold Coast, Angola, Sierra Leone
Southern Brazil	2,204,400	West Central	Angola, Loango (Kongo)
Northern Brazil	934,100	West Central, West	Angola, Slave Coast, Gold Coast
Spanish Mainland Colonies ^[4]	585,700	West, West Central	Slave Coast, Gold Coast, Angola, Sierra Leone
North America	378,000	West, West Central	Slave Coast, Gold Coast, Angola, Sierra Leone, Senegambia
Guiana	312,300	West	Slave Coast, Gold Coast
Uruguay	52,700	West Central, West	Angola, Slave Coast, Gold Coast
Europe	10,800	West	Slave Coast, Gold Coast

Source: Adapted from APAN:I:95

Table 5.2 shows that most of the 12.5 million Africans went to the Caribbean or Brazil. During slavery, the Caribbean alone received eleven times as many as North America (4,143,600 vs. 378,000). Major Caribbean slave colonies included Barbados, Puerto Rico,

Santo Domingo (today's Dominican Republic and Haiti), Jamaica, and Cuba (see Figure 4.1). Thus, although significant, **North America was a periphery, not at the center, of the main zones of slave importation** (Chasteen 2001:17). By the mid-1700s, the economic value of Britain's sugar islands (especially Jamaica and Barbados) dwarfed that of its North American possessions, which after 1763 included lower Canada. In the American Revolution (1775-1783), Britain was at least as concerned to safeguard these immensely valuable Caribbean colonies (which it succeeded in doing) as it was to retain control of the thirteen mainland colonies (which it lost).

5.3 Slavery and the Founders

As in the Caribbean, white slaveholding played a key part in colonial and early republican America (Johnson 1999). To understand this role, below we survey racial-ethnic diversity in colonial times, examine the Constitution's handling of slavery, and discuss slaveholding by the Founders.

British North America featured more racial-ethnic diversity than almost anywhere else in the world in the 1700s. Ruled by Britain, it comprised a wide variety of European, African, and Native American ethnicities (APAN:I:98-99). Northwestern Europeans came from England, Scotland, Ireland, Wales, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and France.

The first enslaved Africans had disembarked in Virginia in 1619. After 1650, increasing use of enslaved African labor, especially in southern agriculture but also in northern towns, added a significant African, non-Christian minority to the American population (APAN:I:86). Throughout the eighteenth century most new arrivals, North and South, were black slaves (ibid:97). By 1775, about 20% of the labor force in Philadelphia was enslaved; about one of every seven residents of New York City was black (ibid:100). Overall, 20 percent of the new nation's population was black, mostly West African, and virtually all enslaved (ibid:86, 103). Laws and customs categorized biracial people of African and European ancestry as

black. This “white or black,” either-or racial classification system is called the **one-drop rule**, with one “drop” of nonwhite “blood” (ancestry) theoretically sufficient to make you nonwhite.

Given slavery’s ubiquity in the new United States—New England, mid-Atlantic, and especially South—it loomed large at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. A major issue of debate was how to apportion federal Congressional representation. Southern states with many slaves wanted them counted in their population, whereas the other states wanted counts to exclude slaves. Slavery was thus a major foundation of the new nation, with three-fifths of a state’s slaves counting toward state population (APAN:I:183-84). Getting the **Three-Fifths Clause** into the Constitution (ratified 1787-1790) was a political victory for southern slaveholders. More Africans were enslaved in Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia than in the mid-Atlantic or New England; the clause gave these states disproportionate political power. Notice also the clause’s ambiguity regarding the humanity of African Americans. Legally, they were portable property: living capital like oxen. Oxen weren’t included in southern population counts. But, to advance southern political interests, 60% of slave property in a state would be included in its (human) population. The clause represents a tacit admission of black humanity.

Similar ambiguity existed between “persons” (or “men”) and “citizens,” a key distinction in the Constitution (1787) and Declaration of Independence (1776). Whereas “persons” included all people residing in the United States (e.g., white women, nonwhites, children), only “citizens” were full members of the nation, exercising key rights such as voting and the rights listed in the Bill of Rights (APAN:I:199). Implicit in the “persons-citizens” distinction was the white, male, commonsense view of the Founders. They saw the new nation as a free (white) man’s republic—similar to the ancient Roman Republic as described by Livy (an ancient historian read by all eighteenth-century gentlemen as schoolboys). The founding documents enshrined white, male privilege or social advantage. The citizenry comprised the free (white) men (especially property-

owners). This conception was radically egalitarian for the eighteenth century, but nevertheless excluded from citizenship women (free or unfree) and unfree (black) men. In American law, these were not “citizens,” but “persons” (though Africans were also “property”).

Such ambiguities amounted to a fundamental contradiction, one that would lead decades later to the women’s rights movement (starting in 1840s) and to Civil War over slavery. The nation in the early 1800s was among the world’s freest, while simultaneously being the largest slaveholding country at that time (Levine 2005:4). **A nation dedicated to the individual freedom of “citizens” denied that very freedom to nonwhite, nonmale “persons.”**



Figure 5.1. Thomas Jefferson’s **Monticello** (left)[\[5\]](#) and George Washington’s Mount Vernon (right)[\[6\]](#) were colonial Virginia plantations—places of bondage—running for generations on the enslaved labor of women, men, and children. Monticello appears on the U.S. nickel.

How the Founders handled slavery in the Constitution reflected its role in their private (social and economic) lives. Many of these men owned enslaved people (Table 5.3 below). However, though pro-slavery feelings would harden in the 1800s, the later 1700s was a time of relative uncertainty about slavery's future and occasional support for gradual abolition (Levine 2005:5-6). For example, Jefferson—though refraining from freeing his almost two hundred slaves—felt much personal anguish about the paradox of a republic founded on liberty yet based on slave labor. Franklin and Jay went farther, with Jay regularly manumitting his slaves as they aged (though holding other slaves), and Franklin liberating all his slaves in 1781. Likewise, Washington grew conflicted about slavery, altering his will so that, after his death, his slaves would be freed following his wife's death (Klinkner & Smith 1999:21). Other Founders like Samuel Adams and John Adams had long opposed slavery.^[7] Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton founded (1784) the Pennsylvania Society for the Abolition of Slavery, as well as (1785) the New York Manumission Society (Levine 2005:148).

Table 5.3. Slaveholding and Founders

Leader	Born-Died	Main political role	Slaveholder at any time?
Benjamin Franklin	1706-1790	Continental congressman, diplomat	Yes
Samuel Adams	1722-1803	Boston artisan and revolutionary leader	No
George Washington	1732-1799	Revolutionary Army general, first president	Yes
John Adams	1735-1826	Continental congressman, president	No
John Hancock	1737-1793	President of Second Continental Congress	Yes
Thomas Paine	1737-1809	English-born US political writer	No
Thomas Jefferson	1743-1826	Main author of independence manifesto, Democratic-Republican leader, president	Yes
John Jay	1745-1829	NY governor, constitutional theorist	Yes
James Madison	1751-1836	Constitutional theorist, president	Yes
John Marshall	1755-1835	Most influential early Supreme Court chief justice	Yes
Alexander Hamilton	1755/57-1804	Federalist leader, constitutional theorist	No
James Monroe	1758-1831	VA governor, president	Yes

Nevertheless, despite some Founders' misgivings, it's important to remember the big picture: Jay and Franklin, like many other Founders, owned Africans for considerable periods of their lives. The experience of mastership shaped in fundamental ways their ideas and actions on the relationship between race (whiteness) and nation (see Chapter 7). "Washington freed his slaves *only* after he and his wife had died. The Washingtons lived their entire lives

served by enslaved African American people, including Martha Washington's half-black sister, the product of her father's rape of a woman he enslaved" (Moore 2008:53).

All U.S. Founders were white creoles^[8] with no significant black or indigenous ancestry, a situation contrasting with Latin America's leadership during independence (1810-1825). To take but two examples, José María Morelos in Mexico's War of Independence (1810-1821) and Antonio Maceo in Cuba's (1868-1898) Wars of Independence were renowned leaders of color (Ferrer 1999; Velázquez 2010). Such leaders, both at the time and in future generations, served crucial political purposes for nonwhites seeking to resist white supremacy. Nonwhite Mexicans and Cubans could point to the heroic roles played by people who looked like themselves in their country's struggle for independence (Fuente 2001). In stark contrast, the total absence of major leaders of color in the American Revolution constrained African Americans and Native Americans at the time and later in their attempts to challenge **white nationalism**: the claim that America was a republic for white people alone.

5.4 Blacks in the Antebellum United States

African Americans, both enslaved and free, endured great oppression in the antebellum U.S. ("Ante-bellum": before the Civil War.) Three themes shed light on this history: (1) slaveholding by U.S. presidents, (2) northern abolition and ongoing black exclusion, and (3) sexual violence of white men against enslaved black women.

(1) Slaveholding and presidents. Not only did early U.S. political leadership include no members of color, but several antebellum presidents (like Founders) owned people of color. Until John Quincy Adams took office in 1825, all presidents had been Virginia slaveholding planters, except slavery opponent John Adams. Zachary Taylor, the Mexican War general who died in office in 1850, was the last slaveholding president. By contrast, Mexico had

abolished slavery in 1829; Britain did the same in almost all its colonies during the 1830s.

Table 5.4. Slaveholding and Presidents, to 1863 Emancipation

No.	President	Year elected
1	Washington	1789, 1792
2	Adams	1796
3	Jefferson	1800, 1804
4	Madison	1808, 1812
5	Monroe	1816, 1820
6	Quincy Adams	1824
7	Jackson	1828, 1832
8	Van Buren	1836
9	Harrison	1840
10	Tyler (no election)	1841 (Harrison died in office)
11	Polk	1844
12	Taylor	1848
13	Fillmore (no election)	1850 (Taylor died in office)
14	Pierce	1852
15	Buchanan	1856
16	Lincoln	1860, 1864

Table 5.4 shows that seven (44%) of the sixteen presidents up

to Emancipation were slaveholders. Twelve (57%) of these twenty-one presidential terms (not including Lincoln's second) featured a slaveholder president. Put differently, across the 75-year period from 1789-1863, a slaveholder was president in 46 (61%) of those years. **For over three-fifths (61%) of the nation's existence from constitutional ratification to the Civil War, the highest office in the land was held by a slaveowner.** These facts provide important background on the oppression of African Americans in antebellum America (Berlin 2003; Deyle 2005).

(2) Northern abolition, denial of citizenship rights, white terrorism. In 1775, almost one in five (about 700,000) Americans was black (APAN:I:200). Over 95% of this group was enslaved (ibid:103). Slavery, though mostly located on southern plantations, was also common in the mid-Atlantic and New England. How did northern abolition come about?

Actions leading toward emancipation often came from blacks themselves, rather than whites. Unlike in 1863—emancipation by federal proclamation affecting all states and territories—northern abolition was a piecemeal process (state by state) starting early in U.S. history during the Revolution (Klinkner & Smith 1999:20). Moreover, whereas some states banned slavery all at once (e.g., Vermont in 1777, Massachusetts in 1783), others adopted gradual emancipation (e.g., Pennsylvania in 1780, New Jersey in 1804). This process is called **the first emancipation** (APAN:I:200). Emancipation created a growing free black population in the North, increasingly sectionalizing slavery as a southern institution. Nevertheless, the process was haphazard: for example, even in the 1830s many blacks remained enslaved in New Jersey and New York (ibid:295).

Northern abolition represented a significant achievement, but freedom often came with no meaningful civil or political rights. Widespread white nationalist assumptions meant that the very idea of “free black” or “black American” seemed paradoxical to many whites, with the most sympathetic often advocating mass black deportation to Africa. Between 1815 and 1860, antiblack racism

thoroughly shaped the life experience of African Americans in the North (APAN:I:295). An important distinction was between law and custom. The bare fact of legal emancipation only provided *negative* freedom: you were no longer someone's property. Customs of racist attitudes (as well as laws) blocked most blacks from *positive* freedoms: the realistic ability to vote and exercise the Bill of Rights, to move about freely, to advance in American society, to hold political office, to expect civil and criminal legal protection, etc. Racism—both in law and custom—replaced slavery with an ambiguous limbo status that was not slavery but not freedom as experienced even by poor whites.

At best, northern laws and customs treated blacks indifferently. However, in the expanding northwest (Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin) many whites embraced a more aggressive version of white nationalism, based on **free labor ideology**. Free (white) northern workers competed with enslaved (black) southern workers, and with free black workers. Northern segregation promoted cross-class white economic interests, with state laws benefiting whites at the expense of blacks. Such northern laws were early versions of racial segregation, systematized in the South after Reconstruction (1865-1877) into Jim Crow apartheid. Inspired by free labor ideology, state laws restricting black citizenship increasingly dominated the North in the antebellum decades. For example, blacks in antebellum New York were dissuaded from voting by a \$250 tax not paid by white voters. After 1803, the new northwestern states—seeking to shield white workers from perceived black competition—passed Black Laws outlawing blacks from voting or entering the state (Marx 1997:42).

Northern Black Laws embodied a version of white nationalism, by denying that the Bill of Rights applied to African Americans. Ohio, which became a state in 1803, passed such laws almost immediately thereafter (Klinkner & Smith 1999:37). “[A]s early as 1804, Ohio legislators had implemented black laws...requir[ing] black people to prove that they were not slaves and to find at least two people who would guarantee a surety of five hundred dollars for

the African Americans' good behavior. The laws also limited African Americans' rights to marry whites and to gun-ownership..."[9] In the 1840s, many Midwesterners and other northerners supported new legislation to curtail citizenship rights of African Americans in their states. At this time, all but five northern states prevented blacks from voting on an equal basis with whites (Levine 2005:177).

Northern apartheid did not stop at legal restrictions, but also included numerous extralegal acts of white terrorism against blacks (APAN:I:296). As noted, whites resented the economic (jobs) competition of enslaved and free blacks. Such resentments frequently burst out in antiblack violence: "The Cincinnati Riots...occurred in...April and July 1836 by a mob of whites against black residents. These were part of a pattern of violence at that time. A severe riot had occurred in 1829, led by ethnic Irish, and another riot against blacks broke out in 1841."[10]

One version of free labor ideology was abolitionist, seeking to extend free labor to slaves and end competition with cheap slave labor. Likewise, frontier regions frequently opposed the extension of slavery westward. Both forms displayed white racism by seeking to restrict the physical movements and economic activities of both enslaved and free blacks (Klinkner & Smith 1999:41). Free labor ideology frequently attacked blacks regardless of free or slave status, seeking to (for example) "keep Kansas white." In sum, **white opposition to slavery often arose from intense antiblack reasoning and feeling** (APAN:I:359; Berwanger 1967; Levine 2005:251). White supremacist laws and customs in western states and territories harmed not only blacks but also East Asians and Mexicans (see Chapter 6).

(3) Sexual violence. Sexual abuse, predation, and rape by white men of nonwhite women under their power has formed a central thread in the entire modern history of the Western hemisphere (Allende 1982; Feinstein 2018; Stannard 1992). Such violence greatly contributed to the growth of mestizo populations in most colonies, starting in the 1500s. Likewise in the U.S.: **enslaved African**

American women were always at risk of sexual abuse and rape by local white men (APAN:I:268). We've seen that, in Maryland, Frederick Douglass' enslaved mother was victimized in this way, probably by her owner (Chapter 2). The decades-long relationship of Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) with Sally Hemings (c.1773-1835) provides another example.

Jefferson's wife, Martha Jefferson (née Wayles) died in 1782, and he never remarried. A few years later, Jefferson began a long-term sexual relationship with his teenage slave Sally, thirty years his junior, with whom he had at minimum six children of mixed race:

“In 1787, Sally, aged 14, accompanied [Jefferson's daughter] Polly to London and then to Paris, where the widowed Jefferson, aged 44 at the time, was serving as the United States Minister to France. Hemings spent two years there. Most historians believe Jefferson and Hemings' sexual relationship began while they were in France or soon after their return to Monticello. The exact nature of this relationship remains unclear – the Monticello exhibition on Hemings used the phrase “rape?” to indicate this lack of certainty, and to acknowledge the power imbalance inherent in the relationship between a wealthy, white, male envoy and a 14-year-old, black, female slave. For a female slave to refuse a master's sexual advances was illegal.”[\[11\]](#)

Sexual violence marked not only Sally Hemings' life, but also her mother's. Sally's father was John Wayles (1715-1773), Martha's (Jefferson's wife's) father, making them half-sisters. Wayles (Jefferson's white father-in-law) had fathered Sally with his (Wayles') black slave Betty Hemings (c. 1735-1807), twenty years his junior.[\[12\]](#) Jefferson, who owned his and Sally's four surviving children, later freed them. He never freed Sally herself, which would have increased public awareness of their relationship (APAN:I:244).

As in Latin America, biracial children were common in the U.S. On the eve of the Civil War, hundreds of thousands of African Americans were “mulattos”: people with significant black and white ancestry, comprising about 12.5% of all African Americans

(APAN:I:268). The one-drop rule made such people legally “Negro”; laws passed by slaveholders ensured that biracial children of female slaves would also be slaves. White masters thus not only had an economic incentive toward promoting births among their slaves, but also fathering slave children themselves (Levine 2005:106; Moore 2008:34). By 1860, out of 4 million slaves, 50% of this population were children (15 years old or younger). As Thomas Jefferson had noted decades earlier, “A [slave] child raised every two years...is of more profit than the crop of the best [enslaved] laboring man” (quoted in APAN:I:265). Indeed, buying slaves not primarily for field or house labor, but mainly for sex, was common in places such as New Orleans (ibid:268).

White sexual violence represented a major form of oppression suffered by African Americans for centuries. White slaveholding is one of history’s greatest tragedies, and child abuse by life enslavement of one’s own children surely one of its worst features.

Chapter 5 Summary

Chapter 5 examined white slaveholding. Section 5.1 introduced European racialized slavery of Africans, distinguishing among forms of slavery and explaining why the European form was worst.

Section 5.2 defined the African Diaspora as the dispersal of 12.5 million Africans to New World slavery. It distinguished among the African origin regions, and described four main New World destinations of slaves. It showed that North America was a periphery of the core regions of slave importation: the Caribbean and Brazil.

Section 5.3 introduced slavery in colonial and early republican America. It defined the one-drop rule as an ideology about white and nonwhite being mutual exclusive. It presented the Constitution’s Three-Fifths clause. And it explained the Constitution’s distinction between “persons” and “citizens.”

Section 5.4 discussed challenges African Americans faced in the antebellum United States. It examined slaveholding by presidents, northern abolition and ongoing restrictions on black civil and

political rights, and sexual violence of white men against enslaved black women.

[1] Image: Public domain. “National era”: post-1776, after the U.S. declared itself an independent nation.

[2] Source: Wikipedia, “Slavery.” Accessed 2/5/21.

[3] A “bight” is a cove or inlet—here, of the Atlantic Ocean.

[4] In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 200,000 of these enslaved Africans went to Mexico (New Spain), entering at Veracruz. Modern Mexican mestizo identity derives mainly from indigenous America and Spain, but also from Africa (Telles & Ortiz 2008:325).

[5] Image credit: Creative Commons license (Martin Falbisoner – Own work)

[6] Image credit: Creative Commons license ([Otherspice](#) – Own work)

[7] Source: Wikipedia, “Founding Fathers of the United States.” Accessed 12/23/20.

[8] Except Paine, born in England.

[9] Source: Ohio History Central; accessed 12/24/20. https://ohiohistorycentral.org/w/Black_Laws_of_1807

[10] Source: Wikipedia, “Cincinnati Riots of 1836.” Accessed 12/16/20.

[11] Source: Wikipedia, “Sally Hemings.” Accessed 2/12/21.

[12] Source: Wikipedia, “Thomas Jefferson.” Accessed 12/14/20.

Chapter 6: Early Immigration and Nativism



Ellis Island in New York Harbor (left image) illustrates nineteenth- and early twentieth-century mass immigration to the United States, and nativist reactions.^[1] From 1892 to 1954, about 15 million immigrants from southern and eastern Europe were processed here for U.S. entry (APAN:II:494). They were mostly poor, non-English-

speaking, and perceived by American authorities as not fully white. The dominant vision of America was as a “**melting pot**,” in which Americanization of immigrants required complete assimilation into white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant (WASP) culture. Despite nativist efforts, this vision never entirely reflected reality.

At Columbia University—not far from Ellis Island—Robert King Merton (right image; see Chapter 1) was developing new functionalist ideas in the 1940s that would soon make him a famous sociologist.^[2] As an ambitious young man, he had invented this name because it sounded “American.” He knew that adopting WASP culture would help him get ahead in American society. His birth name was Meyer Robert Schkolnick. Born in Philadelphia in 1910, he was a second-generation Russian Jew whose Yiddish-speaking family had immigrated in 1904. His father, Aaron Schkolnickoff, had himself received an “Americanized” name at port of entry: Harrie Skolnick.^[3]

How does Merton’s story illustrate both European immigration, and nativist pressures on immigrants? What similarities exist between nativism in the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries? Why do today’s descendants of immigrants, who suffered discrimination and exclusion at the hands of WASPs, now repeat this exclusion of new immigrants?

Chapter 6 Learning Objectives

6.1 Who are “Real Americans”?

- Explain why people immigrate
- Define nativism
- Understand how WASPs became a cohesive racial-ethnic group in early U.S. history

6.2 Immigration and Expansion to 1860: Ireland, Germany, Mexico

- Understand why WASPs saw Irish Catholics as nonwhite

- Recognize examples of nativist violence toward Irish and Germans
- Describe how U.S. expansion created the Mexican border and Southwest

6.3 The New Immigrants, 1860-1929: Europe, Mexico, East Asia

- Understand how sending regions shifted to southern and eastern Europe
- Identify which U.S. regions received East Asian and Mexican immigrants

6.4 The New Nativism

- Understand the significance of 1920s immigration quota laws
- Recognize differences between haphazard exclusion of European immigrants and systematic exclusion of East Asians, Mexicans, and African Americans
- Define the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act

Chapter 6 Key Terms (in order of appearance in chapter)

melting pot: a metaphor of Americanization used between 1880-1920. It pictured immigrants as needing to be completely assimilated into white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant (WASP) culture.

nativism: organized political opposition to immigration. Arises from fears of the native-born that immigrants are worsening the nation or local community

WASP: white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant. Pre-1945 American Protestants of northern or western European ancestry

Protestantism: the branch of Christianity arising in the 1500s European religious reform movement that split from Roman Catholic Christianity

manifest destiny: in the 1800s, a collection of white-supremacist ideas claiming God's intention that U.S. whites expand across the

North American continent “from sea to shining sea.” Some versions called for U.S. expansion throughout the Americas.

proletariat: the economic class of people owning little beyond the sheer ability to labor

Know Nothing Party: an 1850s third party embracing nativism and nationalism. Aka the American Party.

the Mexican Cession: the vast region of northern Mexico that became American following Texas independence (1836) and the U.S. invasion of Mexico (1846). To “cede” (cession) is to relinquish (to give up land or control). Mexican inhabitants became U.S. federal citizens under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848).

Chinese Exclusion Act: 1882 federal law suspending immigration and naturalization of Chinese, mostly manual laborers. An example of anti-Asian immigration policies (versions of white nationalism) in effect until 1965.

WWII Japanese American internment camps: The U.S. Army’s forcible removal from their homes and prolonged detention of virtually all Americans of Japanese ancestry, from 1942 to 1946.

6.1 Who are “Real Americans”?

Immigration and migration are universal features of the human experience in world history. People have always left their homelands: whether as entire peoples, in smaller groups of clans or families, or individually. Perhaps the most common reasons have been: (1) insecurity (violence or persecution, natural disasters such as famine or disease), as when co-religionists fled religious persecution; and (2) limited opportunity (social structural constraints on life chances), as when younger sons left home seeking their fortune, because eldest sons inherited all (primogeniture).

Today, throughout the world, tens of millions of people abandon their homes and illegally cross international borders each year. The main causes are the perennial ones of insecurity and limited opportunity in their homelands (Nazario 2007). Sociologists of

immigration often explain these facts in terms of “push” and “pull” factors (Schaefer 2015:84). Factors like lack of work or violence exert a “pushing” force in a region, leading some people to leave in search of work or safety. Likewise, factors such as presence of work or relative safety exert a “pulling” force in other regions, attracting people from elsewhere. Sociologists also distinguish between “migration”—moving in seasonal patterns from home to work—and “immigration”—moving with the intention to stay. Finally, sociologists describe some regions as “sending” countries and others as “receiving” countries. Generally, the global South tends to “send” and the global North “receive.” Today many migrants and immigrants to Europe and North America come from “Third World” regions such as the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

Immigration often creates political opposition: nativism. As in many past eras, a major political controversy of our own time pits nativists against immigrant advocates. Nativism means opposition to immigration—by foreigners or domestic outsiders—and emphasis on the virtues of the native-born or local. Alternately, it may advocate limited (“sensible”) immigration but with emphasis on complete assimilation. This stance has played a perennial political role in human society as such, influencing perceptions and actions in all likelihood for tens of thousands of years.

Nativism arises from fears of the native-born that immigrants are worsening the nation or local community. Thus, nativism feeds on xenophobia (literally, “fear of outsiders”) and resistance to change. Such fears are economic (“they’re stealing our jobs” or “lowering our housing values”), political (“they’re voting the wrong way”), or social (“they’re increasing poverty and crime” or “they’re marrying our children”). These sentiments are typically voiced politically not as fears or anxieties but as strident nationalism (or localism) proclaiming one’s nation (or local community) to be the “best” or the “greatest,” and tapping nostalgia for a lost past perceived as simpler and better. In the 1830s, nativists perceived the 1790s as a golden age; today, this perception fixates on the 1950s. Rhetoric dehumanizes immigrants as a “tidal wave” “swamping” and

“invading” (Bonilla-Silva 2018:xiv). Although immigration, at some times and places, may indeed worsen existing social problems (Nazario 2007), nativist solutions are often too simple to be effective.

White, Anglo-Saxon Protestants. In American history, nativism in some form has influenced all periods of colonial and national life. Since it relies on a strong distinction between the native-born (“us”) and the foreign-born (“them”), there must be not only a significant “them” to deplore, but also a cohesive “us.” As functionalist sociologist Emile Durkheim observed (see Chapter 1), opposition to the out-group creates and renews solidarity of the in-group (Emirbayer 2003).

In the nineteenth century, the most powerful and numerous American racial-ethnic group—the native-born “us”—was white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants. **“WASP” refers to pre-1945 American Protestants of northern or western European ancestry.** Political, economic, and social power all centered in this group. Members included British-born colonists such as John Smith and John Winthrop; American-born (Creole) revolutionists such as George Washington and John Adams; nineteenth-century politicians such as John C. Calhoun, Daniel Webster, and Abraham Lincoln; later nineteenth-century industrialists such as Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller; early twentieth-century politicians such as Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt and entrepreneurs such as Thomas Edison and Henry Ford. After WWII, WASPs increasingly accepted white ethnics as fully “white” and “American,” and in the process lost much of their former group distinctiveness and identity. Nevertheless, it is revealing that, prior to 2020, all U.S. presidents (except Kennedy and Obama)^[4] and most high-level politicians remained WASP. The U.S. has never had a president of southern (Italian) or eastern (Slavic, Jewish) European ancestry. Likewise, although virtually all pre-1965 southern lynching victims were African Americans, a few were Italians.



Figure 6.1.^[5] Many 1800s farm families were white, of northwestern European ethnicity, and Protestant Christian (WASP).

WASP identity comprised distinctive racial (white), ethnic (Anglo-Saxon), and religious (Protestant) features. **Protestantism** arose in the Reformation, the sixteenth-century reform movement that split from Roman Catholic Christianity (Bataillon 2013). By the 1800s, it had further splintered into many sects: Lutheran, Episcopalian, Baptist, Presbyterian, Quaker, Congregationalist, Methodist, African Methodist Episcopal, and more. However, the Protestant world was generally united in hostility toward Catholics, and belief in an ideology of “progress” in which Protestantism was gradually replacing non-Christian religions and Catholicism throughout the world. Accordingly, American Protestantism was closely linked to American exceptionalism and imperialism, and thereby to whiteness and white supremacy. **Manifest destiny**, a collection of ideas claiming God’s intention that white Americans expand across North America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, was key here (see Chapter 12).

The WASP group was internally diverse, reflecting religious sectarian variety and comprising several European-American ethnicities: English, Scottish, Scots-Irish (Protestant Northern Ireland), Welsh, Protestant Germans, and more (APAN:I:97). The European groups had developed strong political cohesion especially after 1763, when decaying loyalty to the British empire led to American independence (1783). Likewise, they claimed fundamental differences between themselves and African Americans (slave or free), on the one hand, and Native Americans, on the other. References to the American “People” in political speech and documents of the early republic (e.g., 1787 Constitution Preamble) denoted WASPs—with Catholics, Indians, and Negroes excluded. In the nineteenth century, white supremacy and the view of (white) Americans as a chosen people formed the commonsensical social outlook of most whites (Klinkner & Smith 1999:40). By the 1830s-40s, large-scale European immigration, combined with geographical expansion into Mexican territories (Weber 1982), would challenge this exclusive, narrow sense of American racial-ethnic and religious identity.

So, who are the “real Americans”? History suggests that yesterday’s immigrants, suffering discrimination and exclusion at the hands of yesterday’s native-born, may become today’s (or tomorrow’s) nativists advocating exclusion of today’s immigrants (Blumer 1958). Understanding this cycle can develop one’s consciousness of history’s patterns, and self-awareness (see Chapter 2 on reflexivity). Vulnerable people today include both immigrants and natives harmed by immigration (Nazario 2007).

6.2 Immigration and Expansion to 1860: Ireland, Germany, Mexico

The nineteenth century was a time of large-scale European immigration, especially to northern cities, sparking nativist reaction. It was also a century of westward expansion, with the U.S. invading northern Mexico to create the new Southwest.

The first era of mass immigration in U.S. history started in the 1830s and lasted to the eve of the Civil War (1861-1865). In these years, the number of new immigrants—almost 5 million—was greater than the nation's entire 1790 population (APAN:I:293-94; Levine 2005:59). **The new Americans came almost entirely from northwestern Europe, principally Ireland, Germany, and England.** This inflow was larger than any previous, visibly changing the face of many northern cities. "By 1852-53, Boston and New York...had 50% foreign-born population...Close to that in Philadelphia. The Northern cities—seats of market culture, commercialism, manufacturing—were immigrant cities" (Blight 2008, Lecture 4, 31:03). In 1855, 28% of New Yorkers had been born in Ireland, 16% in the German principalities. 1850s Boston's population was approximately 35% foreign-born, with most of this group (over 66%) being Irish (APAN:I:294). By 1860, the foreign-born comprised over 40% of the population of New York, Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, Cincinnati, Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Louis, and San Francisco (Levine 2005:59).

Immigrants differed from prior ones in ways that WASPs perceived as crucial: many were Catholic, poor, unskilled, and resistant to adopting Protestant culture. Many swelled the ranks of the urban poor, contributing to northern cities' growing **proletariat** (those owning little beyond the sheer ability to labor: Tucker 1978). A few were exiled socialists from failed European revolutions in 1848. Overall, they seemed to lack the virtues WASPs saw in themselves.

Irish Americans appeared particularly threatening, given their determination to maintain old-country institutions such as Catholic religiosity and education, and customs such as social drinking. They had many reasons to mistrust American WASPs. Ireland had been an English colony since the later sixteenth century; the first English overseas plantations were not in Virginia or Barbados, but in Ireland (Fredrickson 1981:13-17). The 1800s Catholic population remained firmly under Protestant British control. London's mishandling of Irish events in the 1830s-40s significantly contributed to the devastating Potato Famine of 1845-52, in which one million Irish

died of starvation or disease and over one million emigrated.^[6] Irish Americans thus tended to perceive WASP nativist pressures to assimilate as more of the same Protestant oppression they had endured back home. WASPs, in turn, described Irish as lazy, dirty, stupid, and savage, frequently comparing them to African Americans, the so-called “smoked Irish” (Holt 1992; Ignatiev 2009).

Table 6.1. Major immigration events to 1860

Date	Event	Description
1798	U.S. law on illegal immigrants and sedition	During anti-French XYZ Affair, law prohibits entrance of “illegal immigrants” endangering national peace and security, and provides for their expulsion. It also threatens civil liberties of U.S. citizens.
1830s-40s	Anti-Catholic riots in Northeast	Catholic, German, Irish immigrants attacked.
1846	Invasion of Mexico	In an atmosphere of aggression stoked by President Polk, U.S. General Taylor provokes war with Mexico. The Mexican War (1846-1848) ends with occupation of Mexico City under General Winfield Scott.
1848	Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo	Mexican citizens become U.S. federal citizens in the new Southwest territories. Treaty guarantees protection of their land ownership, but in coming years is repeatedly violated by immigrating WASPs, especially in New Mexico.
1853	Creation of Mexico-U.S. border	Mexico’s territorial losses to U.S. (1848, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo; 1853, Gadsden Purchase of La Mesilla) are half of its claimed territory (including Texas). The resulting international border is 1,954 miles long (3145 km).
1848-60	Peak period of pre-Civil War immigration	Nearly 3.5 million immigrants enter U.S., including 1.3 million Irish and 1.1 million Germans. Proportionate to population, this is the largest inflow of foreigners ever in American history
1850s	Ongoing nativism in national politics	The anti-immigrant and nationalist “American Party” (aka “Know Nothing Party”) forms.
1860	Larger northern cities are “immigrant cities”	15% of the U.S. white population is foreign born. 90% of immigrants live in the North.

Sources: Adapted from APAN:I:293-94, 366; Cisneros 2002; Weber 1982

As immigration accelerated between 1830 and 1860, WASP

nativism intensified. Although Germans had been arriving since the eighteenth century, especially to Pennsylvania, the larger scale of immigration, growing temperance (anti-alcohol) sentiment, and ongoing anti-Catholicism sparked nativist riots targeting both Germans and Irish (APAN:I:294). In addition to religious intolerance, there were economic and social fears, with native-born laborers attracted to nativist politics scapegoating immigrants for job scarcity and low pay (ibid). By 1850, many WASPs of all political stripes were eager to blame immigrants for the nation's troubles (Levine 2005:200-01). This nativist base supported the anti-immigrant "American Party" (aka "**Know Nothing Party**"). The party itself was short-lived—its members absorbed by the new Republican Party in the mid-1850s (APAN:I:366)—but intense nativist sentiment continued into the Civil War years and beyond.

Additional challenges before 1860 to WASP notions of American identity came from expansion into northern Mexico. Westward migration stemmed from economic motives, but also from white-supremacist manifest destiny: the idea that God intended racially superior U.S. whites to have the land and resources of North America (Klinkner & Smith 1999:40; see Chapter 12). After the 1846-48 Mexican War and 1853 Gadsden Purchase, the U.S. possessed the **Mexican Cession**—a vast western region with centuries of European (Spanish) colonization since the 1500s. Long before 1846, Spain had given European names and political identities to the new U.S. states or territories (e.g., California, Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas), towns or forts (e.g., San Francisco, Monterey, Los Angeles, San Diego, Tucson, Santa Fe, Albuquerque, Las Cruces, El Paso del Norte, San Antonio, Laredo), and geography (e.g., San Francisco Bay, Monterey Bay, El Mar de Cortez or Gulf of California, Colorado River, El Río Bravo or Rio Grande). Present-day controversies over the relationship between U.S. globalism and Hispanic immigration originate in these mid-nineteenth century events (see Chapter 13).

6.3 The New Immigrants, 1860–1929: Europe, Mexico, East Asia

After the Civil War and especially by 1880, immigrant-sending regions had shifted to southern and eastern Europe. Significant immigration also came from Mexico and East Asia (China, Japan).

