Latin America and Antarctica: History and Politics between the Second World War and the Antarctic Treaty, 1945-1959

Abstract

This research examines the evolution of Uruguay's relationship with the Antarctic continent from the end of the Second World War to the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959. This period was characterized by a transition from commercial interests in maritime logistics support and whaling to an emerging geopolitical awareness amid early Cold War tensions in the South Atlantic. It is considered the complex diplomatic scenario in the Southern Cone, characterized by overlapping sovereignty claims among Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom, and by the "Antarctic struggle" arising from these disputes, highlighting the Uruguayan's diplomatic position, balancing its alignment with U.S. Pan-Americanism against regional pressures, particularly from Perón´s government in Argentina, which wanted support for its anti-imperialist and territorial agendas.

A central focus is pointed on the development of a national Antarctic doctrine, spearheaded by Navy Captain Carlos Travieso, detailing his theoretical formulation of an “Uruguayan Antarctica"—specifically, his proposal to claim the sector between 20°W and 25°W— and the establishment of a meteorological station on Bouvet Island to assert rights under the Atlantic projection. These initiatives, aimed at preventing the region from becoming a "springboard for attack" against the hemisphere, often clashed with the government's cautious and hesitant posture.

The research also analyzes the strategic role of the Port of Montevideo as a logistical hub, serving as a critical gateway for Norwegian and British fleets and, later, for the Soviet whaling fleet (notably the Slava), which raised alarms within U.S. intelligence agencies about the communist influence in the region. Furthermore, the paper documents the first direct Uruguayan experiences in the Antarctic territory during the late 1950s. This includes Navy officers invited to join Argentine campaigns, journalists documenting the Antarctic region for the public, and meteorologist Juan Mario Nantes, who overwintered twice at the British Base F (Faraday).

The paper concludes that, although domestic economic crises and diplomatic indecision prevented Uruguay from becoming an original signatory to the Antarctic Treaty, the intellectual debates and individual activities coming from this decade laid the necessary foundations for the country’s future institutional integration into the Antarctic System.

Giovannina Sutherland Condorelli is a lawyer and PhD candidate in Law at the University of Chile. She is a doctoral student at the Millennium Biodiversity Institute of Antarctic and Sub-Antarctic Ecosystems and Associate Researcher at the Millennium Nucleus on the Impacts of China in Latin America and the Caribbean (ICLAC).

Abstract

In 1956, India proposed including the so-called “The Question of Antarctica” on the agenda of the 11th Session of the United Nations General Assembly to promote the internationalization of the Antarctic Continent. This initiative could have opened the possibility of debating legal regimes contrary to existing claims of sovereign rights, such as trusteeship and the Common Heritage of Mankind, thereby placing States that had already advanced territorial claims—such as Chile, which delimited its Chilean Antarctic Territory in 1940—in a complex position that prompted the design of a diplomatic strategy. In this context, the figure of Miguel Serrano assumes relevance. In his capacity as Chile’s Chargé d’Affaires in India—subsequently appointed as Chile’s first ambassador to that country—he undertook diplomatic efforts that enabled direct communication with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, resulting in India’s decision to withdraw the proposal during that period. Over time, this episode has been subject to various forms of mythmaking, particularly regarding the circumstances under which the meeting with Nehru allegedly took place, in contrast to the unsuccessful efforts undertaken by other diplomatic representatives, such as the Argentine ambassador, Vicente Fatone, and the United States representative, Sherman Cooper.

Methodologically, the study combines a critical review of specialized scholarship—including contributions by Chilean authors such as Oscar Pinochet de la Barra, Pablo Mancilla, Mauricio Jara, and Oscar Barrientos, as well as foreign authors such as Adrian Howkins, Chaturvedi Sanjay, and Klaus Dodds—with an analysis of official documentation from Chile’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This approach enables historiographical narratives to be contrasted with contemporaneous diplomatic records, thereby contributing to a more precise understanding of Miguel Serrano’s role and Chilean diplomatic practice at a moment now regarded as pivotal to the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959.