Immigration, paused by the Civil War, quickly resumed its torrential flow to the North and West after the South's surrender at Appomattox. Overall, U.S. immigrants between 1870 and 1920 formed part of a global migration exodus from Europe and Asia caused by increased population, industrialization, redistribution of land, and religious intolerance. In these decades, millions of individuals and families immigrated to Argentina, Brazil, Australia, Canada and the United States (APAN:II:492). In the ten years alone after the U.S. Civil War, almost 3 million immigrants flocked to northern and western industrializing cities (APAN:I:439).

Thus, some pre-1860 patterns continued: mass European immigration, especially to northern cities. However, **by 1880 the new sending regions—Italy, Austria-Hungary, Greece, Poland, Russia—were increasingly alien to WASPs.** According to contemporary racial ideas, WASPs were “Anglo-Saxon” or “Teutonic”; they saw themselves as racially distinct from and superior not only to Irish Celts, but also to southern Italians and Sicilians and eastern Slavs and Jews (Gould 1996). Although contemporaries often spoke of the “white” (or “Caucasian” or “American”) race, they also saw many hierarchical gradations of whiteness. Not all were equally white: some were of “pure white” race, whereas “off white” white ethnics were not.

The new European Americans added to previous Catholic challenges to WASP notions of American identity. Appearing now were not only more Roman Catholic Christians but also sizable communities of Eastern Orthodox Christians and Jews (Brodkin 1998). Overall, 26 million immigrants arrived between 1870 and 1920, with most staying to settle in cities. For instance, Catholic Italians mostly immigrated between 1900 and 1915 (Telles & Ortiz 2008:10). Immigrants contributed to redefining and changing American society and culture, often in ways that longer-settled Americans

feared and deplored (APAN:II:492). For the near-century between 1830 and 1920, northern and western towns were immigrant cities; between 1877 and 1920, in many cities immigrants were more numerous than the native-born (APAN:II:503). Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century industry relied on the newcomers' labor and consumption, making possible America's rise as a world economic power.

East Asian and Mexican immigration had also greatly increased in the second half of the 1800s. Chinese newcomers to the West rubbed shoulders with WASPs, together completing the first intercontinental railroad in 1869. "Chinatowns"—Chinese American enclaves or ghettos—appeared in San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, and elsewhere, where many Chinese operated laundries (Riis 1890). Other groups in Western towns were WASPs, Native Americans, African Americans, and Mexican Americans. The latter group included those who pre-dated 1848, especially in New Mexico ("We didn't cross the border, the border crossed us": Gómez 2018:2). Mexicans panned for gold in Northern California, performed southwestern agricultural and domestic labor, and added to booming towns like Los Angeles and San Francisco. By 1910, Mexican immigrants outnumbered Irish newcomers (APAN:II:492).



Figure 6.2.[7] Many Chinese immigrants to the West worked building railroads in the later 1800s. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 barred further Chinese immigration (Gómez 2018:145).

Unlike East Asia or Europe, Mexico was not separated from the U.S. by vast oceans, but only by an invisible international border almost 2,000 miles long. Mexico-U.S. government border presence did not arrive until the early twentieth century, gradually transforming into the intense border militarization of recent decades. Moreover, much of the Southwest and West had been Mexican territory prior to 1853, and Spanish before 1821. Accordingly, the Hispanic world didn't first come to the U.S.; rather the U.S. came to the Hispanic world (Fuentes 1992:444-45). In many ways, then, immigrant and migrant Mexicans (unlike Europeans and Asians) were not entering an alien continent or country, but rather returning to an ancestral homeland increasingly populated by unfriendly WASP newcomers. Indeed, many Mexicans—as in New Mexico and California—had never left.

Table 6.2. Major immigration events, 1860-1929

Date	Event	Description
1860-70	Violence against Chinese, Irish, Mexicans. Anti-Mexican land fraud	The majority of U.S. citizens of Mexico origin (in Southwest) see their land taken and civil rights ignored. Some are lynched. Such actions violate the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
1882	Chinese Exclusion Act	U.S. law suspends immigration and naturalization of Chinese, who are mostly manual laborers. Mexican immigration is increasing.
1891	Immigration control law	U.S. Immigration Law. The first exhaustive U.S. law attempting national control of immigration.
1900-33	Mass immigration from Mexico to Southwest and West	About 1/8 of the entire Mexican population moves to U.S. territory. Primarily due to the violence and economic uncertainty of the Mexican Revolution (1910-20). America is the major arms supplier to the various Mexican armies.
1907	Japanese ban	U.S. economic depression. President T. Roosevelt's Gentleman's Agreement pact prohibits entry of Japanese workers.
1907-08	Overall immigration hits peak	Great influx of southern and eastern Europeans
1909	Importation of Mexican labor	U.S.-Mexico pact brings Mexican workers to California for agricultural labor.
1917	Importation of Mexican labor	U.S. again imports Mexican workers, facing labor scarcity due to U.S. entrance in WWI.
1917	Immigration law	Restricts Asian entry. Introduces literacy tests and a tax of 8 dollars per head for entrance. Such practices block legal entry of the nonwhite poor and uneducated. Anti-German nativism and laws during and after WWI.
1921	Emergency Quota Act	Establishes yearly immigration quotas for each nationality, privileging Anglo-Saxon Protestants and restricting Catholics and Jews.

1924	Immigration Act (includes Asian Exclusion Act, and National Origins Act)	National Origins Act replaces the 1921 Quota Act. Limits annual immigration to 150,000 people and sets quotas at 2 percent of each nationality residing in the United States in 1890, except for Asians, who are banned completely. (Chinese had been excluded by legislation in 1882.) Further restricts southern and eastern Europeans. Establishes U.S. Border Patrol (la Patrulla Fronteriza, la migra) and deportation of those who become a public burden, violate U.S. laws, or participate in anarchist and seditious acts.
1927	National Origins Act is revised	Apports new quotas to begin in 1929. Retains the annual limit of 150,000 but redefines quotas to be distributed among European countries in proportion to the 'national-origins' (country of birth of descent) of American inhabitants in 1920. Entrants from Western Hemisphere (Canada, Mexico) don't fall under the quotas (except for those whom the Labor Department defined as potential paupers), and soon they become the largest immigrant groups.
1929	Penalty for undocumented re-entry	Penalizes undocumented re-entry for previously deported illegal immigrants. Meanwhile, the quota system guarantees that most U.S. immigrants are white (from northwestern Europe or Canada).

Sources: Adapted from APAN:II:618, 635-36; Cisneros 2002; Wright & Rogers 2011

6.4 The New Nativism

The new Americans (1880-1920) all experienced hostility from WASPs and older immigrants, but of different kinds. **Whereas new European Americans suffered haphazardly, Mexican Americans and Asian Americans experienced total and systematic exclusion akin to antiblack oppression.**

With roots in pre-1860 nativism, newer advocates of white American racial purity reacted with alarm to the new European immigration. They were part of the late nineteenth- and early

twentieth-century global resurgence of white supremacy fueled by immigration fears, eugenicist pseudo-science, and white imperialism targeting Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific (Ferrer 1999; Kevles 1995). Accordingly, some Progressive-Era (1895-1920) reformers advocated immigration restriction as a means of advancing eugenicist goals of “improving” the racial quality of society (APAN:II:547). They joined forces with many other WASPs, demanding legislation that would block further immigration by eastern and southern Europeans, and by Asians. In the 1920s, these nativist efforts succeeded in ending the post-1880 period of mass immigration. Indeed, 1920s quota laws, combined with reduced flow from sending countries, ended the near century (1830-1920) of mass European immigration. The percentage of foreign-born Americans fell dramatically in subsequent decades, not rising again until the late twentieth century after 1965 (ibid:886). Subsequent decades (1930s-1960s) saw gradual assimilation of white ethnics into WASP society (see Chapter 7), as well as ongoing importation of Mexican agricultural labor to the West and Southwest.

Despite white inter-ethnic tensions, European newcomers experienced exclusion in relatively mild and unsystematic forms. By contrast, systematic and legalized exclusion of Mexicans and East Asians was comparable to treatment of blacks. **Variation in WASP racism (1880-1920) created the contrasting residential patterns contributing to mid-century acceptance of white ethnics as socially “white,” and mid-century ongoing exclusion of Mexicans, East Asians, and African Americans** (Fernandez 2012; Takaki 1989). Residential segregation limited these latter groups’ opportunities for economic advance and social integration (Cf. Telles & Ortiz 2008:42). Whereas white ethnics (1930-1965) increasingly crossed the color line, achieving political power and urban and suburban integration in housing and schools, Mexicans and East Asians (like African Americans) endured continuing political exclusion and racial segregation (APAN:II:494; Klinkner & Smith 1999:326). White exclusion created similarly monoethnic ghettos of Chinese (e.g., San Francisco’s Chinatown) and Mexicans (e.g., East Los Angeles).

Residential and school segregation limited their opportunities for advance, whereas multiethnic integration of Europeans allowed such advance (APAN:II:495).

Today's descendants of white ethnics tend to overlook this history. Many of their immigrant ancestors worked very hard to rise in American society. However, they did so on a playing field that was far from level: discrimination against African Americans, East Asians, and Mexicans was far more severe, creating patterns of exclusion lasting into the present (Massey & Denton 1993:2; Sanchez 1993).

Anti-Asian nativism. Anti-Asian politics was based in WASP hostility toward Chinese and Japanese. Immigration law, for example, was particularly discriminatory against East Asians, maintaining exclusion until the 1965 Immigration Act ended nationality quotas favoring northwestern Europeans. In 1882, the **Chinese Exclusion Act** had suspended immigration and naturalization of Chinese, mostly manual laborers. But immigration policy formed only part of a much wider spectrum of WASP anti-Asian actions, including violence and terrorism, housing and school segregation, and property disqualification (APAN:II:571). WASPs also excluded Asians from opportunities in civil society, such as male intermarriage with white women (also denied to African Americans) (ibid:462-63).

Early 1900s anti-Asian exclusion culminated in **WWII Japanese American internment camps** (originally called “concentration camps”: Klinkner & Smith 1999:179). Responding to President Roosevelt’s go-ahead in February 1942, the Army began removing virtually all Americans of Japanese descent from their homes; many internments lasted until 1946 (APAN:II:701). Army justifications, based in white supremacy, claimed that the “Japanese race is an enemy race,” that “racial affinities are not severed by migration” from Japan to the U.S., and that even among “third generation Japanese born in the United States, [the] racial strains are undiluted” (quoted in Klinkner & Smith 1999:179).

Further evidence likewise suggests that Japanese internment

primarily stemmed from anti-Asian racism rather than sheer wartime necessity: (1) The Army dealt with German Americans and Italian Americans as possible security threats on an individual basis. By contrast, Japanese Americans were judged collectively, en masse. (2) The British handled all possible internal security risks on an individual basis, regardless of race or nationality. (3) The Army failed to find any Japanese Americans guilty of active subversion (ibid:194). In 1988 the U.S. government officially apologized and offered financial reparation (\$20,000) to each surviving internee, of whom about 60,000 were still living (APAN:II:701). However, this response paled in comparison to victims' lost dignity, homes, and jobs during the war, and decades of continued post-1945 exclusion (Harvey 2007:227).

China—in contrast to Japan, Germany, and Italy—was a U.S. wartime ally. In 1943, Congress accepted Chinese immigration on a largely symbolic rather than actual basis. It ended the Chinese Exclusion Acts, made naturalization possible for people of Chinese ancestry, and assigned a yearly immigration maximum quota of 105 people from China (Klinkner & Smith 1999:377). In the Army, Chinese Americans (like Hispanics and Native Americans) served in white units, whereas African Americans and Japanese Americans served in racially segregated units (APAN:II:705). As noted, Congress did not eliminate white-supremacist immigration quotas until 1965 (see Chapter 13). However, the 1960s also saw the dramatic escalation of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. Though officially fought with Asian allies, the Vietnam War was a conflict against an Asian enemy, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. As with anti-Japanese racism during WWII, so during this war many Americans learned to see the Vietnamese as racial and social inferiors (Klinkner & Smith 1999:286). As with African Americans and Mexican Americans, white anti-Asian racism and nativism has had a long history in America.

Chapter 6 Summary

Chapter 6 presented the history of early immigration to the

United States, and nativism. Section 6.1 explained why people immigrate in terms of two factors: insecurity and limited opportunity. It defined nativism as fear of the native-born that immigrants are worsening the nation or local community. The section also explained how WASPs became a cohesive racial-ethnic group.

Section 6.2 presented the history of immigration to 1860, the eve of the Civil War. WASPs saw the major immigrant groups, especially Irish Catholics, as nonwhite and reacted with nativist violence. The section also described how U.S. westward expansion created the Mexican border and Southwest.

Section 6.3 continued the story of mass immigration, from 1860 to 1929. Immigrant sending regions shifted to southern and eastern Europe, as well as East Asia and Mexico. Europeans came especially to northern and eastern urban areas, whereas East Asians and Mexicans arrived mostly to western and southwestern areas (both urban and rural).

Section 6.4 discussed the development of nativism after 1860. Renewed racism and nativism led to the end of mass immigration in the 1920s, when immigration quota laws were introduced. Variation in WASP racism involved only haphazard exclusion of European immigrants, but systematic exclusion of East Asians, Mexicans, and African Americans. An example is the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.

[1] Image: Public domain

[2] Image credit: Creative Commons license (Eric Koch / Anefo – [Nationaal Archief](#) 917-9297)

[3] Source: Wikipedia, “Robert K. Merton”; Accessed 1/25/21.

[4] Reagan had some Irish Catholic ancestry: Wikipedia, “Ronald Reagan.” Accessed 1/29/21.

[5] Image credit: Creative Commons license (“[My Great-](#)

[Grandparents- The Pence's](#) by [TimothyJ](#) is licensed under [CC BY 2.0](#))

[6] Source: Wikipedia, "Great Famine (Ireland)." Accessed 1/26/21.

[7] Image: Public domain

The servant, taller and stronger than the mistress with an Irish clover design on her dress, raises her fist defiantly. She is portrayed as “masculine” rather than “feminine”: her body is larger than her mistress’, with bulging muscles and legs spread aggressively. The two faces contrast: whereas the mistress’ features (gazing upward) are conventionally “feminine,” the servant’s are “masculine” (or perhaps apelike) with buck teeth, large upper lip, and downward self-righteous gaze. Finally, the ironic title contrasts “WE” with “THE IRISH,” identifying the viewer as WASP. Overall, the cartoon mocks Irish American pretensions to dignity and autonomy by presenting these as ridiculous imitations of the “serious” American Declaration of Independence. Irish self-assertion can only create domestic (national) disturbance.

Unlike in the 1800s, Irish Americans today (like Irish in Ireland, Northern Ireland and Britain, and elsewhere) are perceived, and perceive themselves, as fully and unambiguously white, ticking this box on census forms. Irish no longer stand out from white Americans in religion, wealth, politics, or education. How did Irish Americans undergo a social process—not merely of assimilation—but of **whitening**, and over many decades *become* white (Ignatiev 2009)? How did racial assimilation work with other European groups such as Italians, Poles, Hungarians, Greeks, Jews? How has whitening changed, or not changed, white perceptions of African Americans, Asian Americans, and Hispanics? What is whiteness, and how does it reflect social power?

Chapter 7 Learning Objectives

7.1 The Social Construction of Race

- Explain what sociologists mean by saying that race is socially constructed
- Understand race as a relationship of power among social groups

7.2 Different Ways to Be White

- Contrast different ways that groups have claimed whiteness

7.3 Whitening: From White-Ethnic to White

- Define whitening
- Define white privilege

7.4 Whitening: From Darker to Lighter

- Explain how one-drop ideology differentiated whitening in North America vs. Latin America

Chapter 7 Key Terms (in order of appearance in chapter)

whitening (two versions): (1) A social process of immigrant assimilation into an established white group. (2) A social process in which a darker-skinned group becomes lighter-skinned by intermarrying with the lighter-skinned.

the social construction of reality (SCR): different social groups experience the world in overlapping yet distinctive ways

legal whiteness: white categorization of a group in formal law

social whiteness: white categorization of a group in everyday, informal actions (especially by established whites such as WASPs)

whiteness by “inspection”: North American way of determining whiteness, based on the one-drop rule (your physical traits like skin color)

whiteness by “decency”: Latin American way of determining whiteness, based on your position in the community

white privilege: unearned social, economic, and political benefits accruing to whites but denied to nonwhites (for example, in Brazil, South Africa, and the U.S.)

7.1 The Social Construction of Race

Chapter 3 introduced the concept of social construction. “As a phenomenon of the social world, not the natural world, race is a social construction that reflects differences of power among social groups” (Ch.3 above). **The social construction of reality** (SCR) is one of the most important ideas in social science and philosophy of the past century. Part of its usefulness is its flexibility; sociologists have different versions. But they’d all agree with the following:

Ancient and medieval European philosophers claimed that the world was completely independent of human actions and ideas. God created the world as containing certain kinds of animals, minerals, places, and people. Although people spoke many different languages, all languages referred to the same animals, minerals, places, and people. There was one sacred language that God used to communicate with people (Latin, in the Middle Ages). Likewise, there was one way of learning about God’s creation, through study of sacred texts (Bible) and logical reasoning. The world was independent of what people did. Reality was simply there, not the outcome of any process other than God’s creative activity.

In the 1600s and 1700s, leading European modern philosophers started to question this view. By the 1700s they were seeking to acknowledge and refute skeptical arguments that reason actually can’t tell us about reality in itself. Regardless of whether God exists or not, maybe we can’t know for certain what the world is like. So far this sounds like ancient skepticism doubting the trustworthiness of our seeing, hearing, tasting. But here’s the modern twist: the mind interposes itself like a screen between us (consciousness) and the world (reality). The screen doesn’t simply distort, but **constructs** (produces, generates) our awareness in terms of its own structures. Knowledge is an outcome of a process: the mind’s active processing of raw sensation. Thus, we can’t directly know reality because the mind has always *already* processed our sensory input (sights, sounds, smells) prior to our awareness. When you smell roses, you can’t smell the rose itself. You can only smell the rose as constructed (processed, produced) by your mind. The mind combines the raw

smell (sensory data entering your nose) with its own processing structure. The result is your experience of smelling roses, or any other human experience—not unknowable reality “in itself.” Since all minds have identical structures, we all experience the same smell. By 1800, this argument had revolutionized philosophy (Gardner 1999).

After 1900, philosophers developed reality construction ideas in several ways. Here’s the version relevant to sociology: People are not just minds constructing reality. Rather, mentality is embodied, a way of doing things in culturally appropriate ways (Merleau-Ponty 1945; Ryle 1949; Wittgenstein 1953). Mind is visible in ordinary things our bodies do (grimace in pain) and say (announce an intention to eat chocolate) as we interact with each other. Healthy babies across the world have identical brain structures. But they are raised in different cultures with overlapping yet contrasting ways of doing things. Chinese and Italians both cook noodles; but they use chopsticks or forks to eat them. And the Mandarin Chinese and Italian languages refer to different types of noodles. Thus, against a background of human unity, different societies interpret reality in distinctive ways. Chinese experience is not identical to Italian experience. Modern French experience is not identical to medieval French experience.

Likewise, **different groups within the same society (women vs. men, poor vs. rich, black vs. white, Los Angelenos vs. Kansans) make sense of the world in overlapping, yet distinctive ways.** In the U.S., middle-class, urban white women—on the one hand—and working-class, rural Mexican men who are undocumented immigrants—on the other—likely have many cultural barriers to cross to understand each other. Now we can see why sociologists Berger and Luckmann (1966) described this view as “social” construction of reality (SCR). Our overlapping yet contrasting social identities shape our shared experience of the world in distinctive ways. Studying diversity has a lot to do with learning about these distinctive experiences. Sociologists are especially interested in how SCR relates to social inequality. How do powerful groups (e.g.,

whites, men, the wealthy, heterosexuals) understand the world in ways that contrast with the experience of less powerful groups (e.g., people of color, women, the poor, lesbians)?

A common misunderstanding: Some philosophers historically argued that the mind “creates reality” in the sense that, without people, the world would disappear. This view (“philosophical idealism”) is not what sociologists claim. Sociologists hold that human experience is the outcome of how various kinds of people use everyday culture (ways of talking and doing things) to navigate their lives. As Chapter 2 noted, all people, including scientists, always have a “view from somewhere” (Rorty 1979).

Race as socially constructed. “As a phenomenon of the social world, not the natural world, race is a social construction that reflects differences of power among social groups” (Ch.3 above). We’ve seen that race has no important biological basis. There are no human sub-species: race is an illusion, not biologically real. *But we treat it as real*, and that’s crucial. Sociologically, race continues to matter in the twenty-first century as a key part of social identities and distinctions across world cultures.

Human beings (*Homo sapiens*) have always sought to distinguish their particular group from others: us vs. them (Bourdieu 1984). “Our” way of life is better than “theirs”—as are our god(s), our mythical origins, our ceremonies, our food, our beauty, etc. In short, we are better than they. Using power and violence to enforce social distinction is a human universal. Perhaps especially since the prehistoric transition to agriculture (farming) and settled life, groups have distinguished themselves from others in numerous ways: by place of dwelling, housing, food, religion, gender, age, caste, class, etc.

Not, however, by race. It is a striking historical fact that race—in the modern (1800s) sense of a global hierarchy of peoples based on innate physical traits—did not begin to emerge until the 1400s, as a direct consequence of increasing European encounters with non-Europeans (Desmond & Emirbayer 2010). Not until the 1700s and

especially 1800s did Europeans develop elaborate pseudo-scientific theories justifying white supremacy in terms of innate traits (white skin, brain size, bodily proportions: Gould 1996). **Western Europeans invented race to explain and justify global colonization: first to themselves, then to colonized others** (for the U.S., see Allen 1994; for Spain, see Warman 2003:68). Thus, the very concept of race—e.g., as a way many nations today categorize citizens on census forms (Loveman 2014)—originated as the new and modern way Europeans (1500s) distinguished themselves from everyone else to claim their own innate superiority. Simply by taking race seriously we are already accepting assumptions made long ago by European colonialism.

Like older “us-them” distinctions, race emerged as a *relational* concept (Blumer 1958; Desmond & Emirbayer 2010). Europeans (1500s) proposed a world hierarchy of peoples, with themselves at the top. Since then, race has always been a technique for whites to distinguish themselves from nonwhites. Centuries of European global colonization made racial whiteness synonymous with goodness (virtue), beauty, and truth; color became a sign of badness, ugliness, and falsity. As the color of power, whiteness marked the racial distinctions so necessary to European claims of natural superiority. For instance, the American binary opposition of “white or black” first arose in the British colonial era, with fateful consequences that still shape racial identity and race relations today. Between 1607 (Jamestown) and 1776, American whiteness acquired its modern meaning of “not-Indian” and “not-black” (Harvey 2007:Ch.2).

This either-or, mutual exclusivity of race—the one-drop rule (see Chapter 5)—was more rigid in North America than in most other regions of European global colonization. This descent rule forming the foundation of U.S. racial classification is relatively unique in the rigor of its ancestry principle for deciding who is and is not white (Fredrickson 1981:96). One-drop ideology allowed American colonists to embrace overall homogeneity—“whiteness”—of a wide variety of northwestern European ethnicities and peoples—English,

Scots, Scots Irish, Welsh, Dutch, German, French, Swedes—while rejecting any similarities with African or Native American ethnicities, even people of mixed European ancestry. The fact that these Europeans were almost all Protestants made white racialization (as WASP) easier. The question of Indians was less clear, with some prominent whites such as Thomas Jefferson opining that Indians were closer to whites than were blacks (Klinkner & Smith 1999:23-24). Thus, American racial hierarchy was well established by 1776: whites (WASPs) on top, Indians in the middle, and blacks below.

7.2 Different Ways to Be White

Being WASP was a first way for Americans to be white. By 1800—regardless of wealth, social reputation, European vs. American birthplace, or European ethnicity—if you were of purely northwestern European ancestry, you were white.

Pan-white-ethnic nativism served an important political function particularly between 1763 and 1776, fueling cross-colonial (“American”) solidarity against the British Empire (Chasteen 2001:104-05). This was crucial to the success of Independence, since British North America was one of the most socially diverse regions in the eighteenth-century world (APAN:I:98-99). Though enslaved and free blacks, and Indians, also participated in rebellion, the white creole leadership (many of whom owned slaves) never contemplated civil and political equality with Negroes or Indians. The Founders envisioned the nation as white—as “not-Indian” and “not-black” (see Chapter 5). Indeed, following ratification of the Constitution, **one of Congress’ first laws (1790) restricted naturalization to “free white persons”: only white immigrants could become citizens** (Fredrickson 1981:145; Gómez 2018:146).^[2]

U.S. revolutionaries had not needed nonwhite support nearly as much as did Latin American leaders (e.g., Mexico, South America) with much larger mestizo and indigenous populations (Chasteen 2001:105). Though the American Revolution depended on pan-white-ethnic unity, there was no political need for the Founders to

develop a *multiracial* nationalist ideology, which moreover would threaten the slavery on which both southern and northern colonies profited. We've seen (Ch.5 above) that the most racially egalitarian of them (e.g., Franklin, Samuel Adams, John Adams, Jay, Hamilton) opposed slavery, but this group sympathized with proposals of black mass deportation to Africa—another version of white nationalism—rather than nonwhite full citizenship (Fredrickson 1981:144-145).

True, Latin American ethnic nationalism “celebrates the unique: a particular historical experience, a particular culture”; whereas U.S. civic nationalism “tends to focus on a set of shared political ground rules and ideals” (Chasteen 2001:215). But the North American colonies had already long excluded (using the one-drop rule) nonwhites from the political, economic, and civil spheres; and this exclusion continued long after Independence. Starting in the 1770s, U.S. legislation grounded citizenship rights in male gender and whiteness (APAN:I:202). In sum, the Founders blended civic nationalism with pan-white-ethnic nationalism (WASP nationalism excluding nonwhites). **Race (whiteness) and nation were tightly interwoven from the very beginning in U.S. history** (Harvey 2007:14), though in ways that contrasted with Latin American ethnic nationalism (1810-1825).

After 1830, large-scale immigration posed increasing challenges to WASP notions of whiteness (Jacobson 1998; see Chapter 6). Given WASP white nationalism, the new immigration simultaneously threatened their vision of American identity. Anti-Catholic nativists made explicit this WASP understanding that “white” also meant Protestant. Over the following century (1830-1920) of mass immigration, WASPs (old whites, established whites) displayed their power to accept or reject claims of whiteness by immigrants (new whites, white ethnics). The first Catholic presidential candidacy with a major party—Democratic New York Governor Alfred E. Smith in 1928, a second-generation Irish immigrant—only came many decades later, and his bid was hampered by ongoing anti-Catholic prejudice, especially in rural and southern regions (APAN:II:642).

Even in 1960 when Kennedy (likewise Irish Catholic) won the presidency, he aroused similar widespread WASP prejudice.

All European immigrant groups, as well as Mexicans and Asians, lobbied persistently for WASPs to accept them as fully white Americans.^[3] Their arguments hinged on claims of being “not-black” and “not-Indian,” negative relationships with blackness and indigenesness revealing the pervasive influence of the one-drop rule (white “purity” values) in American society. Yet, even if groups attained **legal whiteness**, like Mexican Americans after 1848, **social whiteness** often remained elusive. For instance, in 1850s Texas, as in New Mexico, Mexicans were categorized legally as white. Though Texas state law banned white-black marriage, Mexican-black marriages were only rarely prosecuted. Mexicans may have been legally white, but social whiteness was restricted to Anglos (non-Mexican whites) (Gómez 2018:107). In U.S. history, egalitarian law has frequently proven insufficient to end racist social customs (Klinkner & Smith 1999; see Chapter 5). Legal, formal citizenship rights do not guarantee substantive, real-world citizenship rights (Hohle 2018:29, 49).



Figure 7.1.^[4] Irish American Al Smith was the 1928 Democratic candidate for president.

WASPs, in turn, evaluated immigrant groups' claims of whiteness using criteria that strongly contrasted with how Latin American elites often viewed whiteness (Briggs 2002:61-62). Although both views (North America, Latin America) of whiteness were racist by

assuming whites to be superior to nonwhites, there were key differences. **North Americans often decided whiteness by “inspection,”** for example by observation of a person’s skin color and hair type. Racial categorization was premised on the one-drop assumption, meaning that white and black were mutually exclusive. Whiteness was all or nothing: a person was either purely white or not white at all.

By contrast, **Latin Americans often decided whiteness by “decency.”** This view rejected the one-drop assumption. A person didn’t necessarily need to be of “pure” white race to be considered white by local elites. It could be sufficient to have some white ancestors, to come from *gente decente* (decent people: a worthy, honorable family), and to have done nothing to stain your family’s reputation (Yashar 2005). Whiteness was a personalized, social category having much to do with one’s family, wealth, and place in the community.

Table 7.1. Two ways of judging whiteness: inspection vs. decency

Process	Focus	Region	Description
Whiteness determined by “inspection”	Individual focus	North America	Whiteness is an impersonal, visual, inspectable characteristic, based on “purity” of ancestry. You know it when you see it. Anyone not white is “of color” (everyone else: a residual category). People are born white or nonwhite; no matter what you do in life, you can’t change racial status. Whiteness has rigid boundaries.
Whiteness determined by “decency”	Community focus	Latin America	Whiteness is a personalized, social characteristic, based on membership in a “decent” family. You often know it when you see it, but it also greatly depends on contextual factors of wealth, social reputation, and education (is less knowable at first glance than in U.S.). People are born into racial categories, but what you do in life can strongly influence how you are racially perceived.

Sources: Adapted from Briggs 2002:61–62; Telles 2004:219.

Table 7.1’s categories express something fundamentally contrastive, rooted in distinctive colonial histories, about the social construction of race in North America versus Latin America (Telles 2004:1). Nevertheless, in Latin America there has been much judgment of whiteness by “inspection”—and in North America much judgment of whiteness by “decency” (and nonwhiteness by “indecency”) (Gómez 2018:155).

The white-skinned Irish exemplify this complexity. Like the cartoon image opening this chapter, many nineteenth-century images and descriptions portray the Irish as beyond the pale of civilization: a “race” mired in barbarism (Ignatiev 2009). Indeed, the very phrase “beyond the pale” originally referred to the wooden

defenses (“pale,” “palisade”) separating “civilized” 1500s English Dublin from the “wild Irish” beyond (Fredrickson 1981:14-17). Many nineteenth-century British and American WASP observers drew detailed comparisons between Irish and blacks. For example, in 1849 Scottish author Thomas Carlyle—writing disparagingly about Afro-Jamaicans—claimed that

“‘[b]lackness’ was not simply a matter of biological endowment...but both consequence and manifestation of culture and labor. Indeed, the whiteness of the Irish was incidental and even something of an inconvenience, because ‘having a white skin and European features, [they] cannot be prevented from circulating among us [British] at discretion’” (Holt 1992:282).

Carlyle wasn’t judging the Irish as nonwhite by inspection, but by decency—or rather their “black” indecency (alleged lack of culture and laziness). The passage also shows how WASPs saw people of African ancestry as the lowest common denominator of humanity. As we’ve seen, whiteness is a *relational* concept: groups became “whiter” the higher they stood on the European racial hierarchy, with blacks at the bottom and the white-skinned but indecent Irish not far above.

7.3 Whitening: From White-Ethnic to White

After the first way to be white American (by being WASP), a new way emerged during mass immigration (1830-1920): whitening. As a form of European immigrant assimilation, **whitening was the social process of established whites increasingly accepting a racialized group as “white” (or “American”).** Such groups included Jews, Germans, Irish, Italians, Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Greeks, Russians, etc.

During the 1800s-1900s, WASPs acted as racial gatekeepers with power to accept or reject claims of whiteness: “the privilege to confer whiteness” (Moore 2018:70). In the twentieth century, whitening increasingly allowed Irish Americans and descendants of

southern and eastern European immigrants to join WASPs as white Americans, an achievement of Americanization assumed to promote “progress” and “civilization.” Immigrants and their descendants wanted this because being perceived as white offered **white privilege**: unearned social, economic, and political benefits accruing to whites but denied to nonwhites, especially blacks (Desmond & Emirbayer 2010).

Whitening could also apply to Native Americans, though with much historical variation. For example, in 1924 the Snyder Act extended citizenship to all Native Americans not already citizens (APAN:II:618). Such overnight changes in political status could influence WASP perceptions of whiteness, but by no means guaranteed social or economic inclusion.

7.4 Whitening: From Darker to Lighter

For Americans of African ancestry, WASP racial purity ideology (determining whiteness by inspection) had always made being white impossible. No matter how light-skinned, one was always “Negro” (or “black” or “African American”)—both to bureaucratic categorizers in schools, workplace, and government, and to whites in everyday life. As we’ve seen (Chapter 4), the very category of white originated (1400s-1500s) as the European racial binary opposite of non-Europeans, especially black Africans. Whiteness was flexible and could mean many things—by 1945 even being Irish, Jewish, or Mexican—but it couldn’t mean being black.

After 1945, whitening of white ethnics didn’t diminish the power of the “white or black” one-drop rule. Rather, it simply added more groups to the expanded white category. Once whitened, descendants of white ethnics could themselves exercise white privilege over African Americans, Asian Americans, and Mexican Americans (APAN:II:760). Today, U.S. racial commonsense—among whites as well as people of color—often continues to assume black-white mutual exclusivity (whiteness by inspection). For example, Barack Obama’s emergence on the national political scene in the

early 2000s generated much debate on how “African American” he was, given his Kansan white mother and Kenyan black father. Nevertheless, he was almost universally perceived as nonwhite (“our first black president”).

By contrast, Latin American racial categorization of Africa-descended groups worked differently, absent the North American one-drop rule (Loveman 2014). In both regions, white supremacy made whiteness socially valued, but Latin American color lines were often more permeable than the U.S. color line, especially where large mestizo populations lived. For centuries, dark-skinned Brazilians, Venezuelans, Mexicans, Cubans, Dominicans, etc. had sought increased social acceptance for themselves and their children by marrying “up” with lighter-skinned partners (Chasteen 2001:84-87; Marx 1997:66-67). (U.S. blacks did too, but in the context of one-drop ideology.) Social status was strongly influenced by shades of skin color (Lamming 1953:xxxvii). Between 1880-1940, whitening of mestizo populations was a major national project for many Latin American countries—especially Brazil, with its large nonwhite population (Telles 2004:28-31). In a neocolonial age of ascendant white supremacy and scientific racism, elites introduced immigration policies promoting white European immigration, with the explicit goal of “lightening” the national complexion to “improve” the national racial type (Chasteen 2001:169, 215-16). According to such leaders—influenced and pressured by Europe and the U.S.—moving from darker to lighter was a form of national “progress.”

In sum, contrasting forms of white supremacy produced different versions of whitening in Latin and North America (Chasteen 2001:86). Today, whitening through intermarriage continues as an important route to upward social mobility for nonwhite Brazilians, with lighter skin color continuing to mark higher social status (Telles 2004:238). Throughout Latin America, race and class remain strongly linked: wealthier people tend to have lighter skin (more European and less African or indigenous ancestry), and poorer people tend to be darker with more non-European ancestry

(Chasteen 2001:20-21; cf. Castellanos 1960; Volpi 2018; Warman 1979). Likewise, in the U.S., patterns of political, economic, and social power continue to correlate with degrees of European ancestry and shades of skin color.

Chapter 7 and Unit II Summary

Chapter 7 introduced the social process of whitening. Section 7.1 explained one of the most important concepts in social science, history, and philosophy: the social construction of reality. The section discussed what sociologists mean by saying that race is socially constructed.

Section 7.2 discussed different ways to be white. It contrasted different ways by which racial-ethnic groups have claimed whiteness. The contrasts center on Latin America versus North America.

Section 7.3 presented a form of whitening, defining it as European white-ethnic immigrant assimilation. The section also defined white privilege as unearned social, economic, and political benefits accruing to whites and whitened groups, but denied to nonwhites.

Section 7.4 presented another form of whitening. For centuries, New World groups of African ancestry sought access to the social privileges of whiteness by intermarrying with lighter-skinned people. Whitening, as a transition from darker to lighter skin across generations, worked in contrasting ways in Latin America versus North America. This was due to one-drop racial ideology in North America, and its absence in much of Latin America.