Law degree from the Marta Abreu Central University of Las Villas (Cuba) in 2006. Master's degree in Public International Law from the University of Havana (Cuba) in 2009. University professor (2006-2022) in the Law program at the University of Sancti Spíritus “José Martí Pérez” (Cuba), senior professor of Public International Law, and head of the International Law Department. 
In 2022, she began her doctorate at the Faculty of Law of the University of Chile. She is currently working on her research thesis entitled “The legal protection of Antarctic marine biodiversity in the Antarctic Treaty System, as well as in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and treaties adopted within the framework of the International Maritime Organization,” under the supervision of Professor Luis Valentín Ferrada. She is a fellow at the Millennium Institute for Biodiversity of Antarctic and Sub-Antarctic Ecosystems.

Abstract

The determination of maritime spaces has been one of the most contentious issues in international law of the sea throughout the twentieth century, particularly in the Latin American context. Between 1945 and 1959, several States in the region promoted a profound revision of the classical maritime regime, challenging the traditional three-mile rule and advancing unilateral extensions of sovereignty and jurisdiction over extensive ocean areas, most notably through the proclamation of the 200 nautical mile zone. These initiatives, embodied in unilateral declarations and regional agreements such as the 1952 Santiago Declaration, generated diplomatic tensions with traditional maritime powers and underscored the absence of an international consensus regarding the delimitation of maritime spaces.

Against this background of legal instability and latent conflict surrounding maritime delimitation, the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 unfolded in parallel. Antarctica, far from constituting a legally isolated space, was marked by overlapping territorial claims and implicit maritime projections capable of reproducing, and potentially intensifying, the conflicts observed in other regions of the world. In response to this scenario, the States negotiating the Antarctic Treaty adopted a prudent and strategic approach: they avoided any express definition of Antarctic maritime spaces and froze sovereignty claims through Article IV of the Treaty.

This paper argues that latin american conflicts over the determination of maritime spaces functioned as an empirical reference for the disputes that the negotiating States of the Antarctic Treaty sought to prevent from being transferred to the southern continent. The controversies arising from unilateral extensions of sovereignty and the persistent lack of international consensus revealed the risks inherent in projecting jurisdictional conflicts onto strategically sensitive spaces. Accordingly, these experiences contributed to the decision, during the negotiation period, to exclude any express definition of Antarctic maritime spaces and to freeze sovereignty claims under Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. This omission should not be understood as a regulatory vacuum, but rather as a preventive strategy aimed at preserving international stability and ensuring the peaceful and cooperative use of Antarctica, thereby reaffirming the role of international law as a mechanism for conflict management and containment.

Bios

Abstract

Este artículo analiza la configuración política, jurídica y sociopolítica de la Antártida entre el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y la firma del Tratado Antártico de 1959, desde una lectura situada en el Cono Sur. Frente a las narrativas historiográficas dominantes que presentan el Tratado Antártico como el acto fundacional de un régimen excepcional basado en la ciencia y la paz, el trabajo sostiene que dicho instrumento jurídico constituyó la institucionalización de un equilibrio previamente construido mediante prácticas estatales, civiles y científicas desarrolladas con particular intensidad durante la década de 1950.

El estudio adopta un enfoque histórico-crítico con énfasis jurídico, integrando aportes de la historiografía argentina, chilena y anglosajona, y otorgando centralidad a las naciones del Cono Sur. Desde esta perspectiva, la década de 1950 es conceptualizada como un período bisagra en el que los Estados del Cono Sur debieron redefinir sus estrategias antárticas en un contexto marcado por la posguerra, la Guerra Fría y la superposición de reclamos de soberanía en la Península Antártica.

El artículo examina la relevancia jurídica y política de la presencia humana como forma de ocupación efectiva y normalización territorial. En este marco, se analizan las políticas impulsadas por la Argentina orientadas a la instalación de bases permanentes, servicios civiles, educación y vida familiar, interpretadas como intentos deliberados de reducir la excepcionalidad antártica y reforzar la legitimidad de la presencia estatal continua. Acciones que evidencia que la política antártica argentina no solo se expresó mediante actos materiales, sino también a través de un discurso soberano dirigido a la comunidad internacional.