Overall, Unit II presented the historical relationship between whiteness and power. It illustrated this connection with historical overviews: of European global colonization, U.S. slavery in the colonial and national periods, U.S. immigration and nativism between 1830 and 1929, and whitening processes in the 1800s and 1900s.

[1] Image: Public domain

[2] In the Immigration and Naturalization Act (1790), Congress stipulated that only immigrant whites could become citizens: white nationalism was U.S. immigration policy. The law was not repealed until the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 (Klinkner & Smith 1999:29; Moore 2008:15; Telles & Ortiz 2008:327).

[3] Likewise, in Brazil (1872-1969) immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Middle East frequently negotiated to be included in the “white” category. The whitening of these groups transformed the meaning of whiteness in Brazil between 1850 and 1950 (Telles 2004:30-31).

[4] Image: Public domain

Chapter 8: Reconstruction and Apartheid, 1865-1968

UNIT III: LEGACIES OF RACIALIZED SLAVERY



During post-Civil War **Reconstruction**, lawyer Robert Brown Elliott (1842-1884, above left) served from 1871-74 as U.S. Congressman representing South Carolina's 3rd District.^[1] Elliott was British, born in Liverpool and a graduate of prestigious Eton College. He arrived in South Carolina at age 25 in 1867, where he entered politics and founded the first African American law firm.

Despite these achievements, violent southern white backlash against sharing political power with blacks forced Elliott from public life. He died in poverty at age 41 in New Orleans.[2]

Elliott's career—both tragic and triumphant—illustrates Reconstruction (1865-1877) as the beginning of U.S. federal protection of civil rights of African Americans and other marginalized groups. After Emancipation and a series of congressional civil rights laws enabling southern black political participation, how did whites succeed in depriving most blacks of basic political and civil rights such as voting access and land ownership? Why in these years did the federal government grant millions of acres of public land to whites (Morrill Act, 1862), yet fail to follow through on promises of land (“forty acres and a mule”) for newly freed slaves, paving the way to post-Reconstruction black disfranchisement and **debt slavery** in sharecropping?[3]

Another wave of congressional civil rights legislation—almost a century later (1950s-60s)—attempted to reincorporate blacks into the nation's political, economic, and social community. **Cold War** civil-rights activism was not new, but rather a phase of America's **long civil rights movement**: almost 100 years of post-Emancipation, black-led struggle against white nationalism, a struggle that continued after the 1960s. The protest signs (image above right) say “I AM A MAN”—a dignified, emphatic response to most whites' insistence (in the South, North, and West) that only whites merited full inclusion in the nation.[4] How did the long Civil Rights movement (APAN:I:437) of 1877-1954, together with WWII and Cold War foreign policy, make possible the victories of the modern Civil Rights movement (1954-1968)? What were similarities and differences between northern and southern versions of racial apartheid? What is the relationship between civil rights legislation (law, theory) and real-world experience (custom, practice)?

Chapter 8 Learning Objectives

8.1 Slavery and Civil War Causation

- Explain the relationship between slavery and the Civil War

8.2 Reconstruction: Origins of Modern Civil Rights, 1865-1877

- Explain the significance of the Reconstruction era to civil rights history
- Distinguish federal from state citizenship
- Describe an example of Reconstruction-era federal Civil Rights legislation
- Describe an example of Reconstruction-era Supreme Court decisions

8.3 American Apartheid: Black Exclusion and White Terrorism, 1877-1968[5]

- Describe how southern U.S. and South African apartheid were similar
- Describe major features of southern U.S. apartheid (aka Jim Crow)
- Define lynch law

8.4 Cold War Civil Rights[6]

- Understand the Cold-War context of modern Civil Rights achievements
- Compare and contrast Reconstruction-era (1865-77) and Cold War-era (1945-91) civil rights legislation

Chapter 8 Key Terms (in order of appearance in chapter)

Reconstruction: the post-Civil War period (1865-77) of the victorious North's political re-integration of the defeated South into the Union

debt slavery: a form of unofficial slavery in which creditors

coerce or entrap a social group in debt for generations. E.g., sharecropping in the post-Civil War South.

Cold War: the global ideological conflict (1945-91) between the U.S. (capitalism) and Soviet Union (communism).

the long civil rights movement: the decades-long, black-led social movement to secure full citizenship for African Americans. It was the context of the modern Civil Rights movement of the 1950s-60s.

American apartheid: racial segregation, either de jure (by law) or de facto (in fact). Post-Civil Rights America (post-1970) remained highly segregated in fact, though not in law, in neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces.

national citizenship: the legal status of citizen of the United States

state citizenship: the legal status of citizen of a U.S. state (e.g., Ohio)

de jure: legal phrase meaning “by law, officially, in theory”

de facto: legal phrase meaning “in fact, in practice”

caste: an especially rigid form of social stratification. The higher-caste group makes upward social mobility very difficult for the lower-caste group (e.g., whites and blacks during American apartheid).

Red Summer: white terrorism in 1919 in dozens of U.S. cities. (“Red” means “bloody.”)

lynch law: mob rule, vigilantism, terrorism. Extralegal white terrorism was common during the colonial era, antebellum era, and apartheid era. During apartheid, white terrorism (in the South, North, and West) targeted especially African Americans, but also Mexicans, Asians, and white ethnics (such as Jews and Italians).

8.1 Slavery and Civil War Causation

Historical causation is complex, involving interaction among a variety of processes and events. However, for decades the consensus view among professional historians has been that, if

assigned to any one single cause, **the Civil War was caused by slavery**. This is despite the ongoing reluctance of many (white) Americans to admit this conclusion, with its attendant glaring focus on the white supremacy of American political and social life in all phases of U.S. history (Levine 2005:x). It has seemed inconceivable to many whites that African Americans, even as enslaved, could have played such a central role in the nation's greatest crisis, the Civil War.

Civil War contemporaries frequently viewed slavery as the underlying reason for the sectional polarization—between northern free states and southern slave states—that led to war (APAN:I:374). In all the major events eventuating in war—the Compromise of 1850, the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, the 1857 Dred Scott decision, John Brown's 1859 Harpers Ferry raid, Southern secession following Lincoln's 1860 election victory—the great issue at stake and root of the conflict was slavery (Levine 2005: Afterword).

Given slavery's enormous importance in antebellum America, this conclusion should not be surprising. As discussed in Chapter 5, the late 1700s was a time of Northern emancipation and doubt about the future of slavery. However, by the early 1800s the South was redoubling its commitment to enslaved labor. Slaveowners dominated the South, and racialized slavery was the foundation of their social, economic, and political power. Due to cotton being the South's most lucrative cash crop, **it was the slaves themselves who produced it who represented the nation's most valuable property asset. In fact, the dollar value of slaves exceeded the combined value of all the United States' manufacturing, railroads, and banks.** In 1860, the total property value of slaves was about \$3.5 billion, or approximately \$75 billion in today's money (APAN:I:262). By the 1850s, the South was deeply invested in and committed to slavery and willing to take extreme political measures—even, as it turned out, secession from the United States and formation of a new federal government, the Confederate States of America—to preserve it. Likewise, despite increasing antebellum northern ideological opposition to slavery, northern industry was tightly linked to

southern slavery as supplier of finished products (e.g., shoes and hats worn by slaves) and purchaser of southern cotton.

The view from above—that of contemporary elites—provides much evidence that slavery was perceived as causing southern secession (between December 1860 and February 1861). Americans had long justified slavery in terms of white supremacy. In March 1861, Alexander Stevens, the Confederacy’s Vice President, voiced this ideology to explain the connection between secession and slavery. The new Confederacy’s “foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man, that slavery—subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal condition. This our new government is the first in the history of the world based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth” (quoted in Levine 2005:228). Stevens’ “Cornerstone Speech” portrays slavery and its preservation as the *raison d’être* of the new southern nation. Similar is the view from below: ordinary soldiers’ perspectives during the war. Slavery often appeared to northern and southern enlisted men to be the reason for the war (APAN:I:400). Relatedly, many African American men themselves served as Union soldiers: by 1865, almost 200,000 (Levine 2005:240).

White reluctance to assign slavery the preeminent role in causing the Civil War developed soon after Appomattox. Facing intense postwar antislavery public opinion, by the 1870s and 80s apologists of the Confederacy were denying the relationship between slavery and the war, instead inventing a romantic myth about secession as a heroic yet doomed “Lost Cause” (ibid:245). The Lost Cause myth, in turn, helped to smooth the process of northern and southern white reconciliation, and to end Reconstruction by 1877 (Marx 1997). Amnesia about slavery’s centrality to the nation’s greatest crisis (the Civil War) is one of many parallels between post-Reconstruction and post-Civil Rights America today (Blight 2002; Klinkner & Smith 1999).

8.2 Reconstruction: Origins of Modern Civil Rights, 1865-1877

Slavery's legacies endured long after the Civil War. Abolition (1863) was followed by massive white resistance—especially in the South, but also North and West—to extending (let alone enforcing) equal civil and political rights to African Americans. **Reconstruction (1865-77) featured the nation's first attempts to incorporate African Americans as a group into the federal- and state-level political communities on an equal basis with whites.** Extending equal rights to black citizens was a central project of Reconstruction (Klinkner & Smith 1999:90), within the overall context of the victorious North's political re-integration of the defeated South into the Union. It was an era of racially progressive federal policy, with Republicans dominating southern politics, African Americans participating in electoral processes, and government accepting the duty of protecting the basic rights of black citizens (Foner 1990:247). Thus, the origins of the modern Civil Rights movement (1954-1968) are found in the Reconstruction era.

In key ways, Americans today—in the post-Civil Rights era—continue to live in the watershed of Reconstruction, begun over 150 years ago. Today, with ongoing **de facto** racial segregation and inequality, Reconstruction remains an “unfinished revolution” (Foner 1988; see also APAN:I:446). It began the task of achieving justice for centuries of white enslavement of blacks—the root cause of the Civil War. After 1970, despite much important progress, the nation again largely retreated from acting on and enforcing its rhetorical support for equalizing civil and political rights for African Americans (Brown et al. 2003; Doane & Bonilla-Silva 2003; Harvey 2007; Kozol 2005; Orfield 1993). Moreover, the post-1970 retreat has recapitulated key aspects of the post-1877 retreat (Klinkner & Smith 1999). In a significant sense, then, **post-Civil Rights America began in 1877, not 1970.** As in recent decades, official color-blindness played a central role in post-1877 **American apartheid** (Alexander 2010; Massey & Denton 1993). Accordingly, post-Civil War history offers valuable insight into race relations in today's era of post-Civil Rights (see Chapters 9-11).

During Reconstruction, such insight comes especially from: (1) congressional legislation incorporating blacks into the nation as equals with whites; and (2) Supreme Court decisions that contributed to U.S. retreat from the enforcement of racial justice, the end of Reconstruction, and the turn toward twentieth-century apartheid (Massey & Denton 1993).

Racial progress: civil rights legislation, 1865-1875. During the Civil War and Reconstruction, the modern federal government and modern American citizenship were born. In effect, the nation transitioned from existence as a plural entity (the United States “are”) to a singular one (“is”). During the war, President Lincoln oversaw the rapid development of a federal government with much greater authority and scope than in antebellum times, including commitment to the ideal of equal rights of Americans as national (not just state) citizens, irrespective of their race (Foner 1990:xvi).

Note the distinction here between national and state citizenship. **Federal citizenship** refers to one’s legal status as a citizen of the United States, whereas **state citizenship** is one’s additional legal status as citizen of a particular state (e.g., Ohio, Alabama, California).^[7] Prior to 1860, federal citizenship in most areas of life counted for little as opposed to state citizenship. Federal authority over state and local affairs was relatively minimal. Accordingly, northern abolition (first emancipation: see Chapter 5) had occurred in state legislatures: at the state rather than federal level.

By contrast, **Reconstruction-era civil rights legislation came from Congress, occurring at the national (federal) level rather than state level.** The Civil War tasks of planning, executing, and coordinating Northern war aims had greatly increased the ability and willingness of the federal government (especially the Republican supermajority in Congress) to take bold action on civil rights. This legislation’s initial effectiveness at fully incorporating blacks into the political community was due to the federal government’s newly expanded reach into affairs (e.g., white exclusion of blacks) that had previously been controlled by state and local governments. That is,

Congress imposed a legal environment conducive to the growth of multiracial democracy on southern states where most whites were determined to maintain black exclusion.

Table 8.1. Civil Rights Legislation During Reconstruction

<i>Legislation</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Description</i>
Thirteenth Amendment	1865	Abolished slavery throughout the United States (APAN:I:422).
Freedmen's Bureau	1865	The Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (the Freedmen's Bureau) managed large-scale federal aid to citizens in the context of Civil War recovery (APAN:I:423).
Civil Rights Act	1866	The first legal guarantee of rights of Americans as national, versus state, citizens (APAN:I:430). The law prioritized "fundamental rights belonging to every man as a free man" over any state law or practice violating such rights (Foner 1990:110).
Fourteenth Amendment	1868	Often described as among the most important of all constitutional amendments. The Amendment forbade states from violating persons' life, liberty, or property without legal due process, or withholding equal protection of the laws (Foner 1990:115). The Amendment provided the legal foundation for many subsequent antiracism actions of the Civil Rights movement (Moore 2008:93).
Fifteenth Amendment	1870	The Amendment prohibited state-level obstruction of voting rights "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude" (APAN:I:434).
The Enforcement Acts	1870-71	Laws providing enforcement measures to civil rights legislation at federal and state levels (Foner 1990:195).
Civil Rights Act	1875	The Act sought to guarantee African Americans equal accommodations with whites in public spaces. But its lack of enforcement measures prevented it from having its claimed effect (APAN:I:441).

Sources: Adapted from APAN:I; Foner 1990; Moore 2008

Retreat from racial justice: white terrorism and Supreme Court decisions, 1869-1896. When American civil rights legislation has been backed up by the willingness and means to enforce it, progress toward equality has been swift (Klinkner & Smith 1999). Enforcement was essential to early Reconstruction's successes, which made major strides toward multiracial democracy (APAN:I:435).

However, as America retreated during the 1870s from commitment to racial justice, civil rights activity became largely rhetorical rather than actual. The effectiveness of federal legislation became severely limited by failure to enforce it. By 1877, several factors had contributed to the retreat: northern Republicans' fatigue with Reconstruction, a recession, and Democrat-Republican compromise on electing Ohio governor Hayes as President (Marx 1997:13). Likewise, by 1877 whites at state and local levels (especially in the South, where most blacks lived) were becoming increasingly adept at circumventing civil rights laws with indirect, color-blind language not mentioning race. Between the 1880s and 1910, most blacks were excluded from political participation with a panoply of voting restrictions added to state laws and constitutions (Fredrickson 1981:239).

White backlash against black equality began immediately after Emancipation. This took a variety of legal and extralegal forms, but often involved implicit or explicit threats of violence. Antiblack white violence was frequent in the South following the Civil War, as whites attempted to re-impose white supremacy in the new legal, political, and economic environment. Many freedpeople who asserted their basic citizenship rights—exercising freedom of movement away from plantations, challenging contracts, purchasing or renting land, resisting whippings—were physically assaulted or murdered (Foner 1990:53; see also Morrison 1987).

White nationalist terrorism has always thrived on white resentment at multiracial democracy. For example, the Ku Klux Klan

was formed during Reconstruction (1866) as a Tennessee social club of Confederate veterans. Its name was based on “kuklos” (or “kyklos”), meaning “circle” in Greek (APAN:I:438). As it expanded into almost all southern states, the Klan used extralegal violence to impose white supremacy by force, terrorizing black and white Republicans during the 1868 presidential election (Foner 1990:146). As southern whites developed more sophisticated and indirect means of re-imposing white supremacy by the 1880s, Klan activity lessened. However, black challenges to white supremacy after WWI and WWII fed rapid growth of Klan membership in the 1920s and 1950s.

Just as significant as white terrorism were **the Supreme Court’s racially retrogressive decisions. Especially during the 1860s-1880s**, the Court played a key role in assisting the white backlash that ended Reconstruction. Prior to *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896)—which definitively began southern Jim Crow segregation—a series of important cases set the stage for American apartheid.

Table 8.2. Supreme Court Civil Rights Decisions, 1869-1896

Decision	Year	Description
<i>Slaughter-House Cases</i>	1869-73	The Court reduced the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. It narrowed the rights of national citizenship, while assigning the racially relevant rights to matters of state citizenship (APAN:I:443).
<i>U.S. v. Cruikshank</i>	1876	This case further reduced the power of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to protect black civil rights (APAN:I:443; Klinkner & Smith 1999:Ch.3).
<i>Civil Rights Cases</i>	1883	The Court overturned the 1875 Civil Rights Act (Foner 1990:247). Justice Joseph Bradley, writing for the majority, asserted that “although African Americans had perhaps merited some assistance right after the end of slavery, ‘there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws’” (Klinkner & Smith 1999:329-30).
<i>Plessy v. Ferguson</i>	1896	The Court’s “separate but equal” decision upheld states’ rights over federal intervention in racial segregation. It marked the definitive beginning of post-Civil Rights apartheid.

Sources: Adapted from APAN:I; Foner 1990; Klinkner & Smith 1999

In sum, the end of Reconstruction (1877) began **a recurring theme in American civil rights history, right up to the twenty-first century: the difference between de jure equality and de facto equality.** The *Plessy* segregationist dictum of “separate but equal,” after all, rhetorically asserted and embraced racial equality. But such equality, as the Court recognized decades later (1954: *Brown v. Board*), was merely a “legal fiction” (Fredrickson 1981:239), not genuine. Similarly, Congress’s Fair Housing Act (1968) rhetorically

embraced open housing (prohibiting racial discrimination in the housing market). But the Act's enforcement measures were gutted before being voted into law, ensuring that American neighborhoods in subsequent decades would remain highly segregated for blacks (Massey & Denton 1993:83). Likewise, key Supreme Court decisions since the 1960s have supported modern white backlash against modern civil rights legislation.^[8] Whether in 1877 or 1968, it has often been America's failure to enforce its civil rights laws that has prevented de jure equality from becoming de facto equality (Alexander 2010).

8.3 American Apartheid: Black Exclusion and White Terrorism, 1877-1968

As sociologist W. E. B. Du Bois (1903; see Chapter 1) famously predicted, the twentieth century was the century of the color line. American apartheid was whites' use of racial segregation and color bars following the Supreme Court's *Plessy* "separate but equal" decision (1896), especially in the South but also in the North and West (Sugrue 2008).

Although white supremacy was old by 1900, apartheid was new. There were many forms of pre-1900 racial exclusion (e.g., northern and southern state Black Codes). But **prior to the twentieth century, whites tended not to strictly segregate African Americans, either in the South or the North** (Massey & Denton 1993:10). Between the Civil War and 1900, most blacks continued to live in the South, predominantly in rural debt slavery (sharecropping) but also in cities. In both settings, long traditions of black servants living near white masters slowed the growth of residential segregation. In the North, blacks experienced much exclusion (e.g., see Chapter 5 on Ohio's Black Laws), but stricter racial segregation was not characteristic of northern schools, neighborhoods, and businesses until after 1900.

By 1900, formal (southern) and informal (northern) racial segregation—apartheid—in neighborhoods, employment, schools,

and public accommodations (hotels, restaurants, parks, cemeteries, toilets, drinking fountains, pools, beaches) was becoming common throughout the nation. Twentieth-century segregation took distinctive forms in the South, North, and West. Below, we discuss its major features in the South, highlighting similarities with South African apartheid.

Southern apartheid (aka Jim Crow segregation). The system of formal apartheid in the South, largely in place by 1900, maintained a strict caste division between white and black racial groups (Fredrickson 1981:252). In a **caste society**, social mobility by the out-caste group (e.g., African Americans) is rendered extremely difficult, with most members kept at the bottom of (or excluded from) social, economic, and political hierarchies (ibid:98; cf. Cox 1948; Wilkerson 2020). Southern state laws and customs restricted blacks' physical movements, marriage choices, educational options, job options and careers, political participation, etc., all of which blocked social ascent.

Nevertheless, despite the context of white supremacy, southerners of both races had much in common, sharing the same society, economy, legal system, and overlapping cultures (Fredrickson 1981:252). For decades following 1877, the South would contrast with the North as a region of poverty, illiteracy, and ill health and disease (e.g., malaria) (APAN:II:670-71). Federal interventions during the 1930s New Deal brought benefits to southern states. However, southern white elites used states' rights rhetoric to challenge any federal action threatening racial hierarchy (ibid:671). Although the South's disprivilege (as compared to the North) affected both races, blacks suffered disproportionately in the three-way relationship among northern whites, southern whites, and southern blacks.

This relationship was paralleled in South Africa by that linking British whites, Dutch Afrikaner whites, and native blacks. In both world regions, twentieth-century apartheid and white racial terrorism greatly magnified the ravages of poverty, disease, and

poor education on black and brown people. Likewise, in both South Africa and America white elites had long used white supremacy as a divide-and-rule political strategy to reduce class conflict between themselves and poorer people of both races (APAN:I:438; Levine 2005:249). Even poor whites could participate in “Herrenvolk [master race] equality” (Fredrickson 1981:154) and receive “psychological wages of whiteness” (Du Bois 1903).



Figure 8.1[9] *South Africa* is the southernmost country on the continent of Africa, colonized by the Netherlands (1600s-1700s) and Britain (1800s). Apartheid in South Africa resembled that in the U.S., especially in the South.

Jim Crow’s characteristic features included debt slavery, black

convict leasing, and white terrorism. Below, we discuss the last of these:

White terrorism. Following widespread and frequent antiblack violence during Reconstruction, the violence continued throughout the apartheid period (1877-1968). White violence was just the most explicit and crudest form of black repression, working together with officially color-blind legislation and judicial decisions to limit and control black participation in public life, especially in the South (APAN:II:517; Klinkner & Smith 1999:90-91). For example, although in 1896 more than 130,000 black Louisianans voted, this number plummeted to 1,342 in 1904. In the same period, black voting turnout dropped over 90% in North Carolina and Alabama, and over 66% in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Arkansas (Klinkner & Smith 1999:104).

White terrorism took three main forms: individual harassment and threat, lynching, and racial massacre. Following World War I and increasing black migration to northern cities (the start of the Great Migration), antiblack riots and massacres occurred throughout the country—examples are East St. Louis, Illinois (1917); Springfield, Ohio (1921); and Tulsa, Oklahoma (1921). The single worst year was 1919—**Red Summer**—when “white supremacist terrorism and racial riots took place in more than three dozen cities across the United States...”[\[10\]](#)

Lynching, however, was perhaps the most emblematic form of white nationalist terrorism. “**Lynch**” **law** refers to vigilante action bypassing official legal processes and violating victims’ due process rights (Fifth Amendment). Victims were merely suspected or informally accused of a crime or noncriminal behavior, after which mob violence took over. Regarding the U.S. apartheid period, lynching means murder by a group of vigilante white males of one or several black males. This typically was death by hanging or being burned alive, but also frequently involved torture (e.g., repeated branding, attack by dogs) and other forms of terror (APAN:II:516). Between 1877 and 1950, American whites lynched about 4,400 black victims.[\[11\]](#) Extralegal racist custom ran parallel with the rule of law, enacting deadly terrorist violence against innocent citizens.[\[12\]](#)

Table 8.3. White Lynchings of Blacks in the U.S., 1882-1905

<i>Year</i>	<i>Lynchings</i>	<i>Year</i>
1882	49	1894
1883	53	1895
1884	51	1896
1885	74	1897
1886	74	1898
1887	70	1899
1888	69	1900
1889	94	1901
1890	85	1902
1891	113	1903
1892	161	1904
1893	118	1905

Source: Klinkner & Smith 1999:91



CHICAGO DEFENDER

Figure 8.2.^[13] *White terrorism and the lynching of Emmett Till, age 14.* Roy Bryant and J.W. Milam kidnapped, tortured, and shot Till in rural Mississippi in 1955. The mutilated corpse shows how Till's eyes had been gouged out. An all-white jury found Bryant and Milam not guilty. Protected from further prosecution (double jeopardy), the two white men publicly admitted to the crime in a 1956 interview with *Look* magazine.^[14]

8.4 Cold War Civil Rights

The Cold War was the international context of the modern Civil Rights movement (Dudziak 2000). The achievements of 1954-68 came after decades of struggle by the long civil rights movement, with crucial turning points being World War II and early Cold War foreign policy (Klinkner & Smith 1999).

Domestic racial apartheid was a serious problem for U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War. This was the global ideological conflict (1945-91) between the U.S. (capitalism) and Soviet Union (communism). Though “cold” (not open warfare between the two superpowers), it spawned many regional hot wars (e.g., Korea, 1950-53; Vietnam, 1955-75; Afghanistan, 1979-89). U.S. racial progress during the 1940s-60s was often motivated by foreign policy concerns for America's image and prestige in the eyes of the Third World (APAN:II:736).

Though the Cold War context made racial progress possible, the Civil Rights movement itself was the primary force responsible for ending formal U.S. apartheid by 1968. The movement relied on many ordinary people, especially blacks but also whites, in the South and North (Morris 1986). Many of these volunteers took risks and made sacrifices for the cause of racial justice; some gave their lives. The movement's leaders represented a range of political and ideological positions. For example, integrationists tended toward politically moderate positions and included Ella Baker, Martin Luther King, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Pauli Murray, and A. Philip Randolph. Black nationalists and others, by contrast, took more politically radical

positions and included Louis Farakhan, Malcolm X, Huey Newton, and Kwame Ture (aka Stokely Carmichael).

Table 8.4. Federal Responses to the Civil Rights Movement

Year(s)	Government branch	Description of events
1944, 1946, 1948	Judicial (Supreme Court)	The Court's decision in <i>Smith v. Allwright</i> (1944) represented a victory for the NAACP. The case prohibited Democratic whites-only primaries. Likewise, <i>Morgan v. Virginia</i> (1946) ruled against segregation in interstate bus transportation. In <i>Shelley v. Kraemer</i> (1948), the Court ruled against the enforceability of antiblack housing covenants, in which white homeowners agreed among themselves not to sell to blacks (APAN:II:757).
1946	Executive	By executive order, Truman created the President's Committee on Civil Rights (ibid:757).
1954	Judicial (Supreme Court)	In <i>Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka</i> , the Court reversed the 1896 <i>Plessy</i> "separate but equal" ruling (ibid:758).
1957	Executive	Arkansas Governor Faubus defied school desegregation. This blatant resistance forced a reluctant President Eisenhower to act by enforcing desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock (ibid:759).
1957	Legislative	The first Civil Rights Act since Reconstruction. The 1957 law formed a federal commission on civil rights to counter discrimination, especially in voting (ibid:759-60).
1964	Legislative	The landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act effectively ended de jure Jim Crow (ibid:786).
1964	Legislative	The Twenty-fourth Amendment ended the poll tax, which had historically frequently been used to limit black voting.

1965	Legislative	A landmark civil rights law, like 1964's Civil Rights Act. The Voting Rights Act prohibited laws and customs obstructing black voting in the South (ibid:776).
1967	Judicial	The Supreme Court's decision in <i>Loving v. Virginia</i> ruled as unconstitutional state miscegenation laws. Such laws prohibited interracial sex and marriage.
1968	Legislative	The Open Housing Act of 1968 mandated open housing. It outlawed racial discrimination in housing markets.
1970	Legislative	Voting Rights Act
1972	Legislative	Equal Employment Opportunity Enforcement Act

Sources: Adapted from APAN:II; Klinkner & Smith 1999:281-83,294; Telles & Ortiz 2008:92

Notable about Table 8.4 are both the extended time frame (almost three decades between 1944 and 1972) of modern Civil Rights achievements, and the actions of all three federal branches (judicial, executive, legislative). Both features are indications of **the massive extent of white resistance at state and local levels to black civil rights and desegregation** (Klinkner & Smith 1999:287). Moreover, the federal government resisted as much as supported racial change. For example, from 1956 to 1971 the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) surveilled, harassed, infiltrated, and disrupted the activities of civil rights leaders and groups.^[15] Given extensive similarities of the modern Civil Rights era with Reconstruction (see Chapter 9), post-Reconstruction (1877) retreat from equality warrants critical

thinking about post-Civil Rights (1968) claims about the “end” of racial injustice in America.

Chapter 8 Summary

Chapter 8 introduced Unit III (Legacies of Racialized Slavery) with a historical overview of Reconstruction and American Apartheid. Section 8.1 explained the consensus view of professional historians in recent decades that slavery was the root cause of the Civil War.

Section 8.2 presented Reconstruction (1865-77), the period of U.S. history following the Civil War. Reconstruction faced the double task of national reconciliation and full incorporation of black freedpeople into the nation. By 1877, the nation had decisively retreated from the latter goal in favor of northern and southern white reconciliation.

Section 8.3 summarized American Apartheid (1877-1968), the post-Reconstruction period of white exclusion of blacks. Racism worsened in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with northern whites isolating migrant blacks in urban ghettos for the first time in U.S. history. Southern apartheid resembled in key aspects South African apartheid. Characteristic features were debt slavery, black convict leasing, and white terrorism.

Section 8.4 discussed the achievements of the Civil Rights movement during the Cold War. These victories came after decades of struggle by the long Civil Rights movement, with the crucial turning points being World War II and early Cold War foreign policy.

[1] Image: Public domain

[2] Source: Wikipedia, “Robert B. Elliott.” Accessed 2/4/21.

[3] Source: Wikipedia, “Morrill Land-Grant Acts.” Accessed 6/7/21.

[4] Image: Public domain

[5] Source of phrase “American Apartheid”: Massey & Denton 1993.

[6] Source of phrase “Cold War Civil Rights”: Dudziak 2000.

[7] Residents of U.S. territories (e.g., New Mexico, 1848-1912; Puerto Rico, 1917-present) generally have had national citizenship without state citizenship. For example, Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens, though Puerto Rico is not a state.

[8] Examples include *Terry v. Ohio* (1968, increased police powers to stop-and-frisk, from “probable cause” to “reasonable suspicion”); *Milliken v. Bradley* (1974, blocked suburban desegregation); *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke* (1978, blocked use of racial quotas in affirmative action); *Graham v. Connor* (1989, applied an “objective reasonableness” standard to officers’ actions, supporting police use of deadly force); *Whren v. U.S.* (1996, allowed racial profiling by police via “pretext” traffic stops). See Alexander 2010.

[9] Image credit: Creative Commons license ([Htonl](#) – Own work)

[10] Source: Wikipedia, “Red Summer.” Accessed 6/8/21. See also Klinkner & Smith 1999:114-15.

[11] Source: Equal Justice Initiative. <https://eji.org/reports/lynching-in-america/>

[12] Cf. white racism in the lives of black jazz musicians: Davis and Troupe 1990; Hasse 1993; Shipton 2001.

[13] Left and right images: Public domain

[14] Source: Wikipedia, “Emmett Till.” Accessed 4/7/21. See also Hohle 2018: Ch.1.

[15] Source: Wikipedia, “COINTELPRO.” Accessed 6/18/21.

Chapter 9: Post-Civil Rights America in Comparative Perspective



Chicago South Side, 1974 (left); Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (right) [\[1\]](#)

The images above illustrate post-Civil Rights America in historical

and comparative (international) perspective. For decades, communities like Chicago's South Side, Roxbury (Boston) and East St. Louis were black **ghettos**: monoethnic slums of concentrated disadvantage. Though still nonwhite today, some ghettos since the 1970s have been transformed by Hispanic immigration—e.g., Roxbury, Harlem (New York), Camden (Philadelphia), Compton (Los Angeles). By contrast, others (e.g., East St. Louis: 98% black) remain **hypersegregated** and overwhelmingly black. In both kinds of ghetto, non-Hispanic white residents remain few.^[2] Similarly, Brazilian slums (*favelas*) today remain mostly black and brown (Telles 2004:194-95).

Police activities in nonwhite U.S. and Brazilian slums have often featured repressive violence. Brazilian police-civilian interactions are much more likely to end with the civilian wounded or dead when the civilian is nonwhite (rather than white). In São Paulo state alone, military police have killed hundreds of civilians each year since the 1980s (ibid:166). Across Brazil, thousands of Brazilians are killed every year by police. Most of these citizens are nonwhite (black, brown) and poor. About 5,800 Brazilians were killed by police in the single year of 2019 (McCoy 2021).

Brazil's official **colorblindness**, state policy since the 1930s despite increasing governmental acknowledgment (post-1990) of ongoing racial injustice, discourages Brazilians from analyzing such facts in terms of race or skin color. For almost a century, color-blind ideology has allowed white Brazilians to blame the poor **life chances** of black and brown Brazilians on class inequality alone, rather than in combination with racial inequality (Chasteen 2001; Marx 1997). How does present-day police abuse connect to the longer history of racial injustice in Brazil and the U.S.? What costs and benefits has official colorblindness brought to race relations in these nations? How has racial injustice in these countries changed across the decades, and how has it stayed the same?

Chapter 9 Learning Objectives

9.1 Cycle of U.S. Racial Progress and Retreat

- Define ghetto
- Describe examples of racial progress and retreat in American history
- Describe three parallels between the post-Reconstruction (1877) era and post-Civil Rights (1968) era

9.2 Colorblindness: Brazil and the United States

- Define colorblindness
- Explain similarities and differences in color-blind ideology between Brazil and the U.S.

9.3 Race and Class

- Define life chances
- Explain why most sociologists see race-class intersectionality as an ongoing source of inequality in post-Civil Rights America

9.4 The Principles/Policy Paradox

- Explain what survey researchers mean by the principles/policy paradox regarding race

Chapter 9 Key Terms (in order of appearance in chapter)

ghetto: a community of nonwhites excluded (formally or informally) from neighboring white areas. Until 1900, this term referred to segregated Jewish areas of European cities. (“Ghetto” was the medieval Jewish quarter of Venice.) Brazilian ghettos are called favelas.

hypersegregation: almost complete residential segregation by race, as in cities in which most whites and most blacks live in different neighborhoods (e.g., whites in suburbs and blacks in inner-

city ghettos). Many U.S. metropolitan regions, especially in the North, remained racially segregated in the 1970s, 80s, and beyond, with several being hypersegregated (Massey & Denton 1993).

colorblindness: the political claim (as in Brazil, South Africa, and U.S.) that society no longer faces serious problems of racial discrimination, and that policies explicitly designed to benefit nonwhites are unnecessary and/or harmful

life chances: the likelihood of social well-being. Key indices include income and wealth, occupational prestige, level of education, mental and physical health (e.g., infant mortality, life expectancy), quality and location of housing, relation to criminal justice, political representation, social mobility.

Nelson Mandela (1918-2013): anti-apartheid revolutionary incarcerated by South Africa for 27 years (1964-1990). He played a central role in South Africa's transition from formal apartheid, serving as President from 1994-1999 (see Chapter 4).

disparities (in life chances): group inequalities in likelihood of social well-being. ("Dis-parity" literally means inequality or discrimination: unfair, differential treatment.) In a society lacking white normalization or racial bias, we would expect comparable or similar processes and outcomes across racial-ethnic groups (all other things being equal: e.g., class inequality).

sociology of race relations: the social science of white racial domination across societies with colonial and national histories of white supremacy. Three important comparative cases are Brazil, South Africa, and the United States (Telles 2004:2).

racial democracy: a color-blind ideology (especially 1930-1990) emphasizing shared Brazilian national identity and claiming the absence of racism in Brazil

principles/policy paradox: the survey research finding that, after 1970, most white Americans have increasingly held abstract racially egalitarian principles, while simultaneously opposing concrete public policy that would promote such principles

9.1 Cycle of U.S. Racial Progress and Retreat

By the early twenty-first century, the United States and South Africa—once bastions of racial apartheid—had had black presidents. Barack Obama served as American President from 2009–2017; in South Africa following **Nelson Mandela**'s presidency (1994–1999), several other black men have served as President. Since the end of de jure white supremacy (1990 in South Africa, 1968 in America), both nations have experienced great racial progress, with larger black middle classes (Keller 2005) and racially tolerant views expressed by many whites on academic surveys (Schuman et al. 1997). To many people, such changes have indicated that antiblack racism and white supremacy have sufficiently weakened as to no longer be serious social problems. They see today's ongoing white-black **disparities in life chances**—legacies of centuries of slavery and apartheid—as mostly due to socio-economic class inequality, not race.

However, most academic experts on race tend to disagree with this view. Especially since the 1990s, an abundance of empirical race research in sociology, criminology, demography, psychology, political science, and history **has led most contemporary professional social scientists of race to conclude that racial injustice has been largely ongoing rather than overcome**—not only in the U.S., but in many countries with legacies of racialized inequality such as South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico (Fredrickson 1981:280; Lewis & Diamond 2015:xvii–xviii; Marx 1997:271; Massey & Denton 1993:15–16, 186). Moreover, as in the 1950s–60s, reported attitudes on race relations by U.S. whites and blacks continue to display large intergroup differences of opinion (Feagin 2020; see Chapter 11). If white supremacy had largely been overcome, wouldn't blacks and whites tend to see race relations more similarly than differently?

Despite the great importance of modern civil rights achievements (see Table 8.4), these advances had limitations, especially in enforcement, that are (even) more evident today with fifty years of hindsight (Bonilla-Silva 2001, 2015; Goldberg 1997). For example,

President Johnson in 1965 acknowledged the limits of civil rights legislation, stating that “You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, ‘you are free to compete with all the others’” (quoted in APAN:II:814). Accordingly, the overall purpose of Chapters 9-11 is to explain why most sociologists see race as a continuing social problem in America. Chapter 9 begins this explanation by discussing insights into contemporary race relations offered by historical and comparative (international) perspectives.

Key insights about post-Civil Rights America can be gleaned from the pre-1960s U.S. history reviewed in Chapters 5-8. This is because **the 1950s-60s Civil Rights era was not the first major period of American racial reform**. According to Klinkner and Smith (1999), this history shows a cyclical pattern, in which a period of racial progress is followed by white retreat from willingness to sustain such reform. Given the overwhelming power U.S. whites have always had (as a group) vis-à-vis blacks, white commitment has always been necessary for such progress; blacks have never had the material resources sufficient for unilateral political action to succeed. Thus, white retreat has been responsible for ending reform periods, initiating long eras of retrenchment of the racial status quo. Later forms of inequality differed importantly from prior forms—for instance, northern de jure freedom (e.g., final emancipation of New York slaves in 1827) was better than northern slavery.^[3] But subsequent periods of retrenchment have, in each historical case to date, always fallen short of the white commitment necessary for full, de facto inclusion of blacks in American society.

Klinkner and Smith (1999:73) note that U.S. history displays **three eras of significant racial reform: the Revolutionary era, the Civil War era, and the WWII-early Cold War era**. Three sources of progress during these eras were (1) a major war in which blacks participated; (2) a war enemy that U.S. elites countered by emphasizing egalitarianism at home; and (3) pressure from antiracism groups on U.S. elites to match egalitarian rhetoric with action (ibid:73). Given similarities with previous retreats from racial

inclusion following the Revolutionary War (after 1820) and the Civil War (after 1877), Klinkner and Smith argue that today's post-Civil Rights era (after 1980) is likewise a retreat phase.

Table 9.1. Cycle of U.S. Racial Progress and Retreat

War era	Enemy	Black military participation	Progress toward racial equality	Start of retreat from racial equality
Revolutionary War (1775-1783)	British Empire	5,000-8,000 black U.S. soldiers (out of total force of 300,000) (Klinkner & Smith 1999:19).	Northern state emancipations; southern manumission made easier	By 1820 (Missouri Compromise)
Civil War (1861-1865)	Confederate States of America	<p>North: by war's end, 180,000 blacks had served in Union armies, and thousands in navy (ibid:70). By war's end, 12.5% of Grant's army was black (ibid:70-71).</p> <p>South: Confederate Congress (March 1865) allows slave enlistment into army (ibid:70). Slaves had already provided much labor support to Confederate armies.</p>	Federal Emancipation; Reconstruction amendments; Civil Rights laws	By 1877 (Compromise of 1877 and southern redeemer governments end Reconstruction)

WWII (U.S. at war 1941-45); early Cold War (1946-72); Korean War (1950-53)	Axis Powers, then global Communism	Black participation in WWII and Cold War conflicts. In armed forces as soldiers, sailors, aviators. In home-front war production industries.	1940s-60s Supreme Court decisions; Civil Rights laws	By 1980 (Reagan presidency and 1960s-80s Supreme Court decisions supporting white backlash)
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Source: Adapted from Klinkner & Smith 1999

In each era, whites end reform in similar ways. White rhetoric—whether in 1820, 1877, or 1980—justifies retreat by describing racially progressive policies as having “failed” (Hohle 2018). Whites blame blacks themselves (communally and individually “blaming the victim”)—rather than social structures created by white supremacy—for ongoing exclusion, poverty, and criminalization (Armenta 2017). Whites create or tolerate new forms of inequality: e.g., northern Black Codes following northern slavery, de facto debt slavery following de jure slavery, de facto segregation and racialized mass incarceration following de jure segregation. In each era, most whites (and some blacks) celebrate the new racial status quo as having “solved” past problems.

Parallels between post-Reconstruction (1877) and post-Civil Rights (1968) America. Today, we live in the post-Civil Rights era. That is, **the modern civil-rights reform era ended by 1980**. Most analysts describe the 1970s as a time of transition to the current neoliberal (i.e., neoconservative) era, starting by 1980 with President Reagan (Kozol 1991; Morris 1986).^[4] In modern white resistance (1960s-90s) to racial change, Klinkner and Smith (1999:328-45) point to numerous parallels with the post-Reconstruction (after 1877) era of white resistance to racial change:

1. Renewal of demands for state and local authority rather than national authority;
2. Rise of color-blind (rather than color-aware) public policy;
3. Prominence or return of laissez-faire (minimal government) principles;
4. Prominence or return of “scientific” racism;
5. Claims seeking to link nonwhites to inherent or endemic “criminality”;
6. Increasing support for restrictions on immigration;
7. Decreasing support for enforcement of existing civil rights laws;
8. Calls for voting restrictions that disproportionately affect nonwhites;
9. Declining interest in high quality, racially integrated public education;
10. Among African Americans, declining interest in black-white integration and rising attraction of black nationalism and separatism;
11. Declining commitment to action (vs. rhetoric) on racial equality by racially progressive major parties: Republicans post-1877, Democrats post-1968.[\[5\]](#)

Although the meaning of such parallels is up for debate, it is difficult—given the undeniable resilience of white supremacy in U.S. history—to simply dismiss them.

9.2 Colorblindness: Brazil and the United States

As with historical analysis, insight into contemporary race relations comes from comparative (cross-national) analysis. White-black race relations have taken different forms in various countries. For example, racial classification often works differently in the U.S. and Latin America (see Chapters 3 and 7). Accordingly, **the sociology of race relations** considers more than just the U.S., encompassing race relations globally (Telles 2004:2; cf. Pettigrew 1980). Cross-

national analysis offers understanding of what is and is not unique about race in the United States, helping to appreciate both the victories of the modern Civil Rights movement and their limitations.

Like South Africa, a fruitful comparative case for studying U.S. race relations is Brazil. The U.S. and post-apartheid South Africa were not the first societies to claim colorblindness. These nations may have much to learn from Brazil, a society with a longer experience with officially race-neutral policies (Telles 2004:66).



Figure 9.1.[6] Brazil, geographically larger than the continental U.S., is the largest country in Latin America (Telles 2004:19). It was colonized by Portugal, in contrast to the Spanish colonization of most

other Latin American nations. Whereas most Mexicans speak Spanish, most Brazilians speak Portuguese.

In key ways, U.S. color-blind discourse has paralleled 1930s-1980s Brazilian **racial democracy**. This is a color-blind ideology emphasizing shared Brazilian national identity and claiming the absence of racism in Brazil (Chasteen 2001:315; Marx 1997:273). Describing colorblindness as an “ideology” (see Chapter 2) emphasizes that it is not simply a putatively desirable state of affairs (“a world beyond race”). Rather, **colorblindness is a political worldview asserting that society no longer faces serious problems of racial injustice**, and that policies explicitly benefitting nonwhites are unnecessary and harmful (Gómez 2018:xii-xiii; Hohle 2018). Colorblindness claims that:

- (1) “[M]ost people do not even notice race anymore;
- (2) [R]acial parity has for the most part been achieved;
- (3) [A]ny persistent patterns of racial inequality are the result of [nonwhite] individual and/or group-level shortcomings rather than structural ones; ...
- (4) [T]herefore, there is no need for institutional remedies...to redress persistent racialized outcomes.”^[7]

Like any political ideology, colorblindness has important social consequences that need to be made explicit to be understood (Holt 1992:25).

Especially after 1930 (President Vargas era), Brazilian calls for greater civic and political inclusion of nonwhites were met by color-blind assertions that Brazilian racism no longer existed. Under the military dictatorship of 1964-1985, it was even illegal to study race in Brazil (Chasteen 2001). Official colorblindness blocked the collection of race-relevant statistical data that might have challenged Brazilian nationalism and elite white interests. The absence of demographic evidence (due to the ban on race analysis) made it difficult to counter claims that racially ameliorative policies were unnecessary (Loveman 2014; Marx 1997:168-69). More recently,

Brazilian society has undergone a widespread reckoning on race, in which antiblack racism has become widely acknowledged. In Brazilian social science, race became an accepted area of study during the 1990s. Since then, many quantitative studies have documented and analyzed Brazil's ongoing racial injustices (Telles 2004:55).

The Brazilian example shows that, **although many Americans are accustomed to thinking of colorblindness as unambiguously racially progressive, the reality is more complex** (Alexander 2010; Bonilla-Silva 2001). Although U.S. legal justice is blind (e.g., to socioeconomic class), everyone knows that this ideal often goes unrealized in practice. Likewise, the achievement of color-blind law has been an important step toward racial justice; however, much social scientific evidence suggests that color-blind (like class-blind) justice is often more ideal than reality (Gonzalez Van Cleve 2016). The real meaning of colorblindness is all too often paying rhetorical lip service to de jure ideals, while turning a blind eye to ongoing de facto racial inequality. For these reasons, historical and comparative scholars familiar with colorblindness as a tool of white supremacy have paid careful attention to its growth in the U.S. after 1970 (Marx 1997:273-74).

Indeed, as in twentieth-century Brazil, **colorblindness was a common white political strategy in many 1800s post-emancipation societies** (e.g., Barbados: Lamming 1953; Cuba: Ferrer 1999, Fuente 2001; Jamaica: Holt 1992). Former slaveowners sought to retain control of newly "freed" black labor, but now in a "modern" (formally color-blind) way consistent with antislavery and laissez-faire economic principles (Scott 2000). Likewise in the post-emancipation South, elite whites used colorblind state legislation to maintain economic, political, and social control over blacks. After 1877, northern white Republicans joined Southern white Democrat calls for policy that was racially neutral, rather than racially aware. As the Supreme Court asserted in the 1883 *Civil Rights Cases* overturning the 1875 Civil Rights Act, "blacks must cease 'to be the special favorite of the laws'" (Foner 1990:247). Thus, racially

neutral policy neither explicitly benefiting nor harming nonwhites—colorblindness—is entirely consistent with retreat from racial equality (Klinkner & Smith 1999).

9.3 Race and Class

As we've seen, social identities are intersectional: complex and overlapping (Chapter 1). Race and socio-economic class are demographic variables of particular interest to social scientists. This is because they are among the most important determinants of social position—one's placement in the social organization and distribution of power, resources, and opportunities (Wright & Rogers 2011).

Regarding class, all other things being equal, you're more likely to receive these social goods (power, resources, opportunities) if you come from a wealthy rather than a poor family (Domhoff 2017). Despite U.S. de jure equality of opportunity, the de facto reality is that class background (e.g., as measured by parent's occupation, family wealth, education) is a key determinant of children's **life chances: the likelihood of social well-being** (Khan 2018). Key indices include income and wealth, occupational prestige, level of education, mental and physical health (e.g., infant mortality, life expectancy), quality and location of housing, relation to criminal justice, political representation and responsiveness, and social mobility.

Chapter 1 noted that intersectional theory observes that members of social groups may experience advantage and disadvantage simultaneously, in comparison to members of other groups (Wingfield 2013:21). Likewise, having multiple marginalized identities (e.g., poor, non-citizen, Latina, disabled, woman) tends to compound life difficulties. Race and class, then, among other variables, interact in their impact on individuals' life chances. As with European Americans, Asian Americans, or any other racial group, **race and class work together to shape the experience of African Americans**. The ongoing poor life chances of this group, as

compared to the white group, are not due solely to either variable but to their interaction (APAN:II:852; Massey & Denton 1993:219-20; Telles 2004:116; Telles & Ortiz 2008:135). As Chapter 3 noted (individuals vs. groups), such social determinants are not destiny: some individuals are unrepresentative of their racial and class background. Rather they pertain to overall group characteristics. In sum, ongoing white-black racial disparities in today's post-Civil Rights era cannot be explained as mostly due to class inequality alone. Racial inequality continues to play an important role, though its mechanics have changed in post-1970, officially colorblind society.

Likewise in Brazil, residential segregation by race was long misunderstood as solely due to class, with race not being relevant (Telles 2004:3). As we've seen, in recent decades Brazil has increasingly acknowledged the abundant demographic evidence suggesting that the country's extreme racial disparities cannot be explained by class inequality alone. Racism, both psychological and social structural, continues to severely limit the life chances of black and brown Brazilians, as compared to white Brazilians (ibid:220).

Still central to race relations today, **race and class have always had an important relationship, ever since the beginnings of European global colonization.** "Race," after all, was invented by Western Europeans to explain and justify global colonization: first to themselves, then to colonized others (Chapters 4 and 7). White supremacy was never just about ideas; rather, it was an ideology justifying and protecting whites' economic interests (Lewis & Diamond 2015:155). The whole point of *racialized slavery* (racializing an economic relationship of absolute domination) was to maximize economic control over an exploitable source of cheap labor, in the context of profit-oriented agricultural capitalism (Dunn 2000). Emancipation—in Jamaica (1834), the U.S. (1863), Cuba (1880s), Brazil (1888)—disrupted this control, and white elites quickly developed colorblind means to reassert it.

Given these regions' legacies of racialized slavery—in which the slave class was defined in terms of black race—how should post-

abolition policy aim to equalize life chances of blacks and whites? Is color-awareness or color-blindness best? This thorny Reconstruction-era problem, hinging on the intersectionality of race and class, is a central part of what historian Thomas Holt (1992) calls the “problem of freedom” in post-emancipation societies. As noted, Americans in the twenty-first century were still grappling with this old policy problem of Reconstruction, our “unfinished revolution” (Foner 1988).

9.4 The Principles/Policy Paradox

Like research on the race-class relationship, a major finding of public opinion researchers since the 1990s has contributed to better understanding of race relations in post-Civil Rights America. This is **the principles/policy paradox** (Klinkner & Smith 1999:324; Schuman et al. 1997).

Americans after 1970 have increasingly expressed support on academic surveys for abstract principles of racial integration and equal opportunity. For example, asked in terms of *principles*—“[S]hould people be able to attend any school?”—whites tend to express support. However, when asked in terms of more specific public *policy*—“[S]hould the government make interventions to ensure integrated schools?”—whites tend to express opposition (Lewis & Diamond 2015:209).

A tension here is between widespread support for color-blind equality of opportunity, on the one hand, and equally widespread antipathy to federal governance, on the other. However, **the paradox is that color-blind equality (what whites support) has—ever since the Civil War—usually been promoted in U.S. history by federal intervention in state and local affairs (what many whites oppose)**. After all, it was sustained federal action for almost thirty years (1944-1972) that made modern Civil-Rights-era victories possible. Supreme Court action (e.g., 1954 *Brown v. Board*), Presidential action (e.g., Eisenhower’s 1958 use of federal troops to force Little Rock school desegregation), and Congressional action

(e.g., 1964 Civil Rights Act) all exemplify the very government interventions that many whites after 1970 have opposed (Klinkner & Smith 1999:315-16). As in the 1950s and 60s, **white Americans post-1970 often remained ambivalent or opposed to government action that would address ongoing obstacles to racial inclusion.**

One example of the paradox is open housing—prohibition by federal law since 1968 of racial discrimination in the housing market. Even as late as 1980, three-fifths (60%) of whites reported themselves opposed to legislation mandating open housing; yet the Fair Housing Act had already been the law of the land since 1968 (Massey & Denton 1993:92). Such ambivalence shouldn't be surprising: as a group, whites benefited in many ways from pre-1970 white supremacy. In the post-1970 era, white opposition to policy proposals for reducing racial disparities in life chances remained a serious obstacle to achieving U.S. racial equality of opportunity (Doane & Bonilla-Silva 2003).

In sum, the principles/policy paradox exemplifies parallels between today's post-Civil Rights era and the post-Reconstruction era (Klinkner & Smith 1999). Both eras saw equality rhetoric (abstract words) increasingly diverge from meaningful equality policy (concrete action).

Chapter 9 Summary

Chapter 9 discussed post-Civil Rights America, using U.S. history and international comparisons to achieve insight into contemporary race relations. Section 9.1 examined the contemporary relevance of the history of U.S. racial progress and retreat. Many parallels are evident between the post-Civil Rights (1968) and post-Reconstruction (1877) eras, suggesting that the contemporary era may be best understood as a time of overall retreat of white commitment to racial equality.

Section 9.2 introduced colorblindness, comparing and contrasting U.S. race relations in the post-Civil Rights era with South Africa and

Brazil. Given Brazil's familiarity with colorblindness since the 1930s, the U.S. may have much to learn from Brazilian experience.

Section 9.3 examined the relationship between inequalities of race and class. The intersectionality of these social identities and positions means that both have contributed to nonwhite disadvantage as compared to whites. Claims that dramatic disparities in U.S. life chances between African Americans and European Americans are primarily due to class, not race, were not new post-1968, but rather date to Reconstruction.

Section 9.4 examined the "principles/policy" paradoxical finding of social survey researchers in the post-Civil Rights era. Whereas Americans have increasingly expressed racially tolerant attitudes (principles) on academic surveys, they simultaneously express opposition to political policies that would put those principles into action. The paradox exemplifies a key parallel between today's post-Civil Rights era and the post-Reconstruction era: the divorce of equality rhetoric from meaningful equality policy.

[1] Left image: Public domain. Right image credit: Creative Commons license ([Leon petrosyan](#) – Own work: Favela not far from Copacabana)

[2] Source: Wikipedia, accessed 6/18/21:

Roxbury: 57% African American, 28% Hispanic, 8% White (2007-11 American Community Survey).

Harlem: 63% African American, 22% Hispanic (any race), 9.5% White (2010 U.S. Census).

Camden: 48% African American, 47% Hispanic (any race), 18% White (2010 U.S. Census).

Compton: 33% African American, 65% Hispanic (any race), 0.8% White (2010 U.S. Census).

East St. Louis: 98% African American, 1% Hispanic (any race), 1% White (2000 U.S. Census).

[3] Source: Wikipedia, “History of slavery in New York (state).” Accessed 6/17/21.

[4] “Neoliberal” means economically (and often socially) conservative.

[5] Source: Adapted from Klinkner & Smith (1999:328-45)

[6] Image credit: Creative Commons license (The original uploader was [Captain Blood](#) at [English Wikipedia](#). – Transferred from [en.wikipedia](#) to Commons)

[7] Source: Quoted in Lewis & Diamond 2015:145.

Chapter 10: Obstacles to Genuine Racial Inclusion



The images^[1] above illustrate ongoing obstacles to African American inclusion in post-Civil Rights America. In 2014, news

articles reported on “Segregation now...: Sixty years after *Brown v. Board of Education* [1954], the schools in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, show how separate and unequal education is coming back” (Hannah-Jones 2014). “Segregation now...” refers to pro-apartheid Alabama governor and 1968 presidential candidate George Wallace (1919-1998). His 1963 inaugural speech famously declared “segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever.” Likewise, Wallace’s 1968 presidential campaign was explicitly white supremacist and segregationist. These messages are visible in his 1960s Confederate-themed campaign materials (left image above).

Today, it is often forgotten that Wallace’s years as Alabama governor were mostly in the 1970s and 80s, not just the 1960s.^[2] Like many other politicians who had opposed black civil rights during the 1940s-60s (e.g., South Carolina’s Strom Thurmond), he successfully maintained political viability in the post-Civil Rights era by adopting colorblindness (see Chapter 9). But beyond race-neutral rhetoric, Wallace and his southern and northern supporters clearly formed part of the white resistance (1970s-80s) to de facto racial equality (Carter 2000; Marx 1997). How does Wallace’s political career—bridging “then” and “now”—illustrate both breaks and continuities with the explicitly racist past? How have social structures created by white supremacy—black ghettos, segregated and unequal education, poverty, criminalization, poor health—endured into the present, continuing to block genuine, versus merely rhetorical, inclusion in the world’s wealthiest nation?

Chapter 10 Learning Objectives

10.1 White Normativity vs. Individual Prejudice

- Define white normativity
- Explain how social institutions without prejudiced individuals can nevertheless show bias against nonwhites

10.2 Understanding White Normativity

- Describe how American society has often treated whiteness as “normal,” like being right-handed
- Understand white normativity in higher education settings such as law school

10.3 De Facto Residential Segregation

- Define de facto residential segregation
- Understand that post-Civil Rights America remained a society of extreme black-white housing segregation

10.4 De Facto Educational Segregation

- Define de facto educational segregation
- Define the racial achievement gap
- Understand that post-Civil Rights America remained a society of racially separate and unequal education

Chapter 10 Key Terms (in order of appearance in chapter)

individual prejudice: aka psychological racism. Personal attitudes of white supremacy or anti-color bias. Prejudice literally means “pre-judgment,” as in judging people before meeting them.

white normativity: aka systemic racism. Institutional normalization of whiteness. This is a feature of social institutions treating white perspectives as the norm (standard, default), while treating nonwhite perspectives as deviant or problematic. Such institutions may be schools, real estate agencies, employers, police departments, hospitals, etc.

de facto residential segregation: racially separate neighborhoods in practice, not by law

de facto educational segregation: racially separate schools or classrooms in practice, not by law

racial achievement gap: racial-ethnic group disparities in

educational outcomes. E.g., test scores, grade point averages, and/or high school and college completion rates.

the schools-to-prison pipeline: an all-too-common trajectory in the lives of young, black males: after dropping out of impoverished, low-quality public schools, they are soon incarcerated.

10.1 White Normativity vs. Individual Prejudice

The purpose of Chapters 9-11 is to explain why most sociologists today see race as a social problem that is largely ongoing, not overcome. This includes not only the U.S., but many societies with long histories of racialized inequality (e.g., South Africa, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico). Chapter 10 adds to this explanation, discussing **two present-day obstacles to genuine (versus rhetorical) African American inclusion: (1) white normativity and (2) de facto segregation.**

All U.S. nonwhite and white-ethnic groups have experienced significant social, political, and economic exclusion. However, none has to the extent of African Americans (APAN:II; Bell 2004; Harvey 2007). Indeed, in contemporary demographic analysis of life chances of racial-ethnic groups (e.g., Mexican Americans), the African American group often serves as a baseline (comparison) measure of extreme exclusion (Telles & Ortiz 2008:264). American society is formally (de jure) color-blind, but the de facto reality is that blackness continues to matter a great deal (DiAngelo 2018). Consider writer Jonathan Kozol's (1991:180) observation in 1991:

“Over 30 years ago [1961], the city of Chicago purposely constructed the high-speed Dan Ryan Expressway in such a way as to cut off the section of the city in which housing projects for black people had been built. The Robert Taylor Homes, served by Du Sable High [School], were subsequently constructed in that isolated area as well; realtors thereafter set aside adjoining neighborhoods for rental only to black people. The expressway is still there. The projects are still there. Black children still grow up in the same

neighborhoods. There is nothing ‘past’ about most ‘past discrimination’ in Chicago or in any other northern city.”[3]

Today, another thirty years have passed since 1991, and many of these structures of racial exclusion remain—expressways isolating black neighborhoods, de facto segregation of neighborhoods and schools, de facto housing and job market discrimination (APAN:II:887-88; Moore 2008:5). **Black race remains a key determinant (predictor variable) of life chances: one’s likelihood of well-being in various social arenas** (Doane & Bonilla-Silva 2003). Whether in housing, education, wealth and income, criminal justice, or health, the gap between the de jure colorblindness of official rules and the de facto reality of their implementation continues to block genuine racial inclusion in twenty-first century America (Lewis & Diamond 2015:168).



Figure 10.1.[4] *After 1968, African Americans of all socio-economic*

classes continued to face de facto challenges to their de jure right to live in white neighborhoods (Massey & Denton 1993:9). The absence of enforcement mechanisms in the federal Fair Housing Act (1968) meant that the burden of proving housing-market discrimination often fell on nonwhite individuals themselves (ibid:195).

In U.S. history since the Civil War, the usual and typical situation for black civil rights has been some form of de jure equality co-existing with second-class citizenship in practice. In each historical era—from Reconstruction and Gilded Age to WWII and early Cold War—most whites opposed black insistence on genuine, rather than rhetorical, equality. Although this pattern continued with 1950s-80s white resistance to racial change (Carter 2000), post-Civil Rights America also saw important advances. For instance, in contrast to previous eras, whites increasingly abandoned biological notions of black innate inferiority (Bonilla-Silva 1997). Likewise, political notions that America is a country for white people alone (white nationalism), despite periodic resurgence (Hochschild 2016), lost much of their traditional appeal. Indeed, **individual prejudice** (aka psychological racism) greatly weakened after the 1960s—although many whites continued to blame black culture and morality, rather than social structures created by white supremacy, for ongoing poor life chances of blacks (Feagin 2020).

However, a major continuity with apartheid has been **white normativity: treating whiteness, white culture, or white experience as the norm (standard, default), and treating nonwhiteness as deviant or problematic** (Brown et al. 2003; Moore 2008).^[5] An analogy helps explain this concept:

Every year, your boss organizes a Christmas (rather than holiday) party at work, with Christmas trees, nativity scenes, crucifixes, biblical readings. It's not her intention to exclude anyone, and she has no non-Christian animosity or prejudice. Nevertheless, the fact that some employees are atheist, Jewish, and Muslim results in exclusion. Perceptions that they aren't "real" or "full" team members (don't "fit in" or

“belong”) can be consequential for their job performance and evaluation.

The analogy here is the Christian/non-Christian relationship with white/nonwhite. Though prejudiced attitudes are absent in many whites, U.S. social institutions (e.g., local governments, banks, schools and school boards, realtors, employers, police departments, hospitals) usually feature whites in higher positions of authority. **Institutions have often treated white (especially middle-class) ways of acting as the standard (norm) for acceptable behavior, with black behaviors (especially working-class or poor) standing out as especially deviant** (Rawls & Duck 2020). White normativity has serious consequences for nonwhites of all socio-economic levels. For example, police responses to rowdy, young black party-goers are routinely more severe than with rowdy white college students (cf. Desmond & Emirbayer 2010; Hohle 2018). Race and class work together (see Chapter 9) to escalate the severity of institutional responses to “deviant” or “antisocial” black behaviors.

Social institutions can (and often do) have racially disparate processes and outcomes, even when staffed by unprejudiced individuals of any race-ethnicity. Well-meaning people, despite their best intentions, can strongly contribute to a racially hostile, exclusionary atmosphere at work, school, place of worship, and other public places. **White-normed institutions tend to produce racially disparate outcomes, with better white outcomes than nonwhite ones** across **many social and economic measures of well-being** (Lewis & Diamond 2015:xvii-xviii). **Compared** to whites, and all other things being equal, after 1968 blacks continued to receive more limited and worse housing and real estate choices (Desmond 2016), worse educational outcomes (Orfield & Eaton 1996), more arrests and harsher sentences in criminal justice (Gonzalez Van Cleve 2016), fewer job callbacks (Bonilla-Silva 2018), and poorer health outcomes (Gómez & López 2013). To explain such disparities, most sociologists of race have concluded that—given declining individual prejudice—an important factor is ongoing white-normed

institutional behaviors and procedures (Armenta 2017; Bonilla-Silva 2018; Duck 2015; Feagin 2020; Lewis & Diamond 2015).

10.2 Understanding White Normativity

As with a “blind spot” while driving, many whites report difficulty detecting institutional racial bias. The ways American society often privileges white (vs. nonwhite) culture and experience tend to be invisible to whites (Morrison 1992). People of color, by contrast, frequently find white-normed institutional climates highly visible.

White “blind spots” seem due especially to three factors:

(1) White-normed institutions and culture are so familiar to whites as to render them invisible. This is like “something right under your nose that you don’t see,” or “fish unaware of the water in which they swim.” By contrast, nonwhites tend to be highly aware of distinctively white American behaviors, cultures, and histories (Brown et al. 2003).

(2) As the demographic majority, most non-Hispanic whites have never had the regular experience of being the only white person in public places, on the job, at school, in one’s neighborhood, at one’s place of worship, etc. Consequently, whites often find it difficult to understand and empathize with nonwhite experiences of social isolation and racial visibility.

(3) American culture and law prioritize individual-level explanations (in terms of psychological motives and intentions) for institutional outcomes. Most Americans are less familiar with social structural, situational, and interactional explanations. In workplace, police, school, hospital, and other settings, if no individuals can be shown to display biased intent, many Americans have difficulty understanding how bias can nevertheless be operative (cf. Moore 2008:91).

The examples below—right-handedness, male normativity, and

white normativity in legal education—offer further insight into white normativity. Granted, whiteness differs in some important respects from right-handedness and maleness; however, there are many similarities. Also, the observations below are descriptive and factual (not judgmental). The point here is not to judge, say, right-handers (or whites) as “bad people,” but rather to understand that many societies have systematically advantaged right-handers (and whites), and often without their even being aware of it.

Example 1: Right-handedness. Valuing right-handedness and devaluing left-handedness are social biases dating back thousands of years. Righty privilege (right supremacy) remains encoded in the English language via Latin: for instance, “dexterity” (skill, capability) literally means right-hand side, whereas “sinister” (evil intentions) means left side. Until recent decades, right-handedness was assumed to be good and normal, whereas left-handedness was bad, problematic, requiring correction.

“In Medieval times, left-handed people had more to worry about than smudging their own handwriting: Being a lefty was associated with demonic possession. While those with southpaw tendencies aren’t likely to be labeled as the devil’s puppet today, life for those in that 10 percent of the population can still be a struggle.”[\[6\]](#)

We wouldn’t get very far in understanding lefties if we ignored the many ways society remains designed for righties. There are no laws excluding left-handed people: and yet the design of many everyday objects—student desks, scissors, zippers, cell phones, dinner place-settings, etc.—creates daily obstacles for them. Indeed, the very meaning of left-handedness is its *relationship* to right-handedness, a relation of disadvantage. **Right-handed normativity does not require right-handers to display any prejudicial intent toward lefties.** Today, righties bear no ill will toward lefties. Rather, righties simply experience a world systematically advantaging them over lefties as familiar, ordinary, unremarkable, normal. By contrast, lefties tend to be highly aware of the daily problems created for

them by righty normalization. Generation after generation, without being aware of it, righties keep remaking the “normal” world in their image, reproducing the same obstacles and problems for another generation of lefties.

Many societies are organized in terms of such binary relationships. Some social identities are deviant, whereas others—defined as opposites—are normalized. Similar observations—lefty (righty)—could be made about other relationships of disadvantage and advantage: disabled (able-bodied), female (male), poor or working class (middle class, affluent), LGBT+ (heterosexual, cisgendered), American Muslim (Christian).

Likewise with nonwhite (white). For centuries, the very meaning of “white” has been “not black or brown” (see Chapters 3-4). Example 1 shows how a color-blind society in which whites display no prejudicial intent may nevertheless continue to confer advantages to whiteness and disadvantages to nonwhiteness.

Example 2: Male normativity. A second analogy offering insight into white normativity is patriarchy (male normativity). Whereas sexism refers to individual (psychological) prejudice against women, patriarchy does not require conscious bias, just a world in which men holding most positions of authority is taken for granted as “natural” and “normal” (Freedman 2007).

Despite the victories of first-wave feminism (1800s-early 1900s: see Chapter 1), de jure sexual equality did not automatically result in de facto equality, either in the U.S. or Latin America (Lavrin 2005). Achieving the vote—the Nineteenth Amendment (1920) granting female suffrage—was a crucial victory for American female political participation and full citizenship. At a time when most men (and many women) were “male nationalists” believing only men could be full citizens, post-Women’s Rights America (1920) pointed toward full civil and political inclusion regardless of sex. Nevertheless, genuine (not merely rhetorical) gender inclusion (socially, economically, politically) remained largely unrealized until

feminism's second wave (1960s-80s), and in many ways remains unrealized today (Feinstein 2018).

Post-Women's Rights America (after 1920) was a society which continued to largely exclude politically active women from decision-making at local, state, and national levels (APAN:II:623). By the 1950s, long after formal female equality in the political sphere, many civil rights goals remained to be accomplished for women (Friedan 2010). Women of color, in particular, experienced multiple dimensions of exclusion due to race (and often class as well). In the 1950s, female admission to medical school was usually limited to 5% of each incoming class. Similarly, in 1960 less than 4% of all lawyers and judges were women (APAN:II:766). White women did not begin to see themselves increasingly represented in high-ranking political offices until the late twentieth century. By 2020, a century after the Nineteenth Amendment, there had yet to be a female President, and women remained severely underrepresented in Congress, as state governors, and in many other high political seats. This is despite the fact that half the U.S. population is female.

Example 2 shows that American institutions have long been formally gender-blind, after much women's-rights struggle—yet in practice often remain male normative. Just as male normativity has endured into the twenty-first century, so white normativity has continued in post-Civil Rights America. De jure color-blindness, like de jure gender-blindness, does not guarantee genuine (versus rhetorical) equality.

Example 3: White-normed legal education. Like women of any race, African Americans continue to be underrepresented in positions of authority. As noted, in the 1950s and 60s few lawyers and judges were women (APAN:II:766) despite females comprising half the U.S. population. Similarly, in 2008 “black Americans ma[d]e up less than 2 percent of important legal officials, including state attorneys general, district attorneys, leading civil and criminal lawyers, and the judges in major state and federal courts” (Moore 2008:x), despite forming 12% of the U.S. population. In the early

twenty-first century, blacks continued to be severely underrepresented in positions of legal power and authority. Part of the explanation appears to be ongoing white normativity in law school education.

As sociologist Wendy Moore (2008:90) notes, discussing her ethnographic research conclusions about two elite law schools, today few white law students, faculty, or staff harbor racist intent or animosity. Nevertheless, they—like Example 1’s right-handers—may continue to *reproduce* the “normal” (traditional, white-normed) institution of legal education, unintentionally recreating the same racial obstacles and problems for another generation of nonwhite students and faculty (ibid:60; see also Bell 2004; Khan 2018; Wingfield 2013).

Chapter 1 introduced intersectionality: people of crosscutting social groups experience the world in contrasting ways. Elite legal education today, though formally color-blind, may continue to transmit values and assumptions characteristic of generations of wealthy white male judges, lawyers, and legal theorists. Law school trains you to “think like a lawyer”—which involves learning to see society from the perspective of these men. Adopting this perspective “comes naturally” to law students who are themselves wealthy white males (though this background doesn’t guarantee good grades). This culture tends to prioritize individualism, autonomy, instrumentalism (means-end, goal-oriented behavior), orientation to abstract rules and principles, impersonal (formal) interactional styles, emotional reserve (distance, detachment), and economic wealth (Domhoff 2017).