Asimismo, el trabajo revisa críticamente el papel del Año Geofísico Internacional (1957–1958), entendido no solo como un hito de cooperación científica, sino también como un mecanismo de legitimación de la presencia estatal en un espacio jurídicamente disputado, donde la ciencia operó como un lenguaje políticamente aceptable de poder.

Un aporte central del artículo es la incorporación del análisis del surgimiento temprano del turismo antártico argentino, impulsado por el Estado a partir de 1958 mediante el buque Les Éclaireurs. Este fenómeno es interpretado como una forma de poder blando y normalización territorial que amplió el repertorio de prácticas legítimas de acceso al continente y contribuyó a humanizar la Antártida más allá de su carácter exclusivamente científico o estratégico.

Finalmente, el artículo concluye que el Tratado Antártico debe ser comprendido como el resultado normativo de un proceso histórico previo, en el cual la presencia humana, el discurso soberano, la ciencia como herramienta política y el acceso civil desempeñaron un rol clave en la construcción del status quo antártico.

Bio

Ignacio is a Researcher at the International Relations Research Centre of the University of São Paulo (NUPRI/USP). He holds a PhD in International Relations from King’s College London and the University of São Paulo, and has held academic positions at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru, the University of São Paulo, the National University of Tierra del Fuego, the National University of Patagonia San Juan Bosco, and the University of Buenos Aires. His research focuses on epistemology and methodology in the social sciences, political theory, international security, and Antarctic politics. He has published extensively on Antarctic governance and policy, including The Antarctic Politics of Brazil: Where the Tropic Meets the Pole (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), contributions to the Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica (Edward Elgar, 2017), and Colonialism and Antarctica (Manchester University Press, 2025).

Abstract

The International Geophysical Year (IGY, 1957–1958) was officially presented as a non-political scientific enterprise, intended to promote global cooperation and to transcend the ideological divisions of the Cold War. Nowhere was this aspiration more visible—or more problematic—than in Antarctica. Despite the rhetoric of scientific neutrality, science and politics were already so deeply intertwined that the ideal of a strictly apolitical Antarctic programme proved untenable. This paper examines how these tensions became explicit during the Antarctic Conferences convened by the Comité Spécial de l’Année Géophysique Internationale (CSAGI) between 1955 and 1957, and highlights the distinctive role played by Argentina and Chile in politicizing discussions that were formally framed as technical and scientific. The CSAGI Antarctic Conferences were designed to coordinate scientific activities in one of the least studied regions of the world, including the allocation of research tasks, the establishment of research stations, and logistical cooperation. However, for claimant states such as Argentina and Chile, these apparently technical decisions carried clear political implications, particularly with regard to sovereignty claims, physical presence, and international recognition. From the outset, both countries chose to involve diplomats directly in the Antarctic Conferences rather than delegating participation exclusively to scientists, and consistently raised concerns about the political repercussions of scientific activities conducted in their claimed sectors. This approach was initially met with discomfort and, in some cases, open disapproval by other participants, particularly within the CSAGI Secretariat, which regarded diplomatic interventions as inappropriate in what was conceived as a scientific forum. However, the dynamics of the conferences changed significantly following the Soviet Union’s declaration that it would join the Antarctic programme. This development made it increasingly difficult to sustain the fiction of a purely technical Antarctic science and forced other delegations to acknowledge the political stakes involved. As a result, participants gradually adapted to a hybrid mode of negotiation in which scientific coordination and diplomatic considerations coexisted. Several outcomes of the Antarctic Conferences were therefore political in nature, even when they continued to be framed in ostensibly technical terms. This case study demonstrates that so-called “small powers” can exert meaningful influence in international discussions by strategically reframing the terms of debate and by exploiting contextual shifts in the broader international environment. At the same time, it shows that such influence is contingent: the effectiveness of Argentina’s and Chile’s interventions depended on specific geopolitical developments that rendered their concerns salient to other actors. In this sense, the Antarctic Conferences of the CSAGI constitute a revealing precursor to the political compromises that would later crystallize in the Antarctic Treaty system.

Bio

Pablo is a B.A. thesis candidate in Political Science at the National University of Mar del Plata (UNMdP). He is also: researcher at the Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI), the Centre for Strategic Studies in International Relations (CEERI) and the Ibero-American Centre for International Studies (CIBEI); adjunct professor of Contemporary International Politics and Argentine Foreign Policy in the Bachelor of Political Science programme (UNMdP). 