Law students who don’t share much of this elite white male culture may face unstated, informal obstacles not experienced by students who do. Professional education requires secondary socialization: internalization of the profession’s values and culture (e.g., law, medicine, business, science: Abbott 2014). According to Moore (2008), some law students of color report extreme personality transformations in their struggle to adopt white male values and “think like a lawyer.” This culture clash factors into

attrition rates of students of color. By contrast, white male students, like “fish in water,” though not necessarily good students, tend to find legal education’s values normal and natural. Thus, the seemingly racially neutral “lawyer” identity, in the experience of many law students of color really means thinking like a white man.

Example 3 indicates how institutional normalization of whiteness in legal education works. Society depends on people having babies to reproduce a population; similarly, institutions (e.g., law, education, medicine, government, religion) from generation to generation must be reproduced. Elite law schools today, to the extent that they uncritically reproduce traditional elite white male values and assumptions, pose unstated challenges to students and employees not sharing this culture (Bell 2004).

10.3 De Facto Residential Segregation

As we’ve seen, in much sociological explanation of enduring black-white disparities, white normativity plays a key role. White-normed social institutions, in turn, have contributed to the maintenance of exclusionary social structures with roots in pre-1970 white supremacy. One of the most consequential of these structures for limiting African American opportunity has been the black ghetto (see Chapter 9).

Writing in the 1990s, demographers Massey and Denton (1993) noted that most Americans vaguely recognized that **U.S. cities after 1968 remained racially segregated in practice**, with identifiable black neighborhoods (Massey & Denton 1993:1). Though federal law barred housing discrimination (Fair Housing Act of 1968), de facto segregation has remained a powerful obstacle to social, economic, and political opportunities for African Americans (Bell 2004; Klinkner & Smith 1999:323; Moore 2008:24-25; Telles & Ortiz 2008:160). In Brazil, segregation of black/brown homes from white homes has been “only” moderate, similar to U.S. segregation of Asian American homes from white homes. However, as compared to Brazilian cities, black-white residential dissimilarity^[7] in many U.S.

cities is far higher. At the turn of the twenty-first century, dissimilarity ranged from 92 in Chicago (almost complete segregation) to 75 in New York City (Telles 2004:202).

Social isolation of blacks via discriminatory housing markets has long been the cornerstone of American apartheid (Desmond 2016; see Chapter 8). The first half of the twentieth century was a time of black mass migration (aka the Great Migration) from the rural South to cities, particularly in the North but also in the South and West. By the end of the 1960s, about 80% of blacks lived in cities rather than rural areas (Massey & Denton 1993:18). Thus, post-1968 housing patterns in cities pertained to the vast majority of African Americans.

Residential segregation has never simply been the “choice” of blacks to live with other blacks. During the Great Migration, northern WASPs and white ethnics fiercely rejected the newcomers, forcing African Americans—mostly poor and working class, but also middle class—together into mono-ethnic ghettos (see Chapter 6). These were zones of dilapidated, overpriced, and overcrowded housing with poor to nonexistent municipal services. With more and more black migrants arriving from the South, especially after the First World War (1918), the result was large black neighborhoods abutting white ones in many northern cities: e.g., New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Cleveland, Indianapolis, Chicago, St. Louis (Drake & Cayton 1970). With 1940s-60s suburbanization, whites abandoned these cities’ “inner” zones, which expressway construction isolated still further (Klinkner & Smith 1999). Thus was born the “inner city,” an urban zone of racialized poverty and few jobs.

In this way, **white exclusion (1877-1968) created the twentieth-century black ghetto, the most extreme form of racial-ethnic residential segregation ever to exist in North America.** Whereas 1800s-early 1900s WASP exclusion created white-ethnic immigrant neighborhoods (e.g., Irish, Jews, Poles, Hungarians, Italians), these were not mono-ethnic (see Chapter 6). So-called “Italian” or “Jewish” neighborhoods almost never contained over 50% of that

ethnic group. For white ethnics, the highest level of spatial isolation ever recorded in the United States was 56%, for Italians in 1910 Milwaukee. In contrast, by 1970 the lowest level of black spatial isolation anywhere in the nation was 56% in San Francisco (Massey & Denton 1993:49). White racism ensured that Asians, Mexicans, and especially African Americans mostly lived in mono-ethnic neighborhoods (APAN:II:495; see Chapter 6). Mono-ethnicity of Chinatowns, Mexican barrios, and black ghettos socially isolated these groups and limited their upward mobility (Ortiz 1996). By contrast, white ethnics had more opportunities to escape urban slums, moving to working-class and middle-class WASP neighborhoods in the city, suburbs, and rural areas (Massey & Denton 1993:9).

Accordingly, a major goal of the 1954-1968 Civil Rights movement was **open housing**—federal rules against racial discrimination in housing markets. Although by 1968 black activism had succeeded in pressuring Congress to pass the Fair Housing Act, the bill's opponents ensured that its enforcement measures were removed (Massey & Denton 1993:195; see Chapter 8). Thus, an old pattern—civil rights laws lacking enforcement measures—was repeated, resulting in continuing residential segregation (de facto rather than de jure) during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (Desmond & Emirbayer 2010; Duck 2015). Black-white residential segregation illustrates the ongoing gap between genuine and merely rhetorical equality in post-Civil Rights America.

10.4 De Facto Educational Segregation

Like white normativity and residential segregation, educational segregation remained a major obstacle to African American inclusion in the early twenty-first century.

As during formal apartheid (in the South) and informal apartheid (in the North and West), so today **America remains a society of racially separate and unequal education** (Brown et al. 2003; Desmond & Emirbayer 2010; Orfield & Eaton 1996). For example,

in 1991 Washington, D.C.'s schools were 92% black, and Detroit's school system was 89% black (Kozol 1991:185, 198). In 1992 (38 years after *Brown v. Board* in 1954), more than 33% of black students were still in schools of over 90% minority students. In the same year, almost 50% of white students nationwide were in schools of at least 90% white students. In the Midwest and Northeast, over 66% of white students attended virtually all-white schools (Klinkner & Smith 1999:323). “[S]chools in the United States today [2008] are as racially segregated as they were at the time of the *Brown* decision [1954], more in some areas” (Moore 2008:64). As during apartheid, today’s **black-white disparities in school quality and funding are exacerbated by housing segregation**. This is because public school district funding is based on local real estate values and property taxes. Poor communities in the U.S. usually don’t have access to well-funded education, and blacks are much more likely to be poor than are whites.^[8]

As with housing, the 1954-1968 Civil Rights movement prioritized school desegregation (Fredrickson 1981:274; Morris 1986). White resistance to desegregation began immediately after the Supreme Court’s *Brown* decision (1954), with local and state governments in the South initially relying on the traditional anti-Civil Rights strategy of shutting down a public service (here, public education) rather than integrating it (Hohle 2018). When desegregation pressures came to the North, white resistance there was likewise fierce. White flight to suburbs and anti-busing politics during the 1960s-70s further increased black social isolation in inner cities.

For example, in Boston white flight (combined with foreign immigration) transformed the racial composition of the school system between 1970 and 2012. The most dramatic drop in white students occurred during the 1970s, when Boston schools became majority-minority:

Table 10.1. White percentage of children in Boston public schools

Year	White percent of students
1970	64%
1980	35.5%
1990	22.2%
2000	14.7%
2012	13%

Source: Hohle 2018:179 (from U.S. Census, Boston Public Schools, 2012)

Among the 1970s-80s Supreme Court cases supporting white backlash against civil rights advances was *Milliken v. Bradley* (1974; see Chapter 8). The Court, though continuing to oppose de jure school segregation, effectively upheld de facto educational segregation (Kozol 1991:200-201). In sum, both factors—southern and northern white backlash against the Civil Rights Movement, and racially retrogressive Supreme Court decisions—allowed school segregation to continue in the post-Civil Rights era (Desmond & Emirbayer 2010; Orfield 1993).

Continuities of school segregation from apartheid to the post-Civil Rights era help to explain the **racial achievement gap** of recent decades. This term refers to academic achievement disparities—high school and college completion rates, grade point averages, test scores—between black and/or Latinx students, and white students (Lewis & Diamond 2015:2; cf. Steele 2011). The gap was not new after 1970; rather, its continuing existence pointed to ongoing educational inequality. On the one hand, schools continued to vary in quality and funding by race (e.g., white suburbs vs. black city). On the other hand, within the same school, accumulated white family resources and networks continued to be much superior on average to those of black families (Kozol 1991:119; Lewis & Diamond

2015:10). Moreover, white normalization in schools continued to contribute to racially disparate outcomes. The cumulative effect of many decisions (usually color-blind and well-intentioned) by parents, teachers, and counselors was that, within the same school, white students ended up being disproportionately tracked into the best classrooms, and blacks into the worst (Desmond & Emirbayer 2010). Generations of students after 1970, just as during apartheid, learned in school to associate blacks with poor academic performance, and whites with overall better performance (Lewis & Diamond 2015:11-12).

Likewise, studies of **school discipline** have revealed patterns of racial profiling similar to those found in policing and criminal justice (Alexander 2010). Racialized discipline may unfairly focus on black and brown students, or it may treat white youth as intrinsically innocent (Lewis & Diamond 2015:48-49). According to the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights, black students and especially black males are much more likely than white students to receive suspensions or be expelled from school (ibid:47). Accordingly, white normalization in schools contributes to the **schools-to-prison pipeline**, an all-too-common trajectory of young, black males in post-Civil Rights America (Alexander 2010; Kozol 1991:118).

In sum, public education plays a crucial role in American equality of opportunity; yet African Americans across a range of socio-economic classes are disproportionately concentrated in segregated, poorly funded schools of low quality (Hohle 2018:186; Orfield 1993; Orfield & Eaton 1996). Contemporary educational segregation represents a major continuity with pre-1970 American apartheid, and an important reminder of the limits of the victories of the Civil Rights Movement (Kozol 1991:2-3). Parallels in education between the post-Reconstruction era (1877) and post-Civil Rights era (1968) further support the claim that our era is one of overall white retreat from commitment to genuine racial equality (Klinkner & Smith 1999; see Chapter 9).

Chapter 10 Summary

Chapter 10—discussing white normativity and de facto segregation—continued Chapter 9’s explanation of why most sociologists see racial inequality as largely ongoing, rather than overcome, in the post-civil rights era. Section 10.1 distinguished individual prejudice from white normativity. Although white Americans after 1970 increasingly disavowed racist attitudes, institutional normalization of whiteness continued to block genuine nonwhite inclusion.

Section 10.2 provided three illustrations of white normativity, using the examples of right-handedness, male normativity, and law school education. The examples show how—despite the best intentions of many whites lacking discriminatory intent—systemic racism may continue to thrive in today’s institutional environments (e.g., law schools).

Section 10.3 introduced de facto residential segregation as an ongoing obstacle to genuine African American inclusion. Socially isolated housing continued to powerfully constrain black social, economic, and political opportunities, long after de jure open housing in 1968.

Section 10.4 introduced de facto educational segregation. Like residential segregation, poorly funded and segregated schooling has endured in the post-civil rights era, severely limiting black opportunities.

[1] Left image: Public domain. Right image credit: Creative Commons license ([“New Classroom at BES”](#) by [BES Photos](#) is licensed under [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#))

[2] Wallace’s gubernatorial terms were 1963–67, 1971–79, 1983–87. See Wikipedia: “George Wallace.” Accessed 6/23/21.

[3] CREDIT LINE: Excerpt(s) from SAVAGE INEQUALITIES:

CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS by Jonathan Kozol, copyright © 1991 by Jonathan Kozol. Used by permission of Crown Books, an imprint of Random House, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

[4] Image credit: Creative Commons license ("[House for sale](#)") by [Mundoo](#) is licensed under [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

[5] Aka systemic racism, structural racism, institutional discrimination, racism without racists.

[6] Source: "11 Everyday Tasks That Are Tricky for Left Handers" by Jake Rossen. *Mental Floss* (August 1, 2019). Accessed 6/27/21.

[7] The dissimilarity index (D) is a demographic measure of segregation. It measures the percentage of a social group that would have to move to a different census tract to achieve the same residential distribution as another social group. D varies from 0—same distribution—to 100—total segregation (Telles 2004:201-202).

[8] According to the 2010 U.S. Census, "25.7% of African Americans and 25.4% of Hispanic Americans [were] living below the federal poverty line, compared to less than 10% of white Americans." Source: Equal Justice Initiative 2019 Calendar: "A History of Racial Injustice." <https://eji.org/>

Chapter II: More Obstacles to Racial Inclusion



The above image^[1] of the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. illustrates ongoing obstacles to genuine African American social, political, and economic inclusion, additional to de facto segregation (Chapter 10). The 116th Congress (2019-2021) made headlines as the most diverse in the nation's history, particularly its freshman class of first-term representatives.^[2] Nevertheless, Congress remained dominated by traditionally powerful social groups, in numbers disproportionate to the national population. In particular, non-Hispanic whites, males, Christians, and the wealthy continued to be greatly overrepresented. Regarding gender, of 100 senators, 74 were men and only 26 women. Of 435 House representatives, 334 were men and 101 women (23% women). Yet half of the U.S. population is female.

Regarding race-ethnicity, the Senate remained overwhelmingly white with 91 non-Hispanic whites, but only 4 Hispanics, 2 Blacks, 2 Asians, and 1 multiracial (Black/Asian). The House—somewhat more diverse than the Senate—was 72% white, with 313 non-Hispanic whites (72%), 56 Blacks (13%), 44 Hispanics (10%), 15 Asians, and 4 Native Americans. Such figures indicate **the ongoing power of non-Hispanic white Americans as a group, far out of proportion to their actual population numbers**. By 2020, about 60% of Americans were non-Hispanic white, in comparison to Hispanic (about 19%) or Black (about 13%). The Black congressional figures highlight both breaks and continuities with the apartheid past. The fact that Black representation in the House (13%) was proportional to the national African American population is a sign of significant racial progress since 1970. Yet the absence of Black senators (3%)—with the Senate being the more powerful and prestigious chamber—underscores ongoing Black political exclusion. Likewise, the small number of Hispanics in Congress points to significant underrepresentation of this group in American politics.

As with elected office, nonwhites in many other settings have frequently had the experience of being “the only one here,” or “we’re the only ones” (McCrummen 2021). Unlike many people of color, few whites have had the regular experience of being the only white person in the classroom, workplace, neighborhood, restaurant, department store, or public park. It can be a lonely experience of powerlessness, isolation, conspicuousness, vulnerability, and anxiety, even if you are technically included.^[3] Differing social experiences of whites and people of color suggest many questions: Why do blacks and whites tend to express contrasting group opinions on academic surveys about race relations? How do black-white disparities in criminal justice and health outcomes both reflect and contribute to ongoing de facto exclusion? Faced with ongoing obstacles, how can societies like the United States, Brazil, and South Africa overcome such barriers?

Chapter 11 Learning Objectives

11.1 Racial Injustice Timeline, 1968-2017

- Describe how the 50-year timeline illustrates continuities with apartheid

11.2 Differing Black-White Perspectives and Experiences

- Define double consciousness
- Explain Black English Vernacular's roots in twentieth-century black social isolation (segregation)
- Describe group differences in black-white perspectives on race relations

11.3 Police Abuse and Mass Incarceration

- Define police abuse
- Define mass incarceration
- Define implicit racial bias
- Understand ongoing racial disparities in policing and criminal justice

11.4 Health Disparities

- Understand ongoing racial disparities in healthcare processes and outcomes

Chapter 11 Key Terms (in order of appearance in chapter)

double consciousness: the lived experience of many people of color of seeing themselves simultaneously from two perspectives, nonwhite and white

Black English Vernacular: A version of American English developed by African Americans living for generations in social

isolation from European Americans. Aka “the language of segregation.”

integration: racial social mixing, for example in neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces. Blacks and whites often have different perspectives on the meaning of “integration.” Whereas blacks on academic surveys often report desiring 50-50 mixing, whites report themselves unwilling to tolerate more than small proportions of blacks. Though the post-Civil Rights era has seen falling levels of principled (de jure) antiblack bias among whites, many whites continue to oppose integration in practice (de facto).

police abuse: a style of policing that emphasizes violence and repression toward civilians, akin to military repression of a conquered population.

racial profiling: a common form of police abuse in Brazil and the United States. Black and brown people in public places are stopped, questioned, and searched far more frequently than are whites. This practice has been so common that the ironic phrase “driving while black” has entered international popular culture.

mass incarceration: the situation of U.S. penal practice since the late 1970s, making America the world’s largest jailer. Not only does the U.S. have the largest absolute prison population in the world, but it incarcerates a higher proportion of its own citizens than any other country. Racial disparities abound in post-Civil Rights mass incarceration.

implicit racial bias: unconscious, antiblack racism. Much social psychological research has shown that people of all racial backgrounds (white, black, other), even those with consciously egalitarian beliefs, commonly display such bias on rapid priming and implicit association tests (Lewis & Diamond 2015:57; cf. Steele 2011).

11.1 Racial Injustice Timeline, 1968-2017

We’ve seen that the purpose of Chapters 9-11 is to explain why most sociologists today see race as a social problem that is largely ongoing, not overcome. Chapter 11 adds to this explanation by

discussing sociological conclusions about present-day obstacles—continuities with apartheid, differing black-white perspectives, police abuse and mass incarceration, health disparities—to genuine African American inclusion.

To better understand black group perspectives on race relations (section 11.2 below), it's important first to appreciate facts about the ongoing nature of racial injustice. Granted, such inequality has changed in many ways since the 1950s-60s Civil Rights era (Anderson 2013). However, **the half-century since 1968 has seen not only breaks with apartheid but also continuities.** The 50-year timeline below (Table 11.1) lists several types of events: white terrorism, continuities with apartheid, overcoming apartheid, racialized police abuse and police impunity, whitewashing history, and federal retreat from Civil Rights advances. It's significant that these kinds of events greatly overlap with the post-Reconstruction (1877) era of U.S. history. Accordingly, the timeline further illustrates overall white retreat from genuine racial equality in the post-Civil Rights era (Klinkner & Smith 1999: see Chapter 9). Also note that the timeline is far from exhaustive; many additional events could be added.

Table 11.1. Racial Injustice Timeline (selected events, 1968-2017)[\[4\]](#)

Year	Event theme	Event
1968	White terrorism	Martin Luther King, Jr. is assassinated in Memphis, TN
1970	Federal retreat from Civil Rights progress	In <i>Evans v. Abney</i> , U.S. Supreme Court upholds Georgia court's decision to close rather than integrate Macon's Baconsfield Park, created by Senator Augustus Bacon [in 1911] for whites only
1970	Racialized police abuse	Police shoot and kill two unarmed black student protesters at Jackson State College
1971	Federal retreat from Civil Rights progress	President Richard Nixon declares "War on Drugs," contributing to 700% increase in U.S. prison population by 2007
1973	Continuities with apartheid: eugenics	Two young black girls, Minnie (age 14) and Mary Alice Relf (12), sue health clinic in Montgomery, Alabama, for sterilizing them without their knowledge or consent
1974	Continuities with apartheid	Delbert Tibbs, a black hitchhiker from Chicago, is indicted for capital murder of a white couple in Florida; he is wrongfully convicted by an all-white jury and spends two years on death row
1976	Overcoming apartheid	Joseph Woodrow Hatchett is elected Justice of the Florida Supreme Court, becoming the first black person elected to any statewide office in the South since Reconstruction [1877]
1977	White terrorism	Newspapers report that Cornell and Geraldine Cook, the only black couple in a white neighborhood in Smithfield, North Carolina, plan to leave after shots are fired into their home

1980	Police impunity	After four Miami police officers are acquitted in brutal beating death of Arthur McDuffie, protests leave 23 dead and hundreds injured
1981	White terrorism	After a Mobile, Alabama, jury acquits a black man of killing a white police officer, Ku Klux Klan members randomly kidnap and kill 19-year-old Michael Donald, a black man, and hang his body from a tree
1983	Racialized police abuse	Chicago police beat, electrocute, and threaten to castrate James Cody; over 100 blacks were tortured by Chicago Police Department over three decades
1986	Federal retreat from Civil Rights progress	Anti-Drug Abuse Act creates a 100-to-1 sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine possession that contributes to mass incarceration of African Americans
1986	White terrorism	Michael Griffith, a 23-year-old black man, is hit by a car and killed after being chased by a white mob in Howard Beach, New York
1987	Federal retreat from Civil Rights progress	U.S. Supreme Court upholds death penalty in <i>McCleskey v. Kemp</i> despite proof it is racially biased, reasoning that racial discrimination in the criminal justice system is "inevitable"
1989	Continuities with apartheid (Scottsboro Boys, 1931)	Five black and Latino teens are arrested for [allegedly] raping a jogger in New York City's Central Park and spend more than a decade in prison before being exonerated
1989	White terrorism	Black teen Yusef Hawkins is accused of visiting a white girl and then is murdered by a white mob in Bensonhurst, New York

1991	Federal retreat from Civil Rights progress	In <i>Board of Education of Oklahoma City Schools v. Dowell</i> , U.S. Supreme Court ends federal desegregation order even though it will cause racial re-segregation of school system
1991	Racialized police abuse	Severe beating of black motorist Rodney King by Los Angeles police is caught on tape
1992	Police impunity	Riots in Los Angeles, California, sparked by acquittal of white police officers who beat black motorist Rodney King, end, leaving 53 people dead, 2,000 injured, and \$1 billion in damage
1994	Continuities with apartheid	U.S. Department of Justice files suit against school principal in Randolph County, Alabama, who refuses to permit racially integrated prom and bans interracial dating at public high school
1994	Continuities with apartheid	Denny's restaurant chain agrees to pay largest-ever settlement to African Americans who sued after they were refused service, made to wait longer, or charged more than white customers
1995	Overcoming apartheid	Mississippi legislature votes to ratify Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing slavery, after having rejected it in 1865
1995	Continuities with apartheid	Alabama resurrects chain gangs for state prisoners, influencing several other states to do the same
1995	Federal retreat from Civil Rights progress	NAACP protests National Park Service's decision, pressured by Sons of Confederate Veterans and Sen. Jesse Helms, to uncover "faithful slave monument" at Harper's Ferry, Virginia

1995	Racialized police abuse	Five police officers in suburban Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, kill black motorist Jonny Gammage during a routine traffic stop by pinning him face down on the pavement until he asphyxiates
2000	Overcoming apartheid	Alabama repeals 1901 state constitutional ban on interracial marriage, although a majority of white voters favor keeping the ban
2001	Continuities with apartheid	Harvard University's Civil Rights Project releases study finding that schools were more segregated in 2000 than they were in the 1970s before desegregation efforts, including busing, began
2004	Continuities with apartheid	Alabama voters reject constitutional amendment that would remove from state constitution a provision requiring separate schools for "white and colored children"
2005	Overcoming apartheid	U.S. Congress formally apologizes for its failure to pass any of the 200 anti-lynching bills introduced from 1882 to 1968
2005	Continuities with apartheid	Hurricane Katrina: the subsequent disaster response is criticized for mistreating many severely impacted black citizens
2006	White terrorism	David Ritcheson, a Latino 16-year-old who was brutally beaten and sexually assaulted after trying to kiss a white girl at a party in Texas, testifies before Congress in support of hate crime laws
2006	Impunity for past white terrorism	Nearly 55 years after civil rights activists Harry and Harriette Moore were killed by a bomb, a renewed investigation finds four now-deceased Ku Klux Klansmen were responsible

2007	Overcoming apartheid	Turner County High School in Ashburn, Georgia, holds first racially integrated prom; in prior years, parents had organized private, segregated proms for white and black students
2007	Continuities with apartheid	Up to 15,000 people in Jena, Louisiana, protest the attempted murder prosecution of six black teens for fighting with white students who hung a noose from a tree on their high school campus
2009	White terrorism	Members of the Ku Klux Klan burn a cross in an African American neighborhood in Ozark, Alabama, to intimidate black residents
2009	Continuities with apartheid	Justice of the peace in Louisiana refuses to marry an interracial couple because of their race and later acknowledges he denied marriage licenses to interracial couples for years
2010	Continuities with apartheid	Civil rights activist lawyers argue to overturn the death-in-prison sentence [life sentence] imposed on a 13-year-old child in Mississippi
2010	Whitewashing history	Alabama prison officials ban all prisoners from reading <i>Slavery by Another Name</i> , a Pulitzer Prize-winning history of the “re-enslavement” of African Americans during Jim Crow era
2010	Racialized police abuse, relative impunity	Police officer Johannes Mehserle is sentenced to two years for fatally shooting black 22-year-old Oscar Grant III in the back while he was face down on an Oakland, California, train platform

2010	Impunity for past white terrorism	Former police officer James Bonard Fowler pleads guilty to 1965 murder of civil rights activist Jimmie Lee Jackson in Marion, Alabama, and is sentenced to six months in jail
2011	Immigration and race	Alabama legislature passes anti-immigrant law designed to force immigrants to flee the state; Governor Robert Bentley later signs it despite language that legalizes racial profiling
2011	Continuities with apartheid: racialized poverty	[2010] U.S. Census reports 25.7% of African Americans and 25.4% of Hispanic Americans are living below the federal poverty line, compared to less than 10% of white Americans
2011	White terrorism	White teens kill James Craig Anderson, a black man, in a hate crime in Jackson, Mississippi
2012	Continuities with apartheid	Trayvon Martin, a 17-year-old black boy, is killed in Sanford, Florida; police arrest shooter George Zimmerman only after national outcry against claim that Stand Your Ground law barred his prosecution
2012	State-level commitment to Civil Rights progress	First decision under North Carolina's Racial Justice Act finds that racial bias infected Marcus Robinson's capital trial 18 years earlier [1994] and commutes his death sentence to life without parole
2012	Overcoming apartheid: eugenics	North Carolina legislators recommend \$50,000 compensation for victims of forced sterilization program from 1930s to 1970s; 60% of women sterilized against their will were black

2012	Continuities with apartheid	Report shows one of every 13 voting-age African Americans is disenfranchised [7.7%] (four times more than non-black citizens); Florida, Kentucky, and Virginia bar over 20% of black residents from voting
2012	Continuities with apartheid: black criminalization	U.S. Justice Department files civil rights lawsuit against Meridian, Mississippi, officials for incarcerating black and disabled children for dress code violations and talking back to teachers
2013	Federal retreat from Civil Rights progress	Alabama officials argue before U.S. Supreme Court in <i>Shelby County v. Holder</i> that Voting Rights Act of 1965's protections are no longer needed to prevent discrimination; on June 25, the Court agrees
2013	State-level retreat from Civil Rights progress	North Carolina House votes to repeal Racial Justice Act, ending remedy for racial bias in capital trials
2013	Continuities with apartheid: criminal justice	Kimberly McCarthy is 500th person executed by Texas since 1972; more than half [50%] of those executed have been people of color
2013	Continuities with apartheid: eugenics	Center for Investigative Reporting breaks story this week that State of California improperly sterilized nearly 150 incarcerated women between 2006 and 2010
2013	Continuities with apartheid: criminal justice	Federal district court rules New York Police Department's "stop and frisk" policy is discriminatory and unconstitutional upon finding that 85% of people stopped are black or Hispanic

2013	Federal retreat from Civil Rights progress	Federal court in Alabama upholds...redistricting plan that reduces black voting power
2014	Overcoming apartheid symbolism	Federal appeals court rules Texas must issue group license plate for Sons of Confederate Veterans that features a Confederate flag; United States Supreme Court later reverses this decision
2014	Continuities with apartheid	Black workers at Memphis, Tennessee, cotton gin file discrimination lawsuit after white supervisor uses racial slurs and threatens to hang them for drinking from "white" water fountain
2014	Racialized police abuse	Eight days after graduating from high school, black teenager Michael Brown is shot and killed by a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, sparking protests and outcry nationwide
2014	Racialized police abuse	Tamir Rice, a black 12-year-old boy, dies after being shot by police while playing with a toy gun in a park near his home in Cleveland, Ohio
2015	Racialized police abuse, continuities with apartheid	U.S. Department of Justice finds pervasive racial bias within police department and municipal court in Ferguson, Missouri, including targeting black people for stops, arrests, and uses of force
2015	Continuities with apartheid	San Francisco police officers' racist text messages referencing cross burning and lynching are released to news media

2015	Continuities with apartheid	Protesters march after University of Oklahoma's Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity is taped singing a song that includes the n-word and "You can hang him from a tree, but he'll never sign with me."
2015	Continuities with apartheid symbolism	Nine states, including Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia, recognize Confederate Memorial Day as an official state holiday to commemorate the surrender of the Confederate army in April 1865
2015	White terrorism	In Charleston, South Carolina, white teen who embraced racist ideology and wanted to start a "race war" is arrested for shooting nine black people attending Bible study at Emanuel A.M.E. Church
2015	Continuities with apartheid symbolism	After discussing the need to protect Confederate memorials, North Carolina's House passes bill requiring legislative approval to remove historical monuments; the bill is signed into law days later
2015	Whitewashing history	Despite public outrage over a Texas history textbook that depicted enslaved people as "workers from Africa," state lawmakers reject proposal to require that textbooks be fact-checked
2016	Racialized police abuse, impunity	Grand jury in Arlington, Texas, refuses to indict Brad Miller, a white police officer who fatally shot unarmed, 19-year-old black college student and football player Christian Taylor in August 2015
2016	Racialized police abuse	Baton Rouge, Louisiana, police officers shoot and kill Alton Sterling, a 37-year-old black man, while he is pinned to the ground; video of the shooting leads to major protests nationwide

2016	Racialized police abuse	Days after shooting black therapist Charles Kinsey and handcuffing him as he lay bleeding on the ground, police in North Miami, Florida, claim officer was aiming for Dr. Kinsey's unarmed autistic patient
2016	Whitewashing history	First Lady Michelle Obama's speech acknowledging "I wake up every morning in a house built by slaves" sparks backlash
2016	Racialized police abuse, impunity	St. Anthony, Minnesota, police officer Jeronimo Yanez returns to duty before completion of the investigation into his fatal shooting of Philando Castile weeks earlier
2017	White terrorism	White nationalists protest removal of a Confederate statue in Charlottesville, Virginia; the next day, a protester drives a car into counter-protesters, injuring 19 and killing one woman. The car driver was a twenty-year-old man who had driven from Ohio, and had previously espoused neo-Nazi and white supremacist beliefs

11.2 Differing Black-White Perspectives and Experiences

In many ways, white and black Americans share the same society, with a common culture, history, government, economy, etc. However, these racial groups also have a long, ongoing history of **social distance**, as measured by indicators like low intermarriage and high residential segregation (Telles & Ortiz 2008:158). Social distance has contributed to significant black-white contrasts in group attitudes about race relations, as studied by academic survey researchers (Schuman et al. 1997). These differing perspectives have endured to the present, long after apartheid's formal end by 1968.

Relevant here is a longstanding theme in African American

culture: **double consciousness** (Du Bois 1903; Gates & McKay 1997). This is the lived experience of many people of color (and colonized peoples worldwide) of seeing themselves simultaneously from two perspectives, nonwhite and white (Glissant 1990:17). Fragmented, colonized consciousness can feel like participating in two “worlds,” with two distinct sets of meanings, values, and allegiances (Fanon 1967; Lamming 1991:xxxvii; La Vega 2006; Rawls 2000). Fractured or double consciousness involves internalization by marginalized social groups—e.g., blacks, women, the poor, gays—of hegemonic social values. The oppressor’s (colonizer’s, master’s) voice becomes an internal voice of conscience leading to self-abasement in favor of the normalized group: e.g., whites, men, the middle class, heterosexuals (Condé 1992; Kincaid 1997). In this and other ways, the black world(s) can feel different from the white world(s). Today, important contrasts remain between black/brown society and white society in countries like Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, and the United States. Many people of color continue to find that “double consciousness” chimes with their own experience (Rawls & Duck 2020).

A telling example of ongoing black-white social distance is **Black English Vernacular**, as compared to Standard American English. Twentieth-century social isolation of blacks—segregated from whites in housing, education, work, leisure, religion, marriage, etc.—was so extreme and enduring as to create contrasting versions of the English language. Sometimes called “the language of segregation,” U.S. Black English Vernacular is analogous to Black Creole languages in the Caribbean—complex idioms of daily life capable of sophisticated and literary expression (Chamoiseau 1999). By contrast, whitening of white ethnic groups by the 1960s resulted in Standard American English (see Chapter 7). White Americans—whether of Irish, German, Italian, Hungarian, Polish, or Jewish ancestry—spoke a version of English characterized by a single set of linguistic norms, featuring key grammatical and lexical differences from the English spoken by many African Americans (Massey & Denton 1993:162-63).

Differing black-white perspectives. Post-1968 survey and ethnographic findings on race relations should be understood in terms of ongoing black-white social distance (Telles & Ortiz 2008:158). Below, we review four themes: (1) race relations, racial change, integration; (2) slavery apology and slavery reparations; (3) ongoing anti-black stereotypes; and (4) the race representative.

(1) Race relations, racial change, integration. One consequence of twentieth-century black social isolation is contrasting black-white views on race relations and racial progress (Bonilla-Silva 2018; Schuman et al. 1997). Opinion polls in recent years continue to show marked differences in the outlooks of the two racial groups. Whereas the majority of whites report optimism on U.S. race relations today and in the future, the majority of blacks report pessimism (Feagin 2020:239). For example, whereas 59% of blacks say their view of contemporary black-white race relations is negative, only 45% of whites report a negative view. On the future of racial change, a national 2019 Pew Research Center poll found that most blacks (78%) saw the nation's efforts to secure black equal rights as insufficient; by contrast, just 37% of whites agreed. Moreover, 50% of blacks viewed U.S. racial equality as unlikely to ever be achieved, whereas this view was rare (7%) among whites (ibid).

Likewise, **black-white perspectives have long differed on the meaning of racial integration.** For example, the 1976 Detroit Area Survey on residential segregation found that the word “integration” meant different things to Detroit blacks and whites (Massey & Denton 1993:93). Whereas for blacks it meant neighborhoods between 15% to 70% black (with 50% being most desirable), for whites it meant far fewer blacks. The Detroit findings were later replicated by academic surveys in Los Angeles, Kansas City, Cincinnati, Omaha, and Milwaukee. In all these northern and western cities, whites reported themselves unwilling to live in integrated neighborhoods with more than 20% blacks (ibid).

Such attitude differences (post-1970) echo similar black-white contrasts during the Civil Rights era itself. During the 1940s-60s, many whites, both South and North, expressed ambivalence or disapproval of federal action on civil rights. In 1964—under intense pressure from the black civil rights movement, white fears of black rioting, and Cold-War era international scrutiny of American racism—Congress passed the most far-reaching civil rights act in U.S. history. However, a 1963 national poll found that almost two-thirds (64%) of white Americans saw blacks as moving “too fast” to achieve equality (Klinkner & Smith 1999:275, 396). Similarly, a 1964 poll found most white Americans (70%) opposed to blacks having more influence in government (ibid:275). By October 1966, 85% of all white Americans viewed blacks as moving too fast to achieve equality (ibid:280).

In sum, during the 1960s most whites—North, South, West—opposed immediate action (public policy) on civil rights. There was never a 1960s white consensus in favor of full social and political equality for African Americans. Rather, the 1960s was a time of marked U.S. political polarization, with one of the major controversies (among whites) being black civil rights. Today’s black-white attitude differences on race relations reflect this long history of white ambivalence to genuine black equality.

(2) Slavery apology, slavery reparations. **The United States has never officially apologized or offered redress or reparations for African American slavery** (Harvey 2007:156). By contrast, in 1988 the U.S. government—responding to sustained pressure by Japanese American advocacy groups—acknowledged and apologized for WWII internment camps, offering financial redress to surviving victims (see Chapter 6).[\[5\]](#)

White resistance to slavery apology says much about the ongoing significance of blackness in the post-Civil Rights era (Feagin 2020). This theme further illustrates differing black-white perspectives. For example, a 1997 ABC News poll found that most white respondents (66%) saw U.S. government apology for slavery as

unnecessary, with 88% opposing reparations for slavery. In stark contrast, 66% of black respondents viewed government apology *and* reparations as necessary (Harvey 2007:228).

(3) Ongoing anti-black stereotypes. After 1970, many whites continued to hold biased and stereotypical views of African Americans. In nationally representative academic surveys, whites continued to report beliefs that blacks are more violent than whites and fail to maintain their homes and lawns. Such stereotypes fueled worries that neighborhood integration would increase crime rates and lower property values of houses (Massey & Denton 1993:95). Although white beliefs in biological black inferiority decreased after 1970, many academic surveys have found that whites continue to blame black poverty, limited education, mass incarceration, and poor health not on white supremacy but rather on inferior black culture and morality (Lewis & Diamond 2015:149). Many white Americans report being more intelligent and working harder than blacks, and view ongoing black-white disparities in life chances as due to lack of motivation among blacks (ibid).

Color-blind ideology claiming that racism is no longer a social problem has allowed whites to explain away such anti-black bias as “not racist.” Accordingly, **a further black-white contrast in perspectives is differing definitions of racism.** After 1970, it was primarily powerful whites (e.g., Supreme Court justices) who decided what legally counted as racism: individual prejudice (biased intentions or motives), not white normativity (Flagg 1993). But “[a]s white people are not the target of racism in white institutional spaces, they are the least likely group of people...to understand how racism works” (Moore 2008:176). Individual-level definitions have often failed to reflect black experiences of exclusion (Bonilla-Silva 2018; Steele 2011).

(4) The race representative. This theme appears prominently in sociologist Adia Wingfield’s (2013:119) interviews with black professional men. These are lawyers (in law firms), engineers (in

engineering departments), doctors (in hospitals), and bankers (in banks). These men, often virtually the only African Americans in their peer group at their institutions, often perceive themselves as cast in the role of symbolizing or embodying their institutions' "commitment to diversity." Being repeatedly asked to volunteer their time and labor at events where they represent their institutions' diversity can significantly detract from normal job responsibilities and thus harm job performance and evaluation (ibid:120).

Overall, the four themes illustrate differing black-white experiences and perspectives on race relations. Much interracial dialogue continues to be needed if Americans are to overcome this obstacle to genuine black inclusion.

11.3 Police Abuse and Mass Incarceration

As during apartheid, American criminal justice and law enforcement remained key obstacles to genuine racial inclusion in the post-Civil Rights era (Gonzalez Van Cleve 2016). Below, we examine two areas: police abuse and mass incarceration.

(1) Police abuse. The timeline above (Table 11.1) indicates the ongoing problem of racialized **police abuse** (Telles 2004). Whereas alternative styles of policing promote good relations with marginalized community members, this style emphasizes violence and repression akin to military occupation of a conquered population (Alexander 2010). Such abuse has often targeted vulnerable groups such as nonwhites, the poor, homosexuals, immigrants, the mentally ill, and the homeless. Police brutality resulting in civilian injury or death has been a common means of repressing nonwhites in Brazil, South Africa, the United States, and many other societies with long histories of racial inequality (Telles 2004:166ff). In Brazil, for example, black and brown people—whether poor, working class, or middle class—have long been police targets, at rates disproportionate to whites of the same economic classes (ibid:167-168).

A common form of police abuse in Brazil and the U.S. has been **racial profiling** (Desmond & Emirbayer 2010). Black and brown people in public places (e.g., walking, shopping, driving cars) are stopped, questioned, and searched far more frequently than are whites (Telles 2004:168). This practice has been so common that the ironic phrase “driving while black” has entered international popular culture

In the U.S., important Supreme Court rulings since 1968 increased the likelihood that racialized police abuse would continue in the post-Civil Rights color-blind legal environment. For example, *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) increased police powers to stop-and-frisk, lowering the requirement for stopping a civilian from “probable cause” to “reasonable suspicion” of criminality. Police discretion, despite official color-blindness, continued to rely on race in making such stops. *Graham v. Connor* (1989) applied an “objective reasonableness” standard to officers’ actions, which encouraged police use of deadly force. *Whren v. U.S.* (1996) allowed racial profiling by police via “pretext” traffic stops (Alexander 2010). Thus, despite de jure color-blind rules, U.S. policing is often not color-blind in de facto practice (Bonilla-Silva 2018).

(2) Mass incarceration. Since the mid-1970s, changes in U.S. penal practices have led to racialized **mass incarceration**, making America the world’s largest jailer. Not only does the U.S. have the largest (in absolute numbers) prison population in the world, but it incarcerates a higher proportion of its own citizens than any other country. For example, about 1 out of every 100 U.S. adults (1%) was in jail or prison in 2008. This figure—extraordinarily high as compared to the pre-1980s United States—was far greater than imprisonment rates in Russia, Canada, or Japan. Since the 1970s, the incarceration rate of U.S. women has ballooned by 7 times (APAN:II:891).



Figure 11.1. Total U.S. incarceration by year.^[6]

Black-white incarceration disparities during the Civil Rights era (1950s-60s)—already large—worsened dramatically in the post-Civil Rights decades. In the 1950s, African Americans formed only 10% of the U.S. population, yet comprised 33% of U.S. prisoners (Telles 2004:169). By the 1990s this disparity had greatly increased, with blacks (by then 12% of the U.S. population) comprising 50% of all state and federal prisoners. The chances of blacks being incarcerated were 7 to 8 times greater than for whites in the 1990s (*ibid*). **In the 1990s, between 25% and 33% of the nation’s entire population of young black men was under the control of the criminal justice system** in some form (e.g., jail, prison, or parole: Klinkner & Smith 1999:337). By 2010, black men remained 7 times more likely than white men to be incarcerated (APAN:II:891). Although the overall U.S. incarceration rate began to dip after 2008, the nonwhite proportion of inmates continued to increase (Hohle 2018:229). By 2013, non-Hispanic whites—comprising about 60% of the U.S. population—were just 33% of the prison population. By

contrast, blacks—only 12% of all Americans—formed a whopping 36% of all prisoners (ibid).^[7]

Such numbers show that U.S. racial disparities in imprisonment greatly worsened after apartheid's end. Post-1970 black-white differences were especially due to drug-related crimes: specifically, how government and police pursued the War on Drugs (Alexander 2010). Though blacks and whites used illegal drugs at about the same levels, arrest and conviction of blacks was much more likely than for whites (Telles 2004:169).

Mass incarceration has had disastrous consequences for black political participation and representation, one of the priorities of the Civil Rights movement (Morris 1986). This is especially due to the fact that many states have prohibited felons and ex-prisoners from voting (Alexander 2010). In any given year, a sizeable portion of all U.S. black males was disfranchised by criminal convictions; for example, in 1999 this figure was 13% (Klinkner & Smith 1999:342). By contrast, the prison boom created a new source of income for many whites (and some nonwhites). Federal and state politics led to prisons being constructed in economically stagnant rural white regions, bringing jobs of many types: e.g., construction workers, corrections officers, wardens, social workers, supervisors (Hohle 2018:207). Moreover, the post-Civil Rights era saw the takeoff of the corrections industry: private prisons in the business of incarceration. The nation's first for-profit prison corporation—Correctional Corporation of America (CCA)—was established in 1983 in Tennessee (ibid:208-209).

Finally, **implicit racial bias—largely unconscious anti-black racism**—has been especially damaging in associating black males with “inherent” criminality. As discussed above, after 1970 many whites continued to hold biased and stereotypical views of African Americans. Such racial bias has contributed to black-white disparities at all stages of the criminal justice processing funnel: from apprehension, arrest, and jail to trial, sentencing, and imprisonment. Much social psychological research has found implicit, antiblack bias in the day-to-day activities of a host of

participants in criminal justice, not only whites but also blacks and others (Lewis & Diamond 2015:57; cf. Steele 2011).

In many ways, then, racial inequalities abound in contemporary criminal justice and law enforcement. Many observers point to racialized mass incarceration as playing a key role in post-Civil Rights white retreat from commitment to racial equality (Alexander 2010; Bonilla-Silva 2018). Certainly, mass incarceration is a major source of differing black-white experiences and perspectives in the post-Civil Rights era. In 2021 on any given day, 10% of all American black men in their thirties were in prison or jail. In 2021, two-thirds (66%) of U.S. juvenile detention consisted of youth of color.^[8] The huge racial disparities of such figures illustrate the big picture: **the extremely disparate impact, as compared to whites, of mass incarceration on people of color and their communities.**

11.4 Health Disparities

The COVID-19 pandemic beginning in 2020 revealed disparities in African American death rates as compared to whites.^[9] Such inequalities are only the most recent example of a long history of black-white differences in medical and healthcare processes and outcomes.

Racialized health disparities represent yet another ongoing obstacle to genuine black inclusion. In the post-Civil Rights era, measures of American health (e.g., health status, healthcare access and outcomes) continued to indicate racial-ethnic inequalities, as hundreds of research studies have shown (Sanchez & Ybarra 2013:104; cf. Cristancho et al. 2008; Flores 2006). Part of the explanation is that a higher proportion of blacks than whites are poor. For example, in 1990 “[i]n Central Harlem, note[d] the *New York Times*, the infant death rate...[was] the same as in Malaysia. Among black children in East Harlem, it...[was] even higher: 42 per thousand, which would be considered high in many Third World nations” (Kozol 1991:115).^[10]

As with any racial group, **black life chances regarding health**

appear to be shaped by the interaction of race and class. Like Native Americans, the high rate of African American poverty contributes to overall low health outcomes as compared to whites. An example is life expectancy: in 2013, white Americans could expect to live (on average) for 78.3 years, whereas for black Americans this figure was 73.1 years (Gómez & López 2013:3). Moreover, health disparities are not only physical, but also show up in mental health status and treatment (Helms & Mereish 2013:146).

In addition to economic class, other important factors in the social context of healthcare appear to contribute to racial disparities. One is de facto residential segregation. For example, in 2013, although the likelihood of getting breast cancer was slightly higher in Chicago for white women than for black women, women in the latter group were two times as likely to die from it (Gómez & López 2013:4-6). As we've seen (Chapter 10), post-Civil Rights Chicago remained highly segregated by race. On average, women in black neighborhoods had to travel farther than white women to get mammograms, making it less likely they would get them regularly, let alone mammograms with up-to-date equipment and trained staff (ibid). Another social factor is the experience of antiblack discrimination. The stresses of dealing with actual and anticipated racism—regular occurrences both in daily life and in the healthcare system—appear to further contribute to black-white health differences (Kahn 2013:25).

As in education and criminal justice, implicit racial bias has frequently operated in healthcare. Much social psychological research has shown that people of all racial backgrounds (white, black, other) with consciously egalitarian beliefs, nevertheless frequently display such bias on rapid priming and implicit association tests (Lewis & Diamond 2015:57; cf. Steele 2011). For instance, in a 2007 study, doctors took an implicit association test of positive or negative psychological associations with blacks and whites. The doctors with the most antiblack associations were less likely to use a heart-attack-preventing medicine with a hypothetical

black patient complaining of chest pain, as compared to doctors with more positive black associations (Lewis & Diamond 2015:195).

Consider the following series of common healthcare practices (Table 11.2). In each area, implicit antiblack bias by clinicians (of a variety of racial-ethnic identities) remains all too common.

Table 11.2. Implicit Racial Bias in Healthcare[\[11\]](#)

Area of Bias	Description of Common Anti-Black Practice
Pain	Clinicians systematically undertreat black and brown patients for pain , as compared to white patients. This practice is rooted in the longstanding medical myth that blacks are less sensitive to pain than are whites.
Heart	In judging the safety of heart surgery, clinicians assign higher risk values to black patients , relative to white patients. That is, clinicians take greater risks with black surgeries than with white ones. This differential treatment is an example of a race-based “correction” in clinical diagnosis, electronic health records, and machine learning algorithms. Such corrections are frequently based on assumptions about different health characteristics between blacks and whites.
Lungs	Spirometry measures patient exhalations (force, volume) and lung capacity, to determine if these fall within a normal range. Measures are adjusted downward for groups shown to have lower lung capacity—e.g., shorter or older patients. But such corrections are also made for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. Contemporary “race” correction in spirometry shows the ongoing influence of the longstanding medical myth that whites have more lung capacity than blacks , and thus that blacks would benefit more than whites from low-skill, manual labor.
Kidneys	Race correction results in fewer black patients being diagnosed with chronic kidney disease , as compared to white patients. Another result is fewer blacks becoming eligible for kidney transplants.
Medical Education	Clinicians learn racially disparate medical practices involving race correction in their medical training. Yet the evidence justifying such practices is far from clear, and at times relies on longstanding antiblack stereotypes rooted in white supremacy.

Chapter 11 and Unit III Summary

Chapter 11 discussed ongoing obstacles to genuine African American inclusion, additional to those presented in Chapter 10. Section 11.1 used a timeline to illustrate continuities with apartheid in the post-Civil Rights era. The timeline contextualized the rest of the chapter discussion.

Section 11.2 discussed contrasting black-white experiences and perspectives, rooted in twentieth-century apartheid. One major continuity with apartheid is ongoing black-white differences in attitudes on race relations. Such findings should be interpreted in relation to ongoing social distance (low intermarriage, high residential segregation) between the two groups.

Section 11.3 reviewed police abuse and mass incarceration as continuing obstacles to black inclusion. The U.S. has been the world's largest jailer since the late 1970s, with nonwhites forming an extremely disproportionate component of the U.S. population under the control of the criminal justice system (jail, prison, parole).

Section 11.4 introduced ongoing black-white health disparities as another obstacle to inclusion. On many measures of physical and mental health, blacks have poorer outcomes than do whites. There has been much recent research on the social context of disparities, and on racist assumptions and implicit racial bias in medical treatment of nonwhites.

Overall, Unit III examined American legacies of racialized slavery. Historical and comparative (international) perspectives with Brazil and South Africa complemented the present-day U.S. focus. Unit III reviewed diversity-relevant aspects of Reconstruction and American apartheid, historical and comparative perspectives on the post-Civil Rights era, and a series of ongoing obstacles to genuine African American inclusion.

[1] Image credit: Creative Commons license ("[US Capitol](#)") by [Mark Fischer](#) is licensed under [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

[2] Source of all Congress facts here and below: Wikipedia, "116th United States Congress." Accessed 9/27/21.

[3] The same can be said about women in otherwise all-male groups or settings.

[4] The table focuses on events in the South. Source: Adapted from Equal Justice Initiative 2019 Calendar: "A History of Racial Injustice." <https://eji.org/>

[5] National Archives website, accessed 3/14/21. [https://www.archives.gov/research/japanese-americans/redress#:~:text=The%20Office%20of%20Redress%20Administration%20\(ORA\)%20was%20established,of%20Japanese%20Americans%20during%20World%20War%20II%20\(WWII\)](https://www.archives.gov/research/japanese-americans/redress#:~:text=The%20Office%20of%20Redress%20Administration%20(ORA)%20was%20established,of%20Japanese%20Americans%20during%20World%20War%20II%20(WWII))

[6] Image: Public domain. Source: Wikipedia, "Incarceration in the United States." Accessed 5/28/21.

[7] Hohle's source is U.S. Department of Justice, "Prisoners in 2013."

[8] Source: The Sentencing Project, <https://www.sentencingproject.org/issues/racial-disparity>. Accessed 5/11/21.

[9] See CDC: "Introduction to COVID-19 Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities" (updated December 10, 2020; accessed 7/13/21). www.cdc.gov/

[10] CREDIT LINE: Excerpt(s) from SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS by Jonathan Kozol, copyright © 1991 by Jonathan Kozol. Used by permission of Crown Books, an imprint of Random House, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

[11] Source: Adapted from "Field Correction" by Stephanie

Dutchen. *Harvard Gazette*, Spring 2021. [https://hms.harvard.edu/magazine/racism-medicine/field-correction?utm_source=SilverpopMailing&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20Gazette%2020210127%20\(1\)](https://hms.harvard.edu/magazine/racism-medicine/field-correction?utm_source=SilverpopMailing&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20Gazette%2020210127%20(1))

Chapter 12: U.S. Imperialism: Latin America and the Pacific, 1846-1945

UNIT IV: IMMIGRATION AND LATIN AMERICA





The images above^[1] illustrate legacies of nineteenth- and twentieth-century American **imperialism**. Hurricane María (left image) made landfall in Puerto Rico in September 2017, when Carmen Yulín Cruz (right image) was mayor of San Juan, the capital of this U.S. **territory**.

The Category 5 storm devastated the U.S. Caribbean territory of Puerto Rico, home to more American citizens than 21 of the 50 **states**. More Americans live in Puerto Rico than in, for example, Utah, Iowa, Nevada, Arkansas, Mississippi, Kansas, New Mexico, Nebraska, West Virginia, New Hampshire, or Rhode Island.^[2] Similarly, the combined population of U.S. territories (3.6 million: Puerto Rico, Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa) is greater than that of the non-contiguous states (2.1 million: Hawai'i, Alaska).^[3] Following the disaster, Puerto Rico received little aid from the Federal Emergency Management

Administration (FEMA). Not coincidentally, the island has little political clout in Washington. A U.S. possession since 1898, islanders—Hispanic Spanish-speakers—have no voting representatives or senators in Congress and no Electoral College votes. They cannot vote in presidential or any other federal elections. In many ways, Puerto Rico today remains a U.S. colony: highly taxed, little political representation, and invisible to most mainland Americans. Puerto Rico illustrates how social groups with relative power (e.g., residents of U.S. states) often have little awareness of the experiences of marginalized groups lacking power (e.g., U.S. territories).

What is the relationship between the mainland and overseas U.S.? How do American citizens of the territories view the mainland? How did American ideologies of **exceptionalism** and **manifest destiny**—often connected to white nationalism—influence direct and indirect rule in the Caribbean and Pacific?

Chapter 12 Learning Objectives

12.1 Statehood and White Nationalism

- Define imperialism
- Distinguish between U.S. states and territories
- Understand the historical link between statehood and white nationalism

12.2 American Exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny

- Define American exceptionalism
- Define manifest destiny

12.3 Growth of American Republican Empire, 1846-1914

- Define the Spanish-American War
- List three examples of U.S. imperialism in the period 1865-1914
- Define white grievance

12.4 Empire of Liberty, 1898-1945[4]

- List three examples of U.S. intervention in Latin America, 1898-1945
- Distinguish between military and economic imperialism

Chapter 12 Key Terms (in order of appearance in chapter)

imperialism: the political policy or doctrine, pertaining to an empire, of asserting or enforcing control over a foreign entity. Although the U.S. has never officially been an empire, its geographical expansion resembled in important respects European imperial expansion and colonialism, especially during the second wave of European empire-building in the late 1800s and early 1900s. (See below for military vs. economic imperialism.)

territory: U.S. administrative region in which residents possess federal citizenship but lack state citizenship

state: U.S. administrative region in which residents possess both state and federal citizenship

American exceptionalism: an ideology stating that the U.S., unlike most other nations, has usually been a force for good in the world

manifest destiny: an ideology stating that U.S. geographic expansion is preordained (e.g., in God's providential plan). Especially prior to 1945, this view was explicitly white supremacist and anti-Catholic.

Spanish-American War: Conflict in which the United States defeated the declining Spanish Empire, mostly in Cuba (1898). The Treaty of Paris (1899) granted the U.S. the former Spanish colonies of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, and indirect rule over Cuba. The war marked the arrival of the U.S. as a twentieth-century world power.

Open Door policy: after 1900, a U.S. foreign policy ideology rationalizing foreign intervention as necessary to America's survival. (See economic imperialism.)

white grievance: a racial group resentment reflected in politics, in which whites see themselves (rather than nonwhites) as the true victims in race relations. E.g., European and American imperialism’s “white man’s burden” (Kipling 1899) of governing nonwhite populations.

military imperialism: imperial domination in the form of military conquest or rule

economic imperialism: imperial domination in the form of mercantilist or modern capitalist economic penetration. E.g., Open Door policy.

12.1 Statehood and White Nationalism

From the Founders’ generation onward (1770s), the U.S. has never wanted to describe itself as a colonial power (Dunbar-Ortiz 2014). Rather, Americans long saw themselves as exceptional among nations, a people specially endowed with democratic virtue (see Chapter 2). They associated colonialism with old European monarchies and empires, and their own continental absorption of Native American territories and resources as fundamentally different from Old World imperialism.

Using rhetorical contrasts (civilized vs. savage, white vs. Indian, Christian vs. heathen), European Americans rejected the legitimacy of indigenous polities like Iroquois, Seminole, Cherokee, Miami, or Sioux (Drinnon 1997; Ostler 2004). They saw foreign relations between European states (e.g., Britain and France) as different in kind from U.S. relations with Indian nations. Thus, the U.S.-Native relationship, beginning in colonial times, was always marked by a strong contrast between theory and practice, words and actions. Theoretically, the U.S. Constitution acknowledged the national sovereignty of each of the many Native peoples. For example, agreements between the U.S. and Native nations were signed and ratified just like international treaties with European nations. However, **the actual conduct of U.S. treaty making and breaking with Indian peoples was characterized by bad faith: fraud,**

dishonesty, hypocrisy (APAN:I:252). The result of the long trail of broken treaties was U.S. continental expansion “from sea to shining sea.” American reluctance to straightforwardly describe this process as imperialism or colonialism stemmed from the gap in U.S.-Native relations between theory (legally binding treaties) and practice (fraudulent treaty violations). Likewise, much the same can be said about U.S. direct and indirect rule in Latin America and the Pacific, processes originating in the 1846-1848 Mexican War (Weber 1982).

Imperialism refers to the political policy or doctrine, pertaining to an empire, of asserting or enforcing control over a foreign entity. The U.S. has always been a geographically growing republic, never officially an empire. But its westward expansion resembled in many ways European imperial growth and colonialism, especially during the second wave of European empire-building of the late 1800s and early 1900s (see Chapter 4). Likewise, much insight can be gained into America’s growing “empire of liberty” (APAN:I:210, 216-17; Wood 2009)—Thomas Jefferson’s phrase—through comparison and contrast with other Western Hemisphere polities like Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina.^[5]

Consider President Jefferson’s (1800-1808) precedent-setting argument on the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase. His administration, acting unilaterally and independently of Congress, doubled the size of the U.S. by purchasing the Louisiana region west of the Mississippi River (including New Orleans) for \$15 million from France (APAN:I:216).

“The constitution has made no provision for our **holding foreign territory**, still less for **incorporating foreign nations** into our Union. The Executive in seizing the fugitive [fleeting] occurrence which so much advances the good of their country, have done an act beyond the Constitution.”^[6]

At the stroke of Jefferson’s pen, hundreds of thousands of people in the Louisiana territory **became subjects of the American republic** overnight (APAN:I:216-17). From Spanish imperial subjects to French republican subjects, now they became U.S. republican subjects. This

politically ambiguous status did not automatically lead to U.S. citizenship rights. Although the Louisiana Purchase treaty specified that “the inhabitants of the ceded territory” would be accorded such rights, free people of color (for instance) found themselves excluded from the right to vote in American elections and serve on American juries (ibid).

Crucial to understanding U.S. imperialism is the distinction between U.S. territories and states. A **state** (e.g., Rhode Island, Arkansas, Oregon, Hawai'i) is a U.S. administrative region with strong local identity in which residents possess both state and federal citizenship (see Chapter 8). American history since 1776 has featured much ambiguity and conflict over the relation of federal to state authority. By contrast, a **territory** (e.g., Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa) is a U.S. administrative region in which residents possess federal citizenship but not state citizenship. The territory system began in the late 1700s as a preliminary stage to statehood. However, national expansion in North America, the Caribbean, and Pacific encountered many non-WASP, nonwhite populations. When such populations were large, as in New Mexico (1846), Puerto Rico (1898), the Philippines (1898), or Hawai'i (1898), many whites opposed these possessions or annexed territories becoming states. To them, full membership in the nation seemed to require white racial identity. As we've seen (Chapters 5-7), this political view is called **white nationalism**: the belief that only whites—especially English-speaking, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant men—should be full members of the United States.

For example, New Mexico statehood was delayed for decades (1846-1912: 66 years) by white nationalist sentiment in Congress (Gómez 2018:118-19; see Chapter 6). Not until New Mexico Territory added a sizeable white, Protestant, English-speaking population—politically and economically dominant over the existing Spanish-speaking Mexican Catholic and Indian populations—did it become a state (Weber 1982). Similarly, Puerto Rico has remained a territory since 1898 (over 120 years) largely due to its deeply rooted

non-WASP institutions, as well as disagreements among Puerto Ricans themselves (Briggs 2002; Findlay 1999).

Likewise, the slavery extension controversy (1820-1860)—over territories entering the Union as slave or free states—illustrates how white nationalism (e.g., free-labor ideology: see Chapter 5) often played a key role in the statehood process. For instance, consider the political issues leading to Oregon’s statehood in 1859:

“In December 1844, Oregon [Territory] passed its Black Exclusion Law, which prohibited African Americans from entering the territory while simultaneously prohibiting slavery. Slave owners who brought their slaves with them were given three years before they were forced to free them. Any African Americans in the region after the law was passed were forced to leave, and those who did not comply were arrested and beaten. They received no less than twenty and no more than thirty-nine stripes across their bare back if they still did not leave. This process could be repeated every six months. **Slavery played a major part in Oregon’s history and even influenced its path to statehood. The territory’s request for statehood was delayed several times**, as members of Congress argued among themselves whether the territory should be admitted as a “free” or “slave” state. Eventually politicians from the south agreed to allow Oregon to enter as a “free” state, in exchange for opening slavery to the southwest United States.”^[7]

Thus, race played a key role in U.S. acquisition and governance of territories, and in admittance of new states. Generally, **territories achieved statehood only after adding a white (WASP) population sufficiently powerful to counter the political influence of resident nonwhites** (cf. Dunbar-Ortiz 2014; Gómez 2018). This pattern reflects the pervasive influence of white nationalism in American history.

12.2 American Exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny

Likewise crucial to understanding U.S. imperialism are (1) exceptionalism and (2) manifest destiny.

(1) **American exceptionalism is a nationalist ideology stating that the U.S., unlike most other nations, has usually been a force for good in the world** (Madsen 1998; see Chapter 2). Much like the nineteenth-century British Empire, America has long seen itself as having a unique, God-given role or providential mission in international relations and foreign policy. In this view, U.S. power is largely benevolent and altruistic, contrasting with European imperialism and colonialism by morally and politically improving dominated peoples as their steward. As during the Cold War, so in the early twenty-first century American occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. foreign policy has frequently sounded this theme.

The roots of exceptionalism date to the very beginning of English colonization in North America. John Winthrop's (c. 1630) description of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and Boston as "a city on a hill"[\[8\]](#) was an early version. Another example is Thomas Paine's political pamphlet *Common Sense* (1776): "The cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind." And Washington's Farewell Address (1796), mostly written by Alexander Hamilton and delivered at the end of Washington's second presidential term, sharply distinguished between Europe and the U.S., emphasizing the latter's uniqueness and exceptionalism (APAN:I:195).

(2) Manifest destiny, in turn, was tightly bound to exceptionalism. This ideology likewise shows deep links between white supremacy and American identity in the nineteenth century (Horsman 1981). As we've seen (Chapter 6), it was **a collection of ideas claiming God's intention that U.S. whites expand across the North American continent**. For example, Americans justified the war with Mexico (1846-1848) in these terms: as the destiny of a racially superior and chosen people to spread across regions currently inhabited by Indians and Mexicans (APAN:I:331; Blight 2008, Lecture 4, 36:09). In subsequent decades, Americans would continue to justify their

territorial expansion and rule (republican imperialism) in Latin America and the Pacific in this way. They saw themselves as having a God-given right or duty to bring American and Protestant Christian institutions to less fortunate and “inferior” peoples incapable of governing themselves (APAN:I:355).

Walt Whitman (1819-1892), one of America’s most influential poets, memorably voiced manifest destiny’s expansive sense of American mission, nationalism, and idealism. For example, “For You O Democracy” (1855) begins: “Come, I will make the continent indissoluble, / I will make the most splendid race the sun ever shone upon, / I will make divine magnetic lands...” (Whitman 1965:117).

12.3 Growth of American Republican Empire, 1846-1914

Two of U.S. imperialism’s most fateful inflection points were the Mexican Cession (1846-1853) and the Spanish-American War (1898). War with Mexico created the modern Mexico-U.S. border and American Southwest, consolidating the nation’s continental expansion to the Pacific Coast (Gómez 2018; see Chapter 6). War with Spain delivered Caribbean and Pacific possessions, certifying the nation’s “arrival” as a global power and peer of Europe, and setting the stage for twentieth-century American globalism (Fuente 2001).

Sectional (North-South) polarization in the 1850s scuttled early attempts at Pacific and Caribbean expansion. Proposals to annex Hawai’i as a territory, which eventually succeeded in 1899, started under the Pierce Administration (1852-1856) but could not overcome southern senators’ opposition to an additional free state (APAN:I:364-65). Likewise under President Pierce, northerners opposed proposals^[9] to purchase or conquer slaveholding Cuba, one of Spain’s Caribbean colonies (ibid:365). Following the 1860 Democratic Party split, the Northern Democrats pledged to support the fugitive slave law, honor the Dred Scott decision, and pursue “the acquisition of the Island of Cuba” (quoted in Levine 2005:216).

With white reunification after the Civil War and Reconstruction,

many Americans returned to an expansive mood. **A key visionary of American globalism was Secretary of State William H. Seward**, who in 1867 orchestrated purchase of Alaska from Russia and possession of the (Pacific) Midway Islands. Throughout his terms as New York senator (1849-1861) and U.S. secretary of state (1861-1869), Seward forcefully pushed expansionism, comparing the growing United States to the expansionist ancient Roman Republic and Roman Empire: “There is not in the history of the Roman Empire an ambition for aggrandizement so marked as that which characterizes the American people” (quoted in APAN:II:572). He envisioned a large American empire incorporating the Caribbean, Mexico, Central America, the Pacific, Canada, Greenland, and Iceland (ibid).

By the late 1800s, the U.S. was rapidly emerging as one of the world’s largest industrializing economies. In accordance with its economic stature, the nation sought an international commercial, political, and military role as a “great power” peer of European states like Britain and France. Thus, the U.S. embraced **the Spanish-American War (1898)** as an opportunity to acquire imperial power status in a geopolitical environment of competitive European world empires “scrambling” for new colonies (Klinkner & Smith 1999:99). By 1900, with Spain’s global empire crumbling and waning British influence in the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. had arrived: a newly global power with dominance in Latin America and possession in the Pacific of Hawai’i, the Philippines, American Samoa, and Alaska (APAN:II:566).

Open Door policy is particularly important for understanding U.S. twentieth-century interventionism in Latin America (see section 12.4 below and Chapter 13). This foreign policy strategy took shape in response to the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901) in China, which threatened to shut China to foreign trade. U.S. Secretary of State John Hay proposed an “open door” approach, which subsequently became a touchstone for twentieth-century American foreign policy and diplomacy. The ideology had three main principles: (1) exports to foreign markets were necessary for U.S. domestic economic health; (2) **economic and military intervention abroad**

was necessary for keeping foreign markets profitable to American business; and (3) any restriction of access abroad to American commodities, ideas, or citizens should be regarded as endangering America's very survival (APAN:II:580). Keeping the Open Door was the key ideological rationale for America's many twentieth-century economic and military interventions in the internal affairs of sovereign nations, especially in Latin America.

Table 12.1. U.S. Imperialism Timeline, 1865-1914[\[10\]](#)

Date(s)	Event(s)
1861-69	Secretary of State William H. Seward promotes U.S. expansionism
1867	Possession of Alaska and Midway
1876-1910	Porfirio Díaz's thirty-four-year dictatorship in Mexico is supported by U.S.
1878	United States acquires naval rights in Samoa
1885	Reverend Josiah Strong's <i>Our Country</i> promotes manifest destiny
1887	United States acquires naval rights at Pearl Harbor (Hawai'i) McKinley Tariff harms Hawaiian sugar exports

1893	<p>U.S. economic recession causes business failures and mass unemployment</p> <p>Pro-U.S. interests depose Queen Lili'uokalani of Hawai'i</p>
1895	<p>Cuban revolution against Spain nears its end</p> <p>Japan wins war against China, and possesses Korea and Formosa (Taiwan)</p>
1898	<p>U.S. formally acquires Hawai'i</p> <p>U.S. battleship <i>Maine</i> explodes in Havana harbor</p> <p>Spanish-American War</p>
1899	<p>Treaty of Paris negotiated, resulting in enlarged U.S. empire</p> <p>U.S. multinational United Fruit Company acquires land and dominates market</p> <p>Philippine rebels led by Emilio Aguinaldo challenge U.S. rule</p>
1901	<p>President McKinley assassinated; Theodore Roosevelt becomes president</p>
1903	<p>U.S. gains canal rights in Panama</p> <p>Platt Amendment establishes U.S. indirect rule over Cuba</p>
1904	<p>Roosevelt Corollary asserts American "police power" in the Western Hemisphere</p>

1905	Russia-Japan War ends with Portsmouth Conference, in which President Roosevelt
1906	Asian American schoolchildren segregated by San Francisco School Board U.S. invasion of Cuba
1907	U.S. Navy (the “Great White Fleet”) tours the world, demonstrating American
1910	Mexican Revolution begins, threatening U.S. business interests
1914	U.S. invades Mexico at Veracruz Start of First World War Opening of Panama Canal

America’s style of imperialism and colonialism resembled, yet also differed from, that of Europe. It shared Europe’s white supremacist ideology of the second wave of empires of the late 1800s and early 1900s (e.g., in Africa, India, Southeast Asia: see Table 4.3). This was an age of intensifying racism, allied with imperialism and eugenics, that saw “civilization” and “whiteness” as largely identical (APAN:II:569; Ferrer 1999; Kevles 1995; see Chapter 4). For example, British colonial poet Rudyard Kipling (1899) celebrated U.S. acquisition of the Philippines in the same way he praised British

rule in India: as the “burdensome” duty of white men tasked with a global mission to govern nonwhites (APAN:II:581). Both European and American imperialists had long argued that the social problems of nonwhites were caused by their own moral failings, not white rule. According to President Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909), alleged black “laziness and shiftlessness” and “vice and criminality of every kind” caused more “harm to the black race than all acts of oppression of white men put together” (quoted in Klinkner & Smith 1999:105). Thus, **white grievance** against nonwhites was a resentment shared by white Americans and Europeans (cf. Gest [2016] on white grievance today). It blamed the victims of racist imperialism for all problems, soothing white consciences.




Figure 12.1. U.S. Imperialism.^[11] This political cartoon, contemporary with the Spanish-American War (1898), shows a westward-facing American eagle spreading its wings, “Ten thousand

miles from tip to tip.” The sun of American power is rising over various Caribbean and Pacific islands such as “Porto Rico.”

However, as compared to Europe, U.S. imperialism was also distinctive. Unlike officials of the British or German Empires, Americans were less forthright about naming their overseas activities as “colonial” or “imperial.” Like France after 1870, the U.S. did not officially describe itself as an empire (Horne 2003). Yet the French Third Republic (1870-1940) was a global colonial power with possessions in the Caribbean and South America (e.g., Martinique, French Guiana), Africa (e.g., Algeria), the Indian Ocean (e.g., Madagascar), Southeast Asia (e.g., Vietnam), and the Pacific (e.g., Tahiti). Likewise, **by the early 1900s, the U.S. was a republic with far-flung overseas possessions, a colonial power whose foreign policy was couched in the language of “democracy” and “liberty”** (Fuente 2001; Turits 2003).

12.4 Empire of Liberty, 1898-1945

As in the nineteenth century, Americans after 1898 questioned the fitness for democratic self-rule of non-WASP and nonwhite populations (Ferrer 1999; Scott 2000). In its new possessions (Philippines, Puerto Rico), territories (Hawai’i), and satellite states (Cuba, Dominican Republic), the U.S. was able to act on these doubts. Two important steps toward post-1945 American globalism (Chapter 13) were (1) U.S. governance of nonwhite Caribbean and Pacific islanders allegedly incapable of conducting their own affairs, and (2) frequent interventions in sovereign Latin American nations.