Abstract

This paper examines how Hernán Pujato’s strategic vision in the 1949–1955 period conditioned the core features of Argentina’s contemporary Antarctic geopolitics. His project articulated three vectors: (i) the institutionalization of science with the creation of the Argentine Antarctic Institute in 1951, which welded science and foreign policy; (ii) logistics and permanent occupation through the founding of General San Martín Base that same year, inaugurating a model of sustained operational projection; and (iii) a vocation for civilian settlement, epitomized in his idea of an “Antarctica occupied by peoples with men and women,” accompanied by early investigations into the feasibility of cultivation (soil-based and hydroponic) to sustain life on the continent. On the diplomatic plane, his initiatives unfolded amid friction with the United Kingdom -with episodes such as Hope Bay in 1952-which consolidated a diplomacy of presence (bases, campaigns, and acts of affirmation) while foreshadowing the need for a multilateral legal regime that would crystallize in 1959. The hypothesis is that Pujato’s tripod -science, logistics, population- anchored a strategy of scientific occupation with sovereign projection whose lineaments continue to organize Argentina’s action: primacy of knowledge, operational continuity, and the aspiration to human rootedness as elements of power and legitimacy in Antarctica. In those years, a strategy emerged that still guides Argentina’s actions in Antarctica today. Science as a source of legitimacy, and human presence is a sign of national rootedness. Scientific work, supported by steady logistics, does more than produce knowledge and it builds prestige and influence within the Antarctic Treaty System. This helped Argentina secure full standing in the Antarctic forum, while also making Antarctica part of the national story, a place linked to Argentina’s identity, history, and culture.

Bio

Raphael Fernandes Vieira is a graduate researcher at the Institute of International Relations of the National University of La Plata (IRI-UNLP, Argentina). He currently serves as a researcher within the South Atlantic Department (IRI) and at the Laboratory of Public Policies regarding the Malvinas Question (Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales, UNLP). Fernandes Vieira is a former board member and past president of APECS-Brazil, a former member of the APECS International Council, and a current member of APECS Argentina. He has participated in numerous research groups across Argentina and Brazil and served as a member of the Brazilian delegation at the XXXV RAPAL (Meeting of Antarctic Administrators) held in Brasilia in 2024.

Abstract

The 1950s represented a seminal period of intense geopolitical deliberation within Brazil, fostering novel conceptualizations regarding the nation's strategic role during the early Cold War era, particularly concerning its projection over South America and the South Atlantic Ocean. The Escola Superior de Guerra (Superior War College) functioned as the intellectual epicentre for these ideas, contributing significantly to the architecture of both Brazilian domestic stability and foreign policy frameworks. Although Brazil’s formal accession to the Antarctic Treaty did not occur until 1975, political, academic, and scientific interest in the "White Continent" emerged substantially earlier. Once Antarctica was conceptualized as an integral component of Brazil’s sphere of influence and a decisive frontier element for national security, groups of scholars, military officers, and governmental authorities dedicated extensive efforts to articulating the imperative for a permanent Brazilian presence and active participation in the area. This research aims to critically address the internal debates and administrative reactions within the Brazilian state apparatus following the country’s non-participation in the 1959 Washington Conference on Antarctica, as well as the multifaceted consequences of this exclusion in subsequent years. The primary objective is to evaluate how Brazil’s absence from this foundational diplomatic event influenced and catalysed the development of a distinct Brazilian Antarctic thought in the following decades. Furthermore, the study examines the diplomatic complexity of pursuing national interests in the southern polar region without jeopardizing bilateral and multilateral relations with key regional and global actors, specifically Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom. To provide a comprehensive understanding of how the Antarctic continent was perceived through the lens of Brazilian geopolitical specialists during the mid-20th century, this work utilizes the foundational writings of Professor Therezinha de Castro, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, and General Carlos de Meira Mattos as primary analytical references. By synthesizing these perspectives, the study illuminates the historical trajectory of Brazil's polar ambitions and their lasting impact on contemporary South Atlantic geopolitics.