(1) Direct or indirect American rule. In U.S. imperialist eyes, Caribbean and Pacific peoples would benefit from a tutorial in American democracy of unspecified duration: direct or indirect U.S. rule. If they proved racially capable of “maturing” into political “adulthood,” then America—like a guardian or tutor—would either grant them independence or graduate them to full membership (statehood) in the Union. Congress would decide their democratic

fitness; they themselves had little say in their own political destinies.

Unsurprisingly, these peoples did not always see themselves as wards needing an American guardian. They tended to oppose Yankee tutelage, though politically and militarily unable to eject the Americans. This was especially the case with Cuba and the Philippines, which by 1898 had already fought protracted wars of independence from Spain, experiences that had generated much nationalistic fervor (Ferrer 1999). Following American entrance into these conflicts and defeat of the Spanish, U.S. propaganda shifted from support of independence to American tutelage (Fuente 2001). By the early 1900s, many Cubans and Filipinos had become disillusioned with the Americans, seeing them as merely a new colonial master, albeit one seeking to improve local sanitary, medical, and educational conditions (APAN:II:575-76). During the U.S.-Philippine War (1899-1902), in which over 4,000 Americans died, about 20,000 Filipinos were killed in combat, and approximately 600,000 died from war-related disease and starvation (APAN:II:579). Following U.S. suppression of the rebellion, Americans maintained their rule over the Philippines until the aftermath of WWII (1898-1946). In the U.S. experience in the Philippines, there is much that foreshadows later, Cold-War events. For example, the Vietnam War: after driving out the French (1954), the northern Vietnamese soon found themselves fighting to expel the United States (1955-1975).

Also, domestic American apartheid overlaps in important ways with overseas imperialism (1898-1945). **As with nonwhites overseas, white Americans had long questioned the fitness for democratic citizenship of nonwhites at home, especially African Americans.** We've seen that the rise of American apartheid after 1900 (Chapter 8) was part of global worsening racism in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The height of U.S. imperialism in Latin America and the Pacific (1898-1945) significantly overlapped with domestic apartheid (1877-1968). Accordingly, the white supremacy of the new U.S. authorities interacted in complex ways with existing local practices

of Spanish colonial white supremacy. Cuba and Puerto Rico, for instance, like the American South, had for centuries been Spanish plantation societies based on black slavery. Indeed, emancipation in Cuba came later (1886) than in the U.S. (1863) (see Ferrer 1999; Scott 2000). Just as the U.S. claimed to exercise guardianship or trusteeship over politically “immature” nonwhites overseas, so white segregationists at home claimed to be acting in the best interests of black Americans (Fredrickson 1981:190).

Thus, the future society that American officials (early 1900s) envisioned for Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawai'i and the Philippines resembled in many ways the Jim Crow South—racial separation, political disfranchisement, and economic exclusion of black and brown people. U.S. imperialism overseas often involved an imported apartheid component, based on white American notions of “appropriate” social and legal relations between nonwhites and whites.

(2) U.S. interventionism in Latin America. Like American imperial governance, military and economic interventionism (1898-1945) was a crucial step toward American globalism. Open Door policy justified aggressive U.S. tactics for influencing policy in sovereign or semi-sovereign Latin American nations in ways that reflected exceptionalism and manifest destiny.

President Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909), in particular, advocated an interventionist foreign policy. In the **Roosevelt Corollary (1904)** he described interventionism in neutral terms as America's “police power” to police the globe (APAN:II:678). States such as Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, etc. were, in Roosevelt's eyes, racially inferior and “destined” to be dominated by white Americans (ibid:581). Roosevelt and later U.S. presidents used the Roosevelt Corollary to justify foreign intervention. For example, between 1900 and 1917, presidents sent U.S. troops to Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Mexico (ibid:583). The soldiers put down resistance to U.S. influence, seized bases and ports,

intervened in civil wars, and prevented European intervention. American officials controlled elections, trained and armed militias that later seized power, and extended U.S. financial control over local economies. After WWI (1918), American desire for new colonial possessions in the Caribbean continued. For instance, in 1929 Britain declined President Hoover's offer to erase Britain's entire WWI debt to the U.S., in exchange for U.S. acquisition of British Honduras (Belize), Trinidad, and Bermuda (ibid:644).

Table 12.2 below shows that interventions embodying U.S. imperialism took two forms: military and economic. Often the two approaches worked in tandem, with military force extending and protecting U.S. commercial interests; but in some cases they were separable (APAN:II:578, 663). Open Door policy rationalized the interventions as necessary to protect American economic, security, and ideological interests. **U.S. military imperialism involved sending troops** and influencing national policy (e.g., in Cuba or Nicaragua) through force or the threat of force. **Economic imperialism took the form of capitalist economic penetration** benefiting U.S. interests and local elites, but tending to extract and deplete national resources (soil and subsoil) for foreign consumption (e.g., sugar, tobacco, petroleum, minerals, fruit) in ways that acted against the long-term interests of most local people (Velázquez 2010; cf. Alonso 2014). U.S. economic control of Central American and Caribbean “banana republics” (originally referring to Honduras) significantly contributed to post-1945 political unrest in these regions (Holt 1992; McCook 2002; see Chapter 13).

Table 12.2. U.S. Military and Economic Interventionism in Latin America, 1918-1939[\[12\]](#)

<i>Region</i>	<i>Interest or event</i>
Chile	U.S. copper extraction
Argentina (Buenos Aires)	Pan-American Conference, 1936: U.S. agrees to
Venezuela	U.S. oil interests
Panama	U.S. possession of Canal Zone
	Declaration of Panama, 1939
Nicaragua	U.S. financial supervision, 1911-24
	U.S. military occupation, 1912-25
	U.S. war against Sandino, [13] 1926-33
	Somoza era, 1936-79
Honduras	U.S. troops, 1924
	United Fruit Company is large landowner
Mexico	1917 Constitution challenges U.S. interests
	Nationalization of foreign oil companies, 1938
	U.S.-Mexico agreement settles oil dispute, 1942
Cuba	U.S. troops, 1917-22
	U.S. investors control sugar industry
	Revolution of 1933
	U.S. annuls Platt Amendment, 1934
	Batista era, 1934-59
	Pan American Conference (Havana, 1928): U.S. d

Haiti	U.S. troops, 1915-34
	U.S. financial supervision, 1916-41
Dominican Republic	U.S. financial supervision, 1905-41
	U.S. troops exit, 1924
	Trujillo era, 1930-61
Puerto Rico	U.S. colony beginning in 1898
	Jones Act extends U.S. citizenship, 1917
Virgin Islands	U.S. colony beginning in 1917

Chapter 12 Summary

Chapter 12 introduced Unit IV (Immigration and Latin America) with a historical overview of American imperialism and colonialism to 1945. This background is necessary to understand the relationship of Cold-War American globalism and post-1965 Hispanic immigration, the topic of Chapter 13. Section 12.1 set the stage by discussing the historical linkage between white nationalism and the state/territory distinction in American history.

Section 12.2 reviewed the U.S. nationalistic ideologies of American exceptionalism and manifest destiny, connecting these to 1800s white nationalism.

Section 12.3 described the growth of American empire in the Caribbean and Pacific in the period 1846-1914. Main inflection points of U.S. imperialism were the Mexican War (1846-1848) and the Spanish-American War (1898). The significance of the latter was marking the arrival of the U.S. as a great imperial power in a world dominated by global empires.

Section 12.4 took the discussion to 1945, when the U.S. emerged as the pre-eminent global superpower. The table listed many examples of U.S. intervention in Latin America between 1898-1945. Americans

justified military and economic imperialism in terms of Open Door policy.

[1] Left image: Public domain. Right image credit: “Carmen Yulín Cruz, Mayor of San Juan.” CC BY-SA 3.0. Author: [Melvin Alfredo \(User: Puertorriquenosoy\)](#) – Own work.

[2] Likewise, the District of Columbia (population: 689,545), though not a state, has more people than Vermont or Wyoming.

[3] Source: Wikipedia, “List of states and territories of the United States by population”: estimated Census populations (July 1, 2020). Accessed 2/8/21.

[4] Source of phrase “empire of liberty”: Wood 2009

[5] Additional comparison cases include the ancient Roman Republic, the French First Republic (1792–95), and the French Third Republic (1870–1940). Cf. De Tocqueville (2003) on monarchy–republic–empire transition.

[6] Thomas Jefferson to John C. Breckinridge, August 12, 1803. “America Past and Present Online – Constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase (1803).” Accessed 7/16/21; boldface added.

[7] Source: Wikipedia, “Oregon.” Boldface added; accessed 7/11/21.

[8] This image, from the Christian New Testament, symbolizes being a moral example to others. Winthrop’s radical Puritan colony—a Christian utopian community—saw itself as a moral example to Anglican England.

[9] Such as the Ostend Manifesto (1854).

[10] Source: Adapted from APAN:II:564

[11] Image: Public domain.

[12] Source: Adapted from APAN:II:663

[13] Nicaraguan nationalist leader who fought U.S. Marines (Chasteen 2001:294).

Chapter 13: American Globalism and Hispanic Immigration



The above image^[1] of a McDonald's in Mexico illustrates the relationship between Hispanic immigration and **American globalism**. The latter term refers to U.S. world predominance since 1945 (see Chapter 1). McDonald's—one of many American multinational fast-food (*comida rápida*) corporations—has long been a global disseminator of American capitalist values such as efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control.^[2] (The sign in the photo advertises *postres*, or “desserts” in Spanish.) Understanding Hispanic immigration requires comparative understanding of Latin America's relationship to the U.S., as well as U.S. immigration history.

The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 (Hart-Celler Act) ended white-supremacist national origin quotas (earlier revised in the 1952 Magnuson Act). American nativism (see Chapter 6) had long imposed racist immigration policies—from the Immigration and Naturalization Act (1790) restricting immigration to whites, to the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) and anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish Emergency Quota Act (1921). **After 1965, the U.S. entered an era of large-scale immigration comparable to the late 1800s and early 1900s.** Likewise, Europe in recent years has experienced large-scale immigration from the global South (“Third World”), especially Africa and the Middle East. In the decades following President Carter’s (1976-1980) insistence on human rights as essential to U.S. foreign policy (Chasteen 2001:290), human rights groups have increasingly leveled this criticism against the U.S. itself, flagging its immigration policy in particular as violating international standards. Controversy in recent years over separation of immigrant families by U.S. border authorities is but one example.^[3]

Why do so many immigrants and migrants attempt to illegally enter America and other countries of the global North? What connection does recent global South-to-North immigration have with previous centuries of European global colonization (Chapter 4), and with U.S. imperialism in Latin America and the Pacific (Chapter 12)? What is the relationship between U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, and Latin American immigration to the U.S.?

Chapter 13 Learning Objectives

13.1 Cold War Interventionism in Latin America, 1945-1989

- Define American globalism
- List three examples of U.S. intervention in Latin America, 1945-1989

13.2 Hispanics: The Largest Minority^[4]

- Understand facts about Hispanics, the largest U.S. ethnic minority group
- Compare and contrast old immigration (1830-1920) and new immigration (since 1965)

13.3 Ambivalent Friendship: Mexico and the United States

- Explain why Mexico and the U.S. have long had a relationship alternating between friendship and hostility
- Define NAFTA
- Understand facts about Mexican political geography

13.4 Mexican Immigration

- Define Chicano
- Understand recurrent themes in Mexican immigration history
- Define America's love-hate relationship with Mexican labor

Chapter 13 Key Terms (in order of appearance in chapter)

American globalism: since 1945, the U.S. has been the predominant military, economic, cultural, and ideological power in the world, with global commitments, relationships, and interests (see Chapter 1)

The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965: Reform of U.S. immigration policy, ending 1920s white-supremacist immigration quotas (see Chapter 6). The 1965 law provided the context for mass immigration from the 1970s onwards.

old immigration: large-scale European immigration from 1830-1920

new immigration: large-scale immigration since 1965, primarily from non-European world regions such as Latin America, Asia, and Africa (e.g., Mexicans, Cubans, Salvadorans, Indians, Koreans, Nigerians, Somalis)

NAFTA: the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement was a

major policy victory for Mexican president Salinas (1988-1994). The commercial treaty significantly increased Canada-U.S.-Mexico economic links, despite harming many rural Mexicans.

sexenio: the six-year term of Mexican presidents. Since the 1930s, it has been taboo for presidents to seek a second term (“No Re-Election”). From 1929-2000, Mexico had one-party rule under PRI (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*: the “Institutional Revolutionary Party”).

Chicano: the 1960s-70s saw the rise of Mexican American empowerment as a political movement. The term Chicano, associated with this movement, refers to Mexican Americans. It may have originated as a version of *mexicano* (“Mexican”).

America’s love-hate relationship with Mexican labor: U.S. economic history alternates between boom and bust. In good times, employers pursue profits by encouraging low-wage immigrant (e.g., Mexican) labor. In hard times (recession), native labor increasingly competes with (Mexican) immigrant labor, fueling nativist hostility to immigration.

13.1 Cold War Interventionism in Latin America, 1945-1989

By 1945, decades of American imperialism in Latin America and the Pacific had prepared one of the foundations of **American globalism** (see Chapter 12). The term refers to America’s status after 1945 as the world’s predominant military, economic, cultural, and ideological power, with global commitments, relationships, and interests (APAN:II:713; see Chapter 1).

During the Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and USSR (1945-1989), American foreign policy statements often drew upon the nation’s long traditions of exceptionalism and expansion (Chapter 12). For example, McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy’s (1961-63) national security adviser, declared that “[t]he United States is the engine of mankind, and the rest of the world is the caboose” (quoted in APAN:II:778). This combination of global military and economic might (extensive but not unlimited), on the one hand,

and anticommunist ideology on the other, formed the context of Cold War U.S. relations with Third World regions like Latin America.

Unlike other global regions, Latin America shared the continent with the northern superpower. Since at least the Monroe Doctrine (1823),^[5] the U.S. had regarded Latin America as a crucial U.S. sphere of influence, against European powers. In the early Cold War, the Soviet Union regularly accused the U.S. of hypocrisy: the Americans were intervening in Eastern Europe, yet warning Moscow to steer clear of affairs in Asia and Latin America. Whereas the U.S. demanded free elections in the USSR sphere of influence (e.g., Eastern Europe), the Americans opposed free elections in Latin American nations ruled by pro-U.S., military dictatorships (APAN:II:721). The two regions were analogous for the two superpowers as historic zones of Russian or U.S. expansion. Like Eastern Europe to the USSR, Latin America was politically, economically, and militarily sensitive to the U.S. As in previous eras, **throughout the Cold War, a major foreign policy goal for each superpower was to maintain these spheres of influence through regional domination.**

During the Cold War, many Latin American nations had **client-governments** of the U.S. The term means a government reliant on a more powerful nation's military or economic aid (APAN:II:722). Like the post-WWII relationship between Britain and Greece, or the USSR and Czechoslovakia, the U.S. had great influence over numerous Latin American governments. When Washington's wishes were challenged—by revolutions against dictatorships (e.g., Cuba in 1959), or by democratically elected leftists (e.g., Guatemala in 1954; Chile in 1973)—the American response was frequently direct or indirect intervention in that nation's affairs. Thus, Cold War interventionism in Latin America repeated in significant ways features of pre-1945 U.S. imperialism.

For example, in 1951 Guatemala elected a socialist, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, to the presidency (Cullather 1999). A poor country, Guatemala's largest landowner was an American multinational corporation, the United Fruit Company. The election result

threatened U.S. anticommunist containment policy in the region, as well as the United Fruit Company's extensive land holdings. In mid-1954, with CIA support and U.S. military equipment, the pro-U.S. Guatemalan opposition bombed the capital city, deposed Arbenz, and returned United Fruit's land. Thus began a civil war in Guatemala (1960-1996) in which over 150,000 people died (APAN:II:737-38; cf. Chasteen 2001:256-57). The Guatemalan case illustrates a larger pattern. All too often during the Cold War, **American foreign policy—couched in the language of “democracy,” “national security,” and “freedom”—resulted in military dictatorships and civil wars in U.S. spheres of influence.** This was especially the case in Latin America (Chasteen 2001:279).

By Cold War's end in the late 1980s, much of Latin America was emerging from bureaucratic authoritarianism: rule by U.S.-allied and U.S.-supported military leaders. The region faced major internal and international reckoning for years of extreme anticommunist policy—e.g., rounding up hundreds of “suspects,” whom the police or military then tortured and murdered (ibid:278). As with Guatemala's civil war following the U.S.-supported proxy force that ousted Arbenz, widespread violence was a result much worse than the alleged communist danger. By 1980, anticommunist dictatorships ruled in most Latin American countries (ibid:288)—an unintended outcome of America's Cold-War quest to promote global democracy and liberty.

13.2 Hispanics: The Largest Minority

Cold War interventionism in Latin America formed a key part of the context of Hispanic immigration to the U.S. after 1965. The Immigration Act of that year, ending racist national origin quotas, also contributed to increasing Latin American immigration from the 1970s onward (Nazario 2007). **Much of the motivation for immigration—insecurity (violence) and limited economic opportunity in immigrants' homelands—was related, in complex ways, to American Cold War foreign policy.**

Since the 1970s, Hispanic immigration has altered the racial-ethnic composition of the United States in history-making ways. Before 1965, the nation’s demographics largely consisted of a large non-Hispanic white majority (88% in 1950) and a much smaller African American minority (10% in 1950). As we’ve seen, the “white” group consisted of WASPs and many white ethnic groups, which by 1950 had largely become whitened (Chapter 7). Hispanics (2% in 1950), in turn, were far fewer than African Americans.

Table 13.1. Year by group percentage of U.S. population[\[6\]](#)

Year	Non-Hispanic white	Hispanic or Latina/o	African American	Asian and Pacific Islander	Two or more races	Arab American	American Indian
1950	88	2	10	< 1	N/A	N/A	< 1
2010	60.3	16.4	12.2	5.0	2.9	0.5	0.7
2060 projected	37	30.6	14.7	8.5	5.9	1.8	1.5

Sources: Adapted from APAN:II:887-88; Schaefer 2015:4.

As Table 13.1 shows, much changed in the half-century after 1965. The biggest shifts have been the falling percentage of non-Hispanic whites in the population (about 60% in 2020), and the rising share of Hispanics (about 19% in 2020). In 2003, people of Latin American or Spanish ancestry or origin became the second largest racial or ethnic group (after non-Hispanic whites), moving past African Americans (APAN:II:887). The majority of this immigration has been documented and legal in terms of U.S. immigration law. However, undocumented or illegal immigration rose from about 3 million people in 1980 to a peak of 12 million in 2007. In 2005, close to 5% of the nation’s labor force consisted of undocumented workers (ibid).

By 2017, Hispanics totaled 56.5 million, forming more than 17.6% of the U.S. population (321 million).[\[7\]](#) In comparison, the total population of Spain in 2020 was 47 million. **After Mexico (126**

million in 2020), the U.S. Hispanic population is today the world's largest, bigger than the total population of countries such as Colombia (48 million in 2018), Argentina (45 million in 2020), or Peru (31 million in 2017).^[8] In an important sense, **the United States—one of the world's most multicultural nations—is increasingly both a non-Hispanic country and a Hispanic one.** As Table 13.1 indicates, in coming decades Hispanicization is likely to continue reshaping American society even further.

How will non-Hispanic Americans respond to these changes? Surely there is much to be learned from the nation's long history of large-scale immigration prior to 1920. The 45-year period from 1920 to 1965—during which immigration was low—was in several respects demographically atypical of America's overall social history.^[9] As we've seen (Chapter 6), especially in the period 1830-1860, mass immigration visibly changed the face of many northern urban centers. Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and others all became immigrant cities (Blight 2008, Lecture 4, 31:03). Likewise, it bears remembering that, like many Hispanic immigrants today, European white ethnic immigrants in the 1800s and early 1900s (e.g., Irish, Jews, Italians) were often perceived as nonwhite ("off-white") by white native-born Americans (Ignatiev 1995; Omi & Winant 2014).

13.3 Ambivalent Friendship: Mexico and the United States

Of the various Hispanic national-origin groups in the U.S.—Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Dominicans, Guatemalans, Salvadorans, Hondurans, Panamanians, Colombians, Venezuelans, Argentinians, Peruvians, Chileans, etc.—**Mexican Americans are by far the largest, forming 11.1% of the U.S. population in 2017.**^[10] Accordingly, it's increasingly essential for diversity students to learn about the Mexico-U.S. relationship and Hispanics of Mexican descent or nationality.

Socially powerful groups often have significant blind spots in relation to less powerful ones (see Chapter 1). Mexico's relationship with the "Colossus of the North" (the U.S.) is a case in point (Bustamante 1997; Delgado & Stefancic 1998; Velázquez 2010).

Whereas the U.S. is the world's leading economic, military, cultural, and ideological power, Mexico—though in many respects a leading Latin American nation—is greatly overshadowed by American world power and influence. In decision-making, Mexico's national leadership takes very seriously Washington's desires; by contrast, American politicians take Mexico much less into account (Castañeda & Pastor 1989; Hernández 2010; Preston & Dillon 2004).

Many North Americans have little awareness of Mexico beyond stereotypes, despite the two nations' dense commercial, political, and cultural ties (Davis & Moore 2014). Whereas most Mexicans can name basic features of U.S. political geography (New York, Florida, Texas, Chicago, California, etc.), the same can't be said about most Americans regarding Mexican political geography (Puebla, Oaxaca, Jalisco, Zacatecas, Ciudad Juárez, etc.). Likewise, even though Mexico is geographically part of North America, many Americans see the continent as ending at their southern border. By contrast, Mexicans tend to be quite aware of America's presence to the north.

Despite such blind spots, Mexico-U.S. ties continued to increase in the early twenty-first century. Perhaps the most fundamental connection—and barrier—is a long border. In fact, at 1,954 miles (3,145 kilometers) it is the world's longest between a First- and Third-World nation (Fuentes 1995). Economic links increased with **the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)** (APAN:II:866). NAFTA was a major policy victory of Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gortari's **sexenio**, or six-year presidential term, of 1988-1994 (Preston & Dillon 2004). American-educated at Harvard, Salinas was followed at Los Pinos^[11] (Mexico's presidential mansion or White House) by Yale University graduate Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000). Despite the end of one-party rule marked by Vicente Fox's (2000-2006) election, a continuity was ongoing American influence: President Fox had worked for many years as an executive in the U.S.-based multinational corporation Coca-Cola (Preston & Dillon 2004; Velázquez 2010).

Mexico and the U.S. have long had a rocky and contentious relationship, one marked by ambivalence and misunderstanding

Figure 13.1. Northern Mexico. [13] Note that the western peninsula contains two states (not shown): Baja California (bordering the U.S. state of California) and Baja California Sur. Likewise, the Bajío (Lowlands), Central Mexico, and Pacific Coast (at bottom) are regions composed of various states in the country's central zone.

Table 13.2. México: Names of States and Capitals

		Mexico City (aka La Ciudad de México, CDMX)	Mexico City is the nation's capital. It is both city and federal entity, similar to Washington, D.C., but much larger.
#	Region	Estado (State)	State capital city
1	Southeast	Chiapas	Tuxtla Gutiérrez
2		Quintana Roo	Chetumal
3		Yucatán	Mérida
4		Campeche	Campeche
5		Tabasco	Villahermosa
6		Oaxaca	Oaxaca
7	South central	Guerrero	Chilpancingo
8		Morelos	Cuernavaca
9		Puebla	Puebla
10		Veracruz	Jalapa
11		Tlaxcala	Tlaxcala
12		México (Mexico State = Estado de México)	Toluca
13	Center	Hidalgo	Pachuca
14		Querétaro	Querétaro

15		Guanajuato	Guanajuato
16		Aguascalientes	Aguascalientes
17		Michoacán	Morelia
18		Colima	Colima
19	West center	Jalisco	Guadalajara
20		Nayarit	Tepic
21		San Luis Potosí	San Luis Potosí
22		Zacatecas	Zacatecas
23		Durango	Durango
24		Sinaloa	Culiacán
25	North	Baja California Sur	La Paz
26		Baja California	Mexicali
27		Sonora	Hermosillo
28		Chihuahua	Chihuahua
29		Coahuila	Saltillo
30		Nuevo León	Monterrey
31		Tamaulipas	Ciudad Victoria

As with connections, many differences exist between Mexico and the U.S. A striking example of contrast in their social realities (and an example of the social construction of race: Chapter 7) is that racial-ethnic identities change when people cross (*al otro lado*: “to the other side” of) the border. In Mexico, as in any country, national differences matter: a Mexican citizen is not a Guatemalan, Honduran, Salvadoran, or Nicaraguan national. Likewise, levels of education, wealth (class), and skin color^[14] are all consequential

for social stratification (Bustamante 1997; Chasteen 2001). However, **these different types of people—in crossing to the U.S. by plane, car, bus, boat, bike, or foot—all become “Hispanic,”** the U.S. catch-all ethnic term highlighting broad cultural similarities such as Spanish language and Latin American origin (Gómez 2018). As noted in Chapter 3, the term “Hispanic” was created by Congress in 1976, and is not used in Latin America.

13.4 Mexican Immigration

A major theme in the Mexican American story—whether in the 2000s or the 1800s—has been low-wage immigrant labor (Skerry 1993). Race (or ethnicity) and class have long worked together to marginalize people of Mexican ancestry or nationality in the U.S.

As with African American civil rights (Chapters 9-11), Mexican Americans after 1965 saw breaks as well as continuities with older forms of exclusion. A key break with the past was the **Chicano** movement during the 1960s-70s, which partly built on and partly rejected older styles of group identity (Villanueva 1980). The term, referring to empowered and proud Mexican American identity, may have originated as a version of *mexicano* (“Mexican”). Today, Americans of Mexican ancestry usually take pride in this heritage.

By contrast, a crucial continuity has been **America’s ongoing demand for low-wage immigrant labor, especially from Mexico.** With much capital, many natural resources, and expanding geography, America in many stages of its economic development has depended on low-wage immigrants. Mexicans have often found themselves entangled in a recurrent historical pattern: **America’s love-hate relationship with Mexican labor.**^[15] The cycle alternates between (1) economic boom (in expanding economic times, employers seek larger profits by hiring cheap immigrant labor), and (2) economic bust (in recessions, increased competition for existing jobs fuels nativist hostility to immigration).

The cycle is deeply influenced by U.S. class conflict. On the one hand, capital demands cheap immigrant labor; on the other hand,

native labor (especially whites competing for jobs with nonwhite immigrants) rejects it. Given that U.S. politics and law tend to prioritize the interests of capital over those of labor, immigrants have often found themselves caught in the middle of this class conflict. The result has been a long history of mixed signals, as America lurches between seeking to entice immigrant labor, and a few years later rejecting it with anti-immigrant nativism (see Chapter 6).

For example, the Great Depression (1929-1941) was an era of bust: historic economic shrinkage. Native-born Americans used nativist politics to blame Mexican immigrants as scapegoats for their woes. In the Southwest in particular, non-Hispanic whites (Anglo-Americans) felt that their jobs had been stolen by foreign laborers (APAN:II:653). Anti-immigration campaigns harmed not only newcomers from Mexico, but also many U.S. citizens of Mexican ancestry, some of whom had ancestries in the Southwest predating the 1800s. Starting in 1931, President Roosevelt's Labor Department announced a plan of mass deportation of illegal immigrants, to make more jobs available to U.S. citizens. However, authorities in the 1930s roundups and deportations frequently made mistakes, such as deporting people lacking papers but who were in fact citizens, as well as children born in the United States. From 1929 to 1935, the government officially deported some 82,000 people to Mexico, with many more (close to 500,000) leaving voluntarily or because someone forced or misled them into thinking the policy applied to them (ibid). Many of these deportees and emigrants were more American than Mexican, having no knowledge of Mexico or of the particular part of northern Mexico where they were sent.^[16]



Figure 13.2.^[17] During the 1930s Great Depression, the U.S. deported tens of thousands of Hispanics, including many U.S. citizens. The official rationale (“We can’t take care of our own”) presumed white nationalism—the assumption that nonwhite Hispanics were not “real Americans.”

By contrast, World War II created a boom: a greatly expanding economy, driven by government-sponsored war production. Immense demand for unskilled agricultural workers meant seeking cheap immigrant labor again from Mexico, as before the Depression. Despite the recent deportations, the U.S. government now did an about-face, offering short-term contracts to bring approximately 200,000 Mexicans to the Southwest for agricultural jobs as *braceros* (hired hands (APAN:II:694). A telling fact is that, in 1941, not a single Mexican American was employed at the Los Angeles shipyards; however, in 1944 about 17,000 were employed there (ibid).

Following WWII, Mexican immigrants endured much rural poverty between 1945 and 1960. The U.S. *bracero* program continued to bring inexpensive migrant labor to the Southwest and West. By

1959, close to a million Mexican laborers entered the U.S. legally (APAN:II:771).

However, in 1978 an amendment to the 1965 Immigration Act added a per-nation quota, which significantly decreased the number of immigrants authorized to enter from Mexico. But since U.S. employers continued to demand cheap immigrant labor, the new policy created a surge in the numbers of “illegal” immigrants (Telles & Ortiz 2008:94). Whereas about 85% of Mexican Americans in the mid-1960s were born in the U.S. (ibid:xxiii), since the 1980s the foreign-born percentage of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the U.S. has greatly increased.

In sum, **Hispanic immigration must be understood in terms of its relationship to U.S. foreign policy, U.S. economic demand, and shifting categorizations (legal vs. illegal) in U.S. immigration law.** The timeline below (Table 13.3) shows the history of Mexican immigration (in particular), providing additional examples of U.S. ambivalence toward Mexican labor.

Table 13.3. Mexico-U.S. Immigration Timeline (to 2001)[\[18\]](#)

Year(s)	Event description
1519-1700s	Colonial period of New Spain (Mexico). European founding of colonial regions now known as California, Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas. Founded: towns or forts of San Francisco, Monterey, Los Angeles, San Diego, Tucson, Santa Fe, Albuquerque, Las Cruces, El Paso del Norte, San Antonio, Laredo, etc. Geographical features receive European names: San Francisco Bay, Monterey Bay, El Mar de Cortez (Gulf of California), El Río Bravo (Rio Grande).
1798	US Law on Illegal Immigrants and Sedition. Prohibits the entrance of “illegal immigrants” that put in danger the national peace and security, and makes possible their expulsion.
1830-40	Catholic, German, Irish immigrants are attacked. The anti-immigrant and nationalist “Know Nothing” party is formed.
1846	US invades Mexico. The Mexican War lasts 1846-48, culminating with US occupation of Mexico City under General Winfield Scott.
1821-1848	Period of Mexican Independence prior to territorial losses to US in 1848 (Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo), 1853 (Gadsden Purchase). Including Texas, Mexico loses half of its claimed territory to US in 17 years (1836-1853). Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo makes Mexican citizens US citizens and guarantees land ownership protection. The resulting Mexico-US border is 3145 km (1954 mi) long.
1860-70	New immigrants to US from China and Ireland are attacked. The majority of US citizens of Mexico origin (in US Southwest) see their land taken and civil rights ignored. Some are lynched. Such actions violate the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.

1882	The Chinese Exclusion Act suspends immigration and naturalization of Chinese, who are mostly manual laborers. The number of Mexican immigrants increases.
1891	US Immigration Law. The first exhaustive law in US attempting national control of immigration.
1898	Spanish-American War. US invades and/or claims control over former Spanish colonies such as Puerto Rico and Cuba (in Caribbean) and Philippines and Guam (in Pacific). Today, Puerto Rico remains a US colony (“protectorate,” “territory”), with Puerto Ricans being US citizens.
1900-33	About 1/8 of the entire Mexican population moves to US territory. Primarily this is due to the violence and economic uncertainty of the Mexican Revolution (1910-20). US is the major arms supplier to the various Mexican armies.
1907	US economic depression. Roosevelt’s Gentleman’s Agreement pact prohibits entry of Japanese workers.
1909	Pact between Mexico and US brings Mexican workers to California for agricultural labor.
1914	US marines occupy Veracruz (Mexico).
1917	US again imports Mexican workers , facing the scarcity of labor due to entrance of US in WWI. The Immigration Law restricts entry of Asians, and introduces literacy tests and a tax of 8 dollars per head for entrance. Such practices make it difficult for poor and uneducated people to enter legally. US population of German descent and German immigrants viewed with suspicion during WWI and afterwards.

1920-21	US Congress proposes a cap or limit of number of Mexican citizens permitted legal entry. US Provisional Quota Law takes a first step toward immigration quotas.
1924	US Immigration Law imposes the first system of permanent quotas of different national origins. Privileged are those from Western and Northern Europe. This law lasts until 1952. Also, law establishes the US Border Patrol (la Patrulla Fronteriza), and provides for the deportation of those who become a public burden, violate US laws, or participate in anarchist and seditious acts.
1929	The quota system guarantees that most US immigrants are white Europeans. Also, law now provides penalty for undocumented re-entry of previously deported illegal immigrant.
1930s	Mexicans are one of the scapegoats blamed for Great Depression. Called the “Mexican Menace,” people of Mexican origin are rounded up and deported to Mexico by the tens of thousands. The roundups are chaotic, with many US citizens among the deported.
1933	US Labor Department consolidates separated functions of immigration and naturalization, giving origin to the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service).
1941	Mexican immigration increases during WWII. Some of these immigrants enroll in US military, either voluntarily or are drafted. As with African American veterans, many of these Mexican veterans experience racial discrimination (or hate crimes) in the post-war years. Pressured by US, Mexico joins Allies in WWII. In 1945, US Congress awards more Medals of Honor to Mexican and Mexican American veterans than to any other nonwhite racial/ethnic group.

1942	Tens of thousands of US citizens of Japanese origin (Japanese Americans) are despoiled of their property, rounded up and interned in camps supervised by US military. Also, tens of thousands of Jewish refugees are denied US entry. INS is transferred to the Justice Department.
1942	The Braceros (“Hired Hands”) Program provides for entry of 5 million Mexican workers to US employers, especially agricultural, during 1940s, 50s, and 60s.
1943	Chinese Exclusion Act is ended. The so-called “Zoot Suit Riots” or “Military Disturbances” in LA: for weeks, US military personnel hunt down and beat people of Mexican ancestry in LA.
1949	US economic recession sparks large dragnets (roundups) of undocumented workers. When recession returns in 1954, so do the dragnets.
1952-53	US Immigration Law. National origin quotas continue. Likewise, quotas continue for immigrants categorized as performing “necessary” services (e.g., Braceros Program). Joseph M. Swing is named head of INS. Swing explicitly proclaims a “professional hatred of Mexicans.” Swing solicits \$10 million to construct a 150-mile long barrier along border. Mexicans are targeted for roundups, arrests, and deportation campaigns throughout the 1950s.
1954	CIA directs overthrow of democratically elected government in Guatemala.
1961	CIA-directed Cuban-exile invasion of Cuba fails.
1965	The Immigration and Nationality Law is amended. Discriminatory, pro-white national origin quotas are revoked. A system of family reunification is instituted. A limit of 20,000 per country for the Eastern Hemisphere, and another limit for the Western Hemisphere.

1965-67	US marines land in Dominican Republic during DR election campaign. US Green Berets intervene against rebels in Guatemala.
1968	Bilingual Education Act is passed by Congress (Telles & Ortiz 2008:318).
1969	National Chicano Liberation Youth Conference, held in Denver (APAN:II:808).
1973	US troops leave Vietnam. Chicano soldiers (Mexican Americans) receive the highest number of medals for bravery per capita among various ethnic groups. They also die in disproportionately higher numbers, given their enrolled numbers.
1973	CIA-backed coup ousts democratically elected president in Chile.
1975	Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act passed by Congress, responding to pressure from Native American activists (APAN:II:808).
1978	The Immigration and Nationality Law is amended. Limits to 20,000 the number of legal visas offered to Mexican immigrants each year.
1980	Refugees Law. Establishes the first permanent US procedure for the admission of refugees. Refugee status is defined in agreement with international terms.
1981-90	CIA directs exile (Contra) invasions in Nicaragua.
1981-92	El Salvador civil war: US military advisers and flyovers aid anti-rebels.

1983-84	US invasion of Grenada (Caribbean island nation).
1986	Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). Authorizes US employers to knowingly contract (hire) undocumented immigrants. Creates programs for legalization; offers amnesty to foreigners who can verify continual US residence since 1982. Also intensifies border scrutiny, increasing militarization of border.
1990	Immigration Law increases the limit of legal immigration. Establishes a condition of temporary protection for refugees of armed conflict or natural disaster in country of origin.
1996	Rise of punitive criminal justice policy starting with President Reagan's first term (e.g., War on Drugs). Mandatory detention of anyone seeking asylum in US who lacks valid documentation. Greater enforcement of immigration law at border. A border barrier of 14 miles at Tijuana/San Diego is built. The penalty for smuggling contraband is increased, and for using false documents to cross.
1997	The bipartisan Commission for Immigration Reform, appointed by Congress and President Bush in 1990, recommends to abolish the INS and distribute its functions to other federal agencies.
2000-2003	US Census (2000) shows that Hispanic and Asian immigrants are transforming the face of many US regions. Hispanics become largest US ethnic minority group by 2003.
2001	September 11 attacks lead US to further restrict border entries. Also, former US Bracero Program workers demand compensation for unpaid labor during the Program (1940s-60s).

Chapter 13 and Unit IV Summary

Chapter 13 discussed the relationship between post-1945 American globalism and Hispanic immigration. Section 13.1 built on Chapter 12 by discussing U.S. interventionism in Latin America since 1945. The Cold War (1945-1991) continued in many ways earlier U.S. imperialism in Latin America. U.S. military and economic activities had many relationships with post-1965 Hispanic immigration.

Section 13.2 discussed Hispanics, after 2003 the largest U.S. ethnic minority group. Mexican Americans have always been the most numerous of the various Hispanic national-origin groups such as Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Dominicans, etc.

Section 13.3 introduced the relationship of the U.S. with Mexico, its southern neighbor. Their relation has a long history of ambivalence, marked by periods of friendship alternating with ones of hostility. Knowledge about Mexico is increasingly essential for diversity students, given the large and growing proportion of Americans of Mexican ancestry.

Section 13.4 provided an overview of Mexican immigration. One of the major continuities with the pre-1965 period is America's ongoing love-hate relationship with Mexican labor.

Overall, Unit IV presented the background and current state of immigration from Latin America. It emphasized the relationship between American globalism and post-1965 Hispanic immigration. After a historical review of U.S. imperialism and colonialism to 1945, it introduced modern immigration in comparative perspective, discussing U.S. Cold War interventionism in Latin America and the Mexico-U.S. relationship.

[1] Image credit: Creative Commons ([“McDonalds Mexico”](#) by [viinzography](#) is licensed under [CC BY-NC 2.0](#))

[2] Source: Wikipedia, “George Ritzer: McDonaldization.” See Ritzer 2013; Weber 1905.

[3] See, e.g., Human Rights Watch. Accessed 3/11/19. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/united-states>

[4] Source of phrase “Hispanics, the largest minority”: Schaefer 2015

[5] President Monroe’s (1817-1825) foreign policy of regarding European political involvement in Latin America as a possible aggression against the U.S. Source: Wikipedia, “Monroe Doctrine.” Accessed 7/16/21.

[6] Table 13.1 replicates Table 1.1 for convenience.

[7] Source: Wikipedia, “Demographics of the United States.” Accessed 7/15/21.

[8] Source: Wikipedia, “Demographics of Spain/ Mexico/ Colombia/ Argentina/ Peru.” Accessed 7/15/21.

[9] E.g., post-WWII low female and male age at first marriage, and low proportion of multigenerational households with grandparents (see Coontz 2016). Immigration restrictions, the Great Depression, and WWII all kept immigration low.

[10] Source: Wikipedia, “Demographics of the United States.” Accessed 7/15/21.

[11] “The Pine Trees,” located in Chapultepec Park, Mexico City.

[12] Source: Adapted from Wikipedia, “List of states of Mexico.” Accessed 7/15/21.

[13] Image credit: Wikivoyage (Creative Commons license).

[14] For example, Mexican advertising and television have long featured lighter-skinned people far out of proportion to their numbers in local and national populations. This has also been a longstanding pattern in Brazil (Telles 2004:155).

[15] In contrast to Skerry's (1993) emphasis on Mexican American ambivalence toward the U.S., I emphasize U.S. ambivalence toward Mexican Americans.

[16] Two recent discussions of 1930s deportation are:

(1) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2018/08/13/the-time-a-president-deported-1-million-mexican-americans-for-stealing-u-s-jobs/>

(2) <https://www.history.com/news/great-depression-repatriation-drives-mexico-deportation>

[17] Image: Public domain

[18] Source: Adapted from Cisneros 2002, Wright & Rogers 2011

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Chapter 1 Quiz

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1 Quiz (correct answers in bold)

(1) Engagement with diversity is a critical need with high stakes for students, if they are to succeed in developing...

A broad economic, political, and social connections with their home states.

B accurate, factual understandings of contemporary U.S. society and its extensive links to the world.

C Both A and B

D Neither A nor B

(2) Marion and Morrow counties (Ohio) are, respectively, ___% and ___% non-Hispanic white. Although these numbers were comparable to the 1950 national figure of 88% non-Hispanic white, since the 1970s they have become increasingly unrepresentative of the nation.

A 97.5, 90

B 67.5, 60

C 60, 67.5

D 90, 97.5

(3) Diversity is defined as both a fact and a value. For example, it is a demographic fact about the U.S. that it is currently among the _____ of all nations.

A most white

B least multicultural

C least nonwhite

D most multicultural

(4) Diversity competence is defined as: knowledge and skills enabling people of varying social identities to interact with each other in mutually _____ ways. Because the nation is so multicultural, such competence plays a key role in American citizenship today.

A beneficial

B harmful

C indifferent

D detrimental

(5) Conflict theory, functionalism, symbolic interactionism, and feminism are _____: scientific worldviews or perspectives on the world. Although this concept has many shades of meaning, for our purposes they are not themselves testable or falsifiable. Sociologists create testable theories within a particular paradigm.

A paradiddles

B low-range theories

C paradigms

D soft-range theories

(6) Whereas structural functionalism uses the metaphor of _____ to understand society, symbolic interactionism highlights _____.

A individuals interacting with each other; the human arm;

B the human body; societies interacting with each other

C societies interacting with each other; the human body;

D the human body; individuals interacting with each other

(7) A “comparative” perspective in diversity learning means a(n) _____ perspective.

A American

B international

C biased

D Ohio

(8) _____: people of crosscutting social identities often experience the world in different ways

A diversity

B multiculturalism

C intersectionality

D sociology

(9) _____: your body parts are the same as your gender identity.

A cisgender

B heterosexual

C transgender

D homosexual

(10) _____: the view that traditional male control of women should change, giving women more power over their own lives

A feminism

B symbolic interactionism

C conflict theory

D structural functionalism

Chapter 2 Quiz

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

Chapter 2 Quiz (correct answers in bold)

(1) _____: self-awareness of how our social identities influence our everyday experiences

A paradigm

B reflexivity

C indexicality

D perspicuity

(2) Which statement best expresses the relationship between reflexivity and social criticism?

A Who we are does not influence what we experience (and don't experience)

B Our social identities are irrelevant to how we experience society and formulate (or don't) criticisms of it

C Who we are bears no relation to what we experience (and don't experience)

D Our social identities matter for how we experience society and formulate (or don't) criticisms of it

(3) Which statement best expresses the role of social criticism in holding society accountable to its claimed values?

A Open, democratic societies require citizens to ignore the gap between values (ideals) and social reality

B Democracy requires citizens to ignore the gap between values (ideals) and social reality, the difference between words and actions

C Closed, authoritarian societies require citizens to take a critical view of the gap between values (ideals) and social reality

D Democracy requires citizens' ability to take a critical view of the gap between values (ideals) and social reality, the difference between words and actions

(4) The U.S. currently ranks #_____ in terms of strength of democracy; by contrast Canada currently ranks #_____.

A 1, 5

B 25, 5

C 5, 25

D 5, 1

(5) _____: the political worldview of a social group—whether a nation, a social movement, a political party, a religion, or a socio-economic class

A multiculturalism

B diversity

C ideology

D reflexivity

(6) _____: extreme anticommunism in the early Cold War. Wisconsin senator Joseph McCarthy led highly publicized “witch hunts” of alleged Communists in American government and industry.

A patriotism

B McCarthyism

C Trumanism

D democracy

(7) How did Frederick Douglass use social criticism to promote democratic values?

A He criticized America's failure to make its freedom rhetoric a reality for blacks

B He praised America's ability to make its freedom rhetoric a reality for blacks

C He criticized America's failure to make its freedom rhetoric a reality for whites

D He praised America's ability to make its freedom rhetoric a reality for blacks

(8) Which statement best expresses the relation between Douglass' nineteenth-century abolitionism and social criticism today?

A It takes courage to stand up for human values when your society is supporting them

B It is never right to criticize your society

C It takes courage to stand up for human values when your society is violating them

D America has never been in the wrong

(9) _____ (1818-1895), abolitionist critic of American slavery and one of the greatest African American leaders of the nineteenth century. His 1852 abolitionist speech "What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?" has great relevance to social criticism today.

A David Walker

B Sojourner Truth

C Frederick Douglass

D Harriet Tubman

(10) _____: nations where civil liberties and fundamental political freedoms are not only respected but also reinforced by a political culture conducive to the thriving of democratic principles

A hybrid regimes

B full democracies

C flawed democracies

D authoritarian regimes

Chapter 3 Quiz

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

Chapter 3 Quiz (correct answers in bold)

(1) Whereas _____ means sorting humans into categories based on physical traits, _____ refers to differences of language, culture, and history.

A race; identity

B race; ethnicity

C ethnicity; race

D identity; ethnicity

(2) Interracial sex tends to whiten the population in _____, while in _____ the same process blackens the population.

A the United States; South Africa

B Brazil; the United States

C the United States; Brazil

D South Africa; Brazil

(3) What's true of _____ is not necessarily true of _____. Facts about rural, white Ohio women's average number of years (or level) of formal education may or may not be true of any particular woman in this group.

A groups; group identity

B individuals; their identity

C groups; individuals

D individuals; group identity

(4) All of us are unique individuals. Diversity learning involves

keeping a _____ focus: *both* on individual uniqueness *and* on facts about the social groups of which we are members.

- A biased
- B American
- C Ohio
- D dual**

(5) The social reality of race is the _____ between more versus less powerful racialized groups.

- A contradiction
- B illusion
- C relationship**
- D reality

(6) In sociological research, racial-ethnic “privilege” means the _____ advantage of one social group over others

- A structural**
- B individual
- C psychological
- D biological

(7) _____: struggle for control over public policy relevant to personal identity (race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, citizenship, religion, age, etc.).

- A identity politics**
- B democratic
- C enculturated politics
- D republican

(8) _____: prejudice and/or violence against Jews

- A African Diaspora
- B identity politics
- C Destruction of the Indies
- D anti-semitism**

(9) _____: practical ways of managing strong emotions through self-awareness.

A social criticisms

B self-care strategies

C identity politics

D indexicalities

(10) _____: a commonsense system for racializing individuals as members of various racial groups.

A racial classification

B reflexivity

C identity politics

D whitening

Chapter 4 Quiz

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

Chapter 4 Quiz (correct answers in bold)

(1) Between 1492 (Columbus' first voyage) to 1945 (end of World War II), Europe dominated nearly every region of the non-European world. Sociologists call this domination the _____.

- A Reformation
- B decline of the West
- C Golden Age
- D rise of the West**

(2) In the colonial binary system, the imposed European religion was _____, and the subordinated non-European institution was any other religion.

- A Catholicism
- B Christianity (either Catholicism or Protestantism)**
- C Baptist (either Southern or Northern)
- D Protestantism

(3) What was the first stage (1400s-1500s) of European global colonization (out of four stages)?

- A Development of empires
- B Creation of overseas empires**
- C Second wave of empire-building, loss of empires
- D Loss of empires, national independences

(4) _____: seeing a particular human group as the standard by which all other groups are measured

- A ethnocentrism**

- B settlement
- C civilization
- D mestizaje

(5) ____: race mixture by interracial sex (aka miscegenation) between groups of mainly European versus mainly non-European descent

- A ethnocentrism
- B settlement
- C civilization
- D mestizaje**

(6) What was the basic feature of colonial education?

A teaching colonial children of color to see the metropole (European mother country) as their source of identity: their cultural home, origin, and center

- B mestizaje
- C teaching colonial white children to see the colony (not the European mother country) as their source of identity: their cultural home, origin, and center
- D settlement

(7) Decolonization in Africa and the Caribbean occurred between ____ and ____.

- A 1901, 1960
- B 1901, 1990
- C 1951, 1960
- D 1951, 1990**

(8) Name the principal European ex-colonial powers in Africa:

- A France and Algeria
- B Britain and Australia
- C Britain and France**
- D France and Australia

(9) _____: a political community (a national state like France, the U.S., or Mexico).

A polity

B hegemony

C reflexivity

D whitening

(10) The U.S., like many other former European colonies dominated by whites, inherited and developed this linkage between civilization and race: to be civilized was to be _____.

A white

B male

C wealthy

D educated

Chapter 5 Quiz

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

Chapter 5 Quiz (correct answers in bold)

(1) Like modern slavery, the modern concept of race sprang from these first sustained trading encounters of _____ with Africa.

A England

B Spain

C Portugal

D the United States

(2) European plantation agriculture in the Americas would drag 12.5 million Africans across the Atlantic by the latter 1800s. This hellish transport inside suffocating, stinking slave ships became known as the _____.

A Great Famine

B Middle Passage

C Destruction of the Indies

D Trail of Tears

(3) Africans taken to the Americas and Europe collectively formed the _____ (literally, “dispersal of seeds”).

A African Diaspora

B Destruction of the Indies

C Middle Passage

D Trail of Tears

(4) _____ were the main New World destinations of enslaved Africans. During slavery, _____ alone received eleven times as many as North America (4,143,600 vs. 378,000).

A The Caribbean, Brazil, Europe, and North America; Europe

B The Caribbean, Brazil, the Spanish mainland, and North America; the Caribbean

C The Caribbean, Brazil, the Spanish mainland, and North America; Peru

D The Caribbean, Brazil, the Spanish mainland, and North America; Europe

(5) This “white or black,” either-or racial system is called _____, with any bit of nonwhite ancestry theoretically sufficient to make you nonwhite.

A whiteness by decency

B mestizaje

C social whiteness

D the one-drop rule

(6) The Constitution’s _____ Clause: this proportion of slaves would be included in state population totals. The formula reflected delegates’ judgment that slaves were less efficient producers of wealth than free people, not that they were partly human and partly property.

A One-Fifth

B Two-Fifths

C Three-Fifths

D Four-Fifths

(7) The Constitution distinguished between “persons” and “citizens.” All persons inhabiting the United States comprised, in some vague sense, *the people* who were sovereign in a republic. But only *citizens* voted; only citizens fully possessed the rights enumerated in the Constitution’s first ten amendments (Bill of Rights). Which groups were persons, not citizens?

A Catholics and Protestants

B White men and black slaves

C White men and Indians

D White women and black slaves

(8) Which of the following U.S. presidents was not a slaveholder?

A Washington

B Lincoln

C Jefferson

D Jackson

(9) _____: a northern version of 1800s white nationalism, seeking to prevent economic competition with enslaved southern blacks (e.g., in agriculture) or free northern blacks (e.g., jobs). For example: “Keep Ohio white.”

A one-drop rule

B free labor ideology

C Three-Fifths Clause

D Monticello

(10) _____ : northern state laws denying that the Bill of Rights applied to African Americans. A version of 1800s white nationalism. Ohio passed its first of these laws in 1804.

A Free Laws

B White Laws

C Indian Laws

D Black Laws

Chapter 6 Quiz

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

Chapter 6 Quiz (correct answers in bold)

(1) Two major reasons why people immigrate are _____ (violence or persecution, natural disasters such as famine or disease), and _____ (social structural constraints on life chances).

A adventure; unlimited opportunity

B insecurity; adventure

C insecurity; limited opportunity

D limited opportunity; adventure

(2) _____: organized political opposition to immigration. Arises from fears of the native-born that immigrants are worsening the nation or local community

A melting pot

B nativism

C manifest destiny

D proletariat

(3) George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, John D. Rockefeller, Thomas Edison, Henry Ford, Franklin D. Roosevelt: the racialized cultural identity of all these people is...

A White Anglo-Saxon Protestant

B White Celtic Catholic

C White Mexican Catholic

D White American Catholic

(4) The new Americans (1830-1860) came almost entirely from northwestern Europe, principally...

- A Ireland, Mexico, England
- B Ireland, Germany, Mexico
- C France, Germany, England
- D Ireland, Germany, England**

(5) By 1850, native-born Americans with widely divergent outlooks and major disagreements on a range of issues were ready to blame their various grievances on foreign influences in American life. This nativist base supported the anti-immigrant “American Party” (aka _____).

- A “Democratic Party”
- B “Whig Party”
- C “Free Soil Party”
- D “Know Nothing Party”**

(6) After the 1846-48 Mexican War and 1853 Gadsden Purchase, the U.S. possessed the _____—a vast western region with centuries of European (Spanish) colonization since the 1500s.

- A Mexican Cession**
- B Oregon Country
- C Louisiana Purchase
- D Texas Republic

(7) By 1880, the new European immigrant-sending regions in _____ Europe were increasingly unfamiliar to native Americans and older immigrants.

- A southern and western
- B northern and eastern
- C southern and eastern**
- D northern and western

(8) Chinese Exclusion Act: _____ federal law in which Congress suspended the immigration and naturalization of Chinese, mostly

manual laborers. An example of anti-Asian immigration policies (versions of white nationalism) in effect until 1965.

A 1882

B 1902

C 1922

D 1942

(9) World War II _____ internment camps: The U.S. Army's forcible removal from their homes and prolonged detention of virtually all Americans of this ancestry, from 1942 to 1946.

A Korean American

B Vietnamese American

C Chinese American

D Japanese American

(10) Whereas white ethnics (1930-1965) increasingly crossed the color line, achieving political power and urban and suburban integration in housing and schools, _____ and _____ (like African Americans) endured continuing political exclusion and racial segregation.

A Italians; Jews

B Jews; East Asians

C Mexicans; East Asians

D Mexicans; Jews

Chapter 7 Quiz

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

Chapter 7 Quiz (correct answers in bold)

(1) _____: different social groups experience the world in overlapping yet distinctive ways.

A whiteness by inspection

B social whiteness

C the social construction of reality

D whiteness by decency

(2) “Western Europeans invented race to explain and justify global colonization: first to themselves, then to colonized others.” This statement is an example of...

A social whiteness

B the social construction of race

C legal whiteness

D reflexivity

(3) Like older “us-them” distinctions, race emerged as a(n) _____ concept. Europeans (1500s) proposed a world hierarchy of peoples, with themselves at the top.

A unreal

B decency

C relational

D unimportant

(4) “The assumption that America was meant to be a homogeneous white nation, inhabited chiefly by members of the Anglo-Saxon and closely related ‘races,’ was strongly established by

the time the Constitution went into effect. One of its most dramatic manifestations was the passage of a _____law by Congress in 1790 which expressly limited the acquisition of citizenship to white immigrants.”

A naturalization

B tax

C voting

D inheritance

(5) Even if groups attained _____, like Mexican Americans after 1848, _____ often remained elusive.

A legal whiteness; social whiteness

B social construction of race; social whiteness

C legal whiteness; social construction of race

D whiteness by decency; legal whiteness

(6) _____: whiteness is an impersonal, visual, inspectable characteristic, based on “purity” of ancestry. You know it when you see it.

A legal whiteness

B whiteness by inspection

C whiteness by decency

D reflexivity

(7) _____: whiteness is a personalized, social characteristic, based on membership in a “decent” family. You often know it when you see it, but it also greatly depends on contextual factors of wealth, social reputation, and education.

A legal whiteness

B whiteness by inspection

C whiteness by decency

D reflexivity

(8) _____: the social process of established whites increasingly accepting a racialized group as “white” (or “American”).

Such groups included Jews, Germans, Irish, Italians, Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Greeks, Russians.

A white privilege

B reflexivity

C civic nationalism

D whitening

(9) _____: unearned social, economic, and political benefits accruing to whites but denied to nonwhites, especially blacks.

A white privilege

B reflexivity

C civic nationalism

D whitening

(10) whitening (two versions): (1) A social process of immigrant assimilation into an established white group. (2) A social process in which a _____group becomes _____by intermarrying with them.

A lighter-skinned; darker-skinned

B darker-skinned; lighter-skinned

C civic; ethnic

D ethnic; civic

Chapter 8 Quiz

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

Chapter 8 Quiz (correct answers in bold)

(1) For decades, the consensus among professional historians has been that, if assigned to any one single cause, the Civil War was caused by...

- A states' rights
- B territorial expansion
- C slavery**
- D immigration

(2) By 1860, cotton production made _____ the single most valuable financial asset in the United States—greater in dollar value than all of America's banks, railroads, and manufacturing combined.

- A textiles
- B agriculture
- C the cotton gin
- D slaves**

(3) Reconstruction (_____) featured the nation's first attempts to incorporate African Americans as a group into the federal- and state-level political communities on an equal basis with whites.

- A 1830-60
- B 1861-65
- C 1865-77**
- D 1877-1900

(4) _____ citizenship refers to one's legal status as a citizen

of the United States, whereas citizenship is one's additional legal status as citizen of a particular state (e.g., Ohio, Alabama, California).

- A State; federal
- B Territorial; state
- C Territorial; federal
- D Federal; state**

(5) Which of the following is NOT an example of Reconstruction-era federal Civil Rights legislation by Congress?

- A Thirteenth Amendment (1865)
- B Freedman's Bureau (1865)
- C Fourteenth Amendment (1868)
- D U.S. v. Cruikshank (1876)**

(6) Which of the following contributed to ending Reconstruction's racially egalitarian policies, rather than promoting them?

- A Fourteenth Amendment (1868)
- B The Enforcement Acts (1870-71)
- C Civil Rights Act (1875)
- D Civil Rights Cases (1883)**

(7) _____: a form of unofficial slavery in which creditors coerce or entrap a social group in debt for generations. E.g., sharecropping in the post-Civil War South.

- A convict leasing
- B white terrorism
- C debt slavery**
- D apartheid

(8) _____ is a legal phrase meaning "by law, officially, in theory." By contrast, _____ is a legal phrase meaning "in fact, in practice."

- A DeNiro; de novo
- B De jure; de facto**
- C De facto; de jure
- D De novo; DeNiro

(9) _____: racial segregation, either de jure or de facto.

A convict leasing

B apartheid

C debt slavery

D white terrorism

(10) Federal action supporting the modern Civil Rights movement extended from _____ to _____.

A 1877-1954

B 1919-1944

C 1944-1972

D 1954-1965

Chapter 9 Quiz

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

Chapter 9 Quiz (correct answers in bold)

(1) _____: a community of nonwhites excluded (formally or informally) from neighboring white areas. Until 1900, this term referred to segregated Jewish areas of European cities.

- A apartheid
- B enclave
- C neighborhood
- D ghetto**

(2) Most contemporary professional social scientists of race discuss not only breaks (post-1968) with American apartheid, but also continuities. Racial injustice has not simply been overcome, but rather has been _____.

- A defeated
- B broken
- C ongoing**
- D ended

(3) According to Klinkner and Smith, three parallels between the post-Reconstruction (1877) era and post-Civil Rights (1968) era are:

A rise of colorblindness as government policy; rise of white fear of “criminality” of racial minorities; disempowerment of black voting

- B rise of colorblindness as government policy; empowerment of black voting; calls for immigration restriction
- C decline of colorblindness as government policy; decline of white

fear of “criminality” of racial minorities; empowerment of black voting

D decline of colorblindness as government policy; empowerment of black voting; calls for immigration restriction

(4) _____: the political claim (as in Brazil, South Africa, and U.S.) that society no longer faces serious problems of racial discrimination, and that policies explicitly designed to benefit nonwhites are unnecessary and/or harmful.

A apartheid

B ideology

C affirmative action

D colorblindness

(5) _____: a color-blind ideology (especially 1930-1990) emphasizing shared Brazilian national identity and claiming the absence of racism in Brazil.

A racial democracy

B affirmative action

C apartheid

D principles/policy paradox

(6) _____: the likelihood of social well-being. Key indices include income and wealth, occupational prestige, level of education, mental and physical health (e.g., infant mortality, life expectancy), quality and location of housing, relation to criminal justice, political representation, social mobility.

A colorblindness

B life chances

C racial democracy

D apartheid

(7) _____: the survey research finding that, after 1970, most white Americans have increasingly held abstract racially egalitarian

principles, while simultaneously opposing concrete public policy that would promote such principles

A principles/policy paradox

B racial democracy

C life chances

D colorblindness

(8) _____: extreme residential segregation by race, as in cities in which most whites and most blacks live in different neighborhoods (e.g., whites in suburbs and blacks in the inner city).

A hyper-segregation

B racial democracy

C affirmative action

D principles/policy paradox

(9) According to Telles and Ortiz (2008), the large differences between black and white wealth can be largely attributed to _____ discrimination.

A immigration

B voting

C housing

D tax

(10) According to survey researchers, the principles/policy paradox is that color-blind equality (what whites _____) has—ever since the Civil War—usually been promoted in U.S. history by federal intervention in state and local affairs (what many whites _____).

A oppose support

B support; oppose

C decline; support

D support; desire

Chapter 10 Quiz

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

Chapter 10 Quiz (correct answers in bold)

(1) _____: also known as systemic racism. Institutional normalization of whiteness. This is a feature of social institutions treating white perspectives as the norm (standard, default), while treating nonwhite perspectives as deviant or problematic.

- A apartheid
- B individual prejudice
- C psychological bias
- D white normativity**

(2) According to Chapter 10, two present-day obstacles to genuine (versus rhetorical) African American inclusion are _____ and _____.

- A racial democracy; de jure segregation
- B white normativity; de facto segregation**
- C racial democracy; de facto segregation
- D white normativity; de jure segregation

(3) White-normed institutions tend to produce racially disparate outcomes, with better _____ outcomes than _____ ones across many social and economic measures of well-being.

- A white; nonwhite**
- B nonwhite; white
- C male; female
- D female; male

(4) Why is right-handed normativity a useful analogy for white normativity?

A It doesn't depend on left-handers displaying any prejudicial intent toward righties.

B It depends on right-handers displaying prejudicial intent toward lefties.

C It doesn't depend on right-handers displaying any prejudicial intent toward lefties.

D It depends on left-handers displaying prejudicial intent toward righties.

(5) Though federal law barred housing discrimination in 1968 (Fair Housing Act), _____ segregation remained a fundamental obstacle in the early twenty-first century to social, economic, and political opportunities for African Americans.

A de facto

B de novo

C de jure

D ex nihilo

(6) By 1970, ___% of black Americans lived in urban areas.

A 97

B 80

C 50

D 27

(7)_____: federal rules against racial discrimination in housing markets.

A de facto segregation

B ghetto

C open housing

D de jure segregation

(8) Racial disparities in _____ quality and funding are exacerbated by _____ segregation. This is because public school

district funding is based on local real estate values and property taxes. Poor communities in the U.S. usually don't have access to well-funded education, and blacks are much more likely to be poor than are whites.

A school; racial democracy

B school; housing

C housing; racial democracy

D housing; charter

(9) In _____(1974), the Supreme Court, though continuing to oppose de jure school segregation, effectively upheld de facto educational segregation:

A *U.S. v. Cruikshank*

B *Brown v. Board of Education*

C *Terry v. Ohio*

D *Milliken v. Bradley*

(10) _____: the disparities in test scores, grade point averages, and/or high school and college completion rates between white students and black and/or Latina/o students.

A gender pay gap

B racial continuum

C gender continuum

D racial achievement gap

Chapter 11 Quiz

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

Chapter 11 Quiz (correct answers in bold)

(1) The timeline (Table 11.1), spanning ____ years, illustrates not only breaks with apartheid but also continuities.

- A 5
- B 25
- C 50**
- D 70

(2) 2014. Tamir Rice, a black 12-year-old boy, dies after being shot by police while playing with a toy gun in a park near his home in Cleveland, Ohio. This event illustrates:

- A apartheid
- B racialized police abuse**
- C federal retreat from civil rights advances
- D racial democracy

(3) Which demographic measures indicate significant ongoing social distance between blacks and whites?

- A low intermarriage; low residential segregation
- B high intermarriage; low residential segregation
- C low intermarriage; high residential segregation**
- D high intermarriage; high residential segregation

(4) _____: the lived experience of many people of color (and colonized peoples worldwide) of seeing themselves simultaneously from two perspectives, nonwhite and white.

- A racial democracy

- B white normalization
- C mass incarceration
- D double consciousness**

(5) The 1976 Detroit Area Survey (and other later surveys) found that blacks and whites largely _____ on the meaning of racial “integration.”

- A disagree**
- B compromise
- C agree
- D fixate

(6) Whereas alternative styles of policing promote good relations with marginalized community members, _____ emphasizes violence and repression akin to military occupation of a conquered population.

- A rehabilitative policing
- B police duty
- C police abuse**
- D community policing

(7) _____: black and brown people in public places (e.g., walking, shopping, driving cars) are stopped, questioned, and searched far more frequently than are whites.

- A rehabilitative policing
- B racial profiling**
- C gender profiling
- D community policing

(8) In 2010, _____ were seven times more likely than _____ and two and a half times more likely than Hispanic men to be incarcerated.

- A white men; black men
- B black men; white men**
- C white women; black women

D black women; white women

(9) _____: largely unconscious anti-black racism; it has been especially damaging in associating black males with “inherent” criminality.

A colorblindness

B explicit racial bias

C white normativity

D implicit racial bias

(10) In healthcare, black and brown patients are systematically _____ for pain.

A overtreated

B attended to

C undertreated

D listened to

Chapter 12 Quiz

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

Chapter 12 Quiz (correct answers in bold)

(1) _____ : the political policy or doctrine of imperial expansion, pertaining to an empire. Although the U.S. has never been an empire, its geographical expansion resembled in important respects European imperial expansion and colonialism.

A state

B imperialism

C territory

D white nationalism

(2) Whereas a _____ is a U.S. administrative region in which residents possess federal citizenship but lack state citizenship, a _____ is a U.S. administrative region in which residents possess both state and federal citizenship.

A state; territory

B colony; territory

C territory; state

D territory; colony

(3) Which statement best expresses the historical link between U.S. statehood and white nationalism?

A Territories that achieved statehood had a nonwhite population sufficiently powerful to counter the political influence of resident whites

B States that achieved territory status had a nonwhite population sufficiently powerful to counter the political influence of resident whites

C Territories that achieved statehood had a white population sufficiently powerful to counter the political influence of resident nonwhites

D States that achieved territory status had a white population sufficiently powerful to counter the political influence of resident nonwhites

(4) _____: a nationalist ideology stating that the U.S., unlike most other nations, has usually been a force for good in the world.

A manifest destiny

B American exceptionalism

C imperialism

D white nationalism

(5) _____: a nationalist ideology claiming God's intention was that U.S. whites expand across the North American continent.

A manifest destiny

B American exceptionalism

C imperialism

D white nationalism

(6) Which statement best expresses the link between U.S. imperialism and manifest destiny?

A American exceptionalism provided no rationale for territorial expansion

B Manifest destiny provided a political and ideological rationale for territorial expansion

C Manifest destiny provided no rationale for territorial expansion

D Manifest destiny provided a political and ideological rationale for racial equality

(7) What is the significance of the Spanish-American War (1898)?

A it was the only nineteenth-century war the U.S. lost

B it made the U.S. a declining power in a world increasingly dominated by the Spanish Empire

C it was the only nineteenth-century war the U.S. won

D it made the U.S. an imperial power in a world increasingly dominated by great empires

(8) List three examples of U.S. imperialism in the period 1865-1914.

A United States loses Alaska and Midway (1867); Pro-U.S. interests stage unsuccessful coup against Queen Lili'uokalani of Hawai'i (1893); Mexican troops invade U.S. (1914)

B United States acquires Alaska and Midway (1867); Pro-U.S. interests stage successful coup against Queen Lili'uokalani of Hawai'i (1903); U.S. troops invade Mexico at Veracruz (1930)

C United States acquires Alaska and Midway (1867); Pro-U.S. interests stage successful coup against Queen Lili'uokalani of Hawai'i (1893); U.S. troops invade Mexico at Veracruz (1914)

D United States loses Alaska and Midway (1867); Pro-U.S. interests stage successful coup against Queen Lili'uokalani of Hawai'i (1903); U.S. troops invade Mexico at Veracruz (1930)

(9) Whereas _____ involved the U.S. sending troops and influencing national policy through force or the threat of force, _____ took the form of capitalist economic penetration benefiting U.S. interests and local elites but tending in the long run to harm most local people.

A white grievance; manifest destiny

B economic imperialism; military imperialism

C manifest destiny; white grievance

D military imperialism; economic imperialism

(10) _____: a racial group resentment reflected in politics, in which whites see themselves (rather than nonwhites) as the true victims in race relations.

A manifest destiny

B white grievance

C American exceptionalism

D imperialism

Chapter 13 Quiz

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

Chapter 13 Quiz (correct answers in bold)

(1) _____: since 1945, the U.S. has been the predominant military, economic, cultural, and ideological power in the world, with global commitments, relationships, and interests

A sexenio

B American globalism

C U.S. interventionism

D NAFTA

(2) Three examples of U.S. intervention in Latin America (1945-1989) are...

A Colombia (1934); Haiti (1971); Argentina (1983)

B Guatemala (1934); Cuba (1971); Chile (1983)

C Colombia (1954); Haiti (1961); Argentina (1973)

D Guatemala (1954); Cuba (1961); Chile (1973)

(3) In _____, Latinos moved past African Americans to become the second largest ethnic or racial group in the nation (after non-Hispanic whites).

A 1963

B 2013

C 1983

D 2003

(4) After _____ (126 million in 2020), the U.S. Hispanic population is today the world's _____, _____ than the total population of

countries such as Colombia (48 million in 2018), Argentina (45 million in 2020), or Peru (31 million in 2017).

A Spain; largest; bigger

B Mexico; largest; bigger

C Spain; smallest; smaller

D Mexico; smallest; smaller

(5) The U.S.-Mexico relationship has, since at least the U.S. invasion of Mexico in _____, been marked by U.S. geographical expansion and increasingly global power.

A 1846

B 1946

C 1898

D 1998

(6) The six Mexican states bordering the U.S. are: _____, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas.

A Jalisco

B Morelos

C Baja California

D Oaxaca

(7) NAFTA: the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement was a policy victory for Mexican president _____ (1988-1994). The commercial treaty significantly increased Canada-U.S.-Mexico economic links, despite economically harming many rural Mexicans.

A Zedillo

B Fox

C Calderón

D Salinas

(8) Chicanos: the 1960s-70s saw the rise of political empowerment of this group. The term Chicano, associated with this movement, refers to _____.

A Puerto Ricans

B Honduran Americans

C Mexican Americans

D Cuban Americans

(9) America's love-hate relationship with Mexican labor: U.S. economic history alternates between _____ and _____. In good times, employers pursue profits by encouraging low-wage immigrant (e.g., Mexican) labor. In hard times (recession), native labor increasingly competes with (Mexican) immigrant labor, fueling nativist hostility to immigration.

A boom; bust

B stock; bond

C capital; labor

D depression; recession

(10) new immigration: large-scale immigration since _____, primarily from _____ world regions such as Latin America, Asia, and Africa. For example, Mexicans, Cubans, Salvadorans, Indians, Koreans, Nigerians, Somalis.

A 1945; non-European

B 1985; European

C 2005; European

D 1965; non-